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ABSTRACT 
 
DEAN ACHESON AND THE TURKISH-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1945-1953 
 
Adam McConnel 
History Department, PhD Dissertation, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak 
 
Key Words:  Dean Acheson, Turkey, the United States, the Truman Doctrine, NATO  
The early Cold War historiography on Turkish-American relations has long been dominated 
by chronological narratives that explained post-WWII developments in relations between the 
two countries either through an ideological account, or through an attempt to identify which 
officials, usually on the U.S. side, pushed for and promoted closer ties between the two states.  
This dissertation, based on research performed in the U.S. National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland and the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, breaks 
with the traditional post-WWII historiography on Turkish-American relations by focusing on 
one official, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in order to provide a more comprehensive 
account of how Turkish-U.S. relations developed between 1945 and 1953.  Through 
concentration on Acheson’s life, character, career, and approach to diplomacy, this 
dissertation explores the decisions that Acheson took concerning U.S. relations with Turkey, 
and his interactions with Turkish officials, especially Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. 
Feridun Cemal Erkin.  Additionally, the text focuses on the postwar U.S. political and social 
context in order to provide a more complete examination of the factors which Secretary 
Acheson considered while formulating policies towards Turkey that eventually resulted in 
Turkish accession to NATO.  Ultimately, this thesis provides a new conceptual framework 
for post-WWII Turkish-U.S. events, and concludes that Acheson was the single most 
important U.S. official responsible for developments in post-WWII Turkish-American affairs.  
Furthermore, the U.S. Congress is identified as the single greatest impediment, on the U.S. 
side, to faster development in Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII.  
 
v 
 
ÖZET 
 
DEAN ACHESON VE TÜRK-AMERİKAN İTTİFAKI, 1945-1953 
 
Adam McConnel 
Tarih Doktora Programı 
 
Tez Yöneticisi:  Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Dean Acheson, Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Truman Doktrini, 
 NATO 
Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerine yazılan erken Soğuk Savaş tarih literatürü uzun zamandır 
kronolojik anlatıma dayalı metinlerin hâkimiyetinde olmuştur. Bu metinlerin büyük 
çoğunluğu, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türk-Amerikan münasebetlerindeki gelişmeleri ya 
ideolojik bir bakış açışıyla açıklamaya çalışmıştır ya da hangi resmi görevlilerin (çoğu zaman 
ABD tarafında) bu iki devlet arasında daha yakın ilişkiler kurulmasını istediği ve lehine 
çalıştığı üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu tez, ABD’nin Maryland eyaletinin College Park 
kasabasındaki devlet arşivlerinde ve Missouri eyaletinin Independence kasabasındaki Harry 
S. Truman Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kütüphanesi’nde yapılan araştırmalardan elde edilen yeni 
bilgilerle yazılmıştır. Ayrıca tez, Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerine yazılmış mevcut tarih 
literatüründen, bir resmi şahsa, ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Dean Acheson’a, odaklanmasıyla 
benzerlerinden ayrılıyor. Böylece 1945-1953 arasında Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerindeki 
gelişmeleri açıklayan daha kapsamlı bir anlatım sağlıyor. Tez, Acheson’un hayatı, şahsiyeti, 
kariyeri ve diplomasiye yaklaşımına odaklanırken, Acheson’un oluşturduğu Türk-Amerikan 
ilişkileri ile ilgili kararlarını anlamaya yönelik yeni bir yaklaşımı ortaya koyuyor. Ayrıca bu 
tez, Acheson ile dönemin ABD Türkiye Büyükelçisi Feridun Cemal Erkin arasındaki resmi 
görüşmeleri de ele alıyor. Böylece, bu tez ABD’nin II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası siyasal ve sosyal 
durumunu anlatırken, Dışişleri Bakanı Acheson’un kararlarını oluştururken göz önüne aldığı 
faktörlere ve Türkiye’nin NATO’ya katılmasıyla sonuçlanan sürece de daha kapsayıcı bir 
bakış sunuyor. Sonuç olarak tez hem II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri için  
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yeni bir çerçeve sunuyor, hem de Acheson’un bu ilişkilerin gelişmesinden sorumlu en önemli 
şahıs olduğunu ortaya koyuyor. Ayrıca tez II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türk-Amerikan 
ilişkilerinin hızlı gelişmesini engelleyen en önemli unsurun ABD Kongresi olduğunu da 
tespit ediyor. 
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1.0.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  It is always the case that the one who is not your friend will request your 
 neutrality, and the one who is your friend will request your armed support…. But 
 when you boldly declare your support for one side, then if that side conquers, even 
 though the victor is powerful and you are at his mercy, he is under an obligation to 
 you and he has committed himself to friendly ties with you….  But when such an 
 alliance cannot be avoided…  then the prince should support one side or another for 
 the reasons given above.  Then, no government should ever imagine that it can adopt a 
 safe course; rather, it should regard all possible courses of action as risky.  This is the 
 way things are…  Prudence consists in being able to assess the nature of a particular 
 threat and in accepting the lesser evil.1 
 
Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince has been an essential text for practitioners and students of 
politics since its publication in the early 16th century.  Despite the brevity of Machiavelli’s 
book, the controversies surrounding it have endured for the supposedly amoral behaviors that 
he recommends.  In actuality, the essence of the text is simple, that politicians act according 
to the realities of the situations that confront them, not according to preconceived ideals.  
This study concerns an American diplomatic and political figure who identified with that 
realist political tradition, and whose decisions gave shape to the world that exists today.  
Dean Acheson, who acted as Assistant Secretary of State from 1945 to 1947 and United 
States Secretary of State from 1949 to early 1953, more than any other person, even President 
Truman, had decisive roles in the formulation and implementation of the Truman Doctrine, 
the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and ultimately, the 
admission of the Turkish Republic to that ostensibly Western European alliance.  This thesis 
will define exactly what role Acheson played in what was, if considered according to 
contemporary conditions, a surprising development, the acceptance of the Turkish Republic 
                                                            
1
 Machiavelli, Niccolò.  The Prince.  George Bull, transl.  London:  Penguin Books, 2003.  p. 
73.  
2 
 
into the alliance that defined the Cold War’s dominant power bloc.  That decision was 
certainly fateful for the Turkish side.  Without considering other hypothetical results, Turkey 
was launched onto a new track of rapid cultural, economic, political, and social change, 
nearly as radical as the changes that had occurred in the 1920s.  Dean Acheson was more 
responsible for the U.S. decisions in the process that led to Turkish accession to NATO than 
any other U.S. official.      
 
1.1.  America Post-WWII 
 
The United States (U.S.), after WWII, confronted an unprecedented situation:  human 
history’s most potent and productive economy also possessed previously unseen military 
strength and a weapon capable of unimaginable devastation.  This strength was derived from 
the U.S.’ large and industrially-organized population, natural resources, and political and 
cultural system, which enabled the productive resources of the population and territory to 
create great wealth for the state and a large percentage of its citizens.  Industrialization, which 
started in Great Britain in the latter half of the 18th Century, had previously created new 
sources of economic, political, and military strength for the 19th Century British, French, and 
German states, and in the 20th Century, for Japan.  The fearful conflagrations of the early 20th 
Century, however, served to destroy much of those states’ power.  Those same disastrous 
wars pushed the U.S.’ productive capacities to new levels, resulting in enormous economic 
and military strength, as well as the political power that flowed from those capabilities.2 
The U.S. embarked on its industrialization process in the 19th Century, primarily after the 
Civil War destroyed the political power of the agrarian Southern states that had rebelled 
                                                            
2
 Kennedy, Paul.  The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:  Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500-2000.  New York:  Random House, 1987.  pp. 151-169, 182-191, 209-
215, 219-232, 242-249, 275-291, 303-320. 
3 
 
against the mercantile and already industrializing Northern states.  U.S. industrialization was 
largely completed by the end of the 19th Century, as the U.S. began to expand its power 
overseas.  In terms of economic production, the U.S. had no rival by 1914, but chose to 
largely withdraw from international affairs after WWI. After WWII, the U.S. faced no serious 
economic or military competitor, not even the one other Great Power that emerged from 
WWII with a semblance of economic and military strength, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).  Consequently, the U.S. leadership knew that they had asingular 
opportunity to reshape the world’s economy, politics, and power in hopes of creating a more 
stable and less violent global system that would be more likely to bring lasting prosperity to 
the world’s peoples.3 
Naturally, the degree of success that the U.S. leadership achieved in pursuing such a project 
has been the subject of countless studies over the past 60 years.  One thing does seem 
undeniable, however:  for better or for worse, the world system and essentially all human 
societies have been affected by the preponderance of U.S. strength since WWII, as well as by 
the international institutions (such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank) founded through U.S. efforts,  the vision of international economic 
relations that the U.S. promoted, and the cultural mentalities and items the U.S. exported to 
the world’s societies during the same period.      
 
1.2.  The Turkish Republic 
 
The Turkish Republic, founded in the early 1920s, was heir to the Ottoman state in most 
respects, and the problems confronting that new republic were largely the same as those that 
                                                            
3
 Kennedy pp. 242-249, 275-291, 327-333, 357-372; Leffler, Melvyn P.  A Preponderance of 
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.  Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1992.  p. 5. 
4 
 
had faced the extinguished Ottoman state.  The Ottoman political elite, by the end of the 18th 
Century, had begun to identify economic, military, and political reforms that seemed 
necessary to maintain military and political competition with European states.  The first 
Ottoman attempts to industrialize, for example, were actually carried out in the first decades 
of the 19th Century, but were largely unsuccessful.  By WWI, the Ottoman economy had 
achieved some minor successes in creating industrial enterprises, but was still almost totally 
dominated by agriculture.  The reasons for this continued dependence on agriculture were 
many and varied, but the result was that the Ottomans did not possess the military strength, 
productive capacity, or technology of its wartime opponents.  In fact, even though Ottoman 
soldiers fought tenaciously on multiple fronts in the conflict, the successes that were achieved 
by the Ottomans during WWI largely depended on the military leadership, technology, and 
weapons of their German allies. 
The Turkish Republic was proclaimed by the Turkish Parliament on 29 October 1923, 
following the successful conclusion of the struggle to eject post-WWI occupying forces from 
Anatolia and İstanbul.  Led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the remaining Ottoman 
bureaucratic, intellectual, and military elites who shared his vision embarked upon the 
creation of a nation-state, and upon the complex cultural, economic, governmental, and social 
engineering that this project entailed.4  Over a span of time from the beginning of WWII to 
the Cold War’s inception, those same Turkish elites, now led by Mustafa Kemal’s 
collaborator İsmet İnönü, chose to pursue an alliance with the United States. 
For the past 60 years the interaction between Turkey and the United States has been 
especially intense, but the relationship extends back nearly to the U.S.’s foundation in the late 
18th century.  Exchange between Turkey and the U.S. has had a long period of time to mature 
                                                            
4
 Hasan Bülent Kahraman.  Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi, Vol. I:  Kavramlar, Kuramlar, 
Kurumlar.  İstanbul:  Agora Kitaplığı, 2008.  Passim, but pp. 188-197, 241-248 can be 
referred to as a summary.  
5 
 
as, over the past one hundred-plus years, a large portion of the Turkish elite has been 
educated by U.S.-style schools such as Robert College, and as greater numbers of Turkish 
students began to receive education in the U.S.  Previous to that period, American Protestant 
missionaries had worked in many areas of Anatolia and the Levant, bringing new ideas and 
cultural items to the local inhabitants, and founding schools which eventually became 
institutions such as Bosphorus University and Robert College.   
After WWII, the Turkish Republic and the United States embarked on a deeper, multifaceted 
relationship that served the interests of both and eventually became a military alliance.  Even 
though the American presence in Turkish society was not new, the depth and extent to which 
the two states, and consequently their societies, would become intertwined was entirely 
novel.  For reasons of power, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. has often been 
dominated by the U.S., but Turkish governments and citizens have always preserved their 
individuality and interests, even to the point of political tension with their prodigious partner. 
The reasons that moved Turkish elites to choose the United States as an ally are still the 
subject of historiographical speculation, and concrete information would shed a great deal of 
light on why Turkish statesmen have made certain decisions at key conjunctures in their 
interactions with the U.S.  Some issues are clear, such as the Turkish need for U.S. financial 
and technological aid for its industrialization project, as well as military reinforcement 
against the Soviet threat.  However, because the official Turkish documents for the era are 
still unavailable to researchers, this study focuses on the U.S. side of the relationship.  
Hopefully, in the near future more balanced studies, making full use of the archives of both 
states, will be possible. 
 
 
6 
 
1.2.1.  From the Barbary Corsairs to WWII 
 
Turkey, whether as the Ottoman Empire or as the Turkish Republic, has interacted with the 
government, citizens, economy, and military of the United States since the late 18th century.  
The United States’ first overseas military venture was, in a de facto manner, a conflict with 
the Ottoman state since the Barbary corsairs of North Africa were technically subjects of the 
Ottoman Padişah.  Other than those two little-known Barbary Wars (1801-1805, 1815-
18165), United States relations with the Ottoman Empire, throughout the 19th century, were 
generally limited to low-level trade and missionary activity amongst the Empire’s Christian 
subjects.  For a short period in the 1830s, American military officers directed Mahmut II’s 
shipyard and the rebuilding of the Ottoman Navy following the disaster at Navarino6; U.S. 
officers also aided Khedive Ismail, yet again under the de facto sovereignty of the Ottoman 
                                                            
5
 For more information on these conflicts, see:  Field, James A.  America and the 
Mediterranean World 1776-1882.  Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press, 1969;  
Herring, George.  From Colony to Superpower:  U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776.  New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2008. For an interesting historical-adventure approach to the 
First Barbary War, see:  Zacks, Richard  The Pirate Coast:  Thomas Jefferson, the First 
Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805.  New York:  Hyperion, 2005.  For more 
information on Ottoman-American relations in the 18th and 19th centuries, see:  Armaoğlu, 
Fahir. Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açiklamalı). Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 
Ankara, 1991; Aydın, Mustafa and Çağrı Erhan, eds.  Turkish-American Relations:  Past, 
Present, Future.  London:  Routledge, 2004; Criss, Nur Bilge, et al., eds.  American Turkish 
Encounters:  Politics and Culture, 1830-1989.  Newcastle upon Tyne:  Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2011; Curti, Merle and Kendall Birr.  Prelude to Point Four:  American 
Technical Missions Overseas 1838-1938.  Madison:  The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1954; Danacıoğlu, Esra.  “Anadolu’da Birkaç Amerikalı Misyoner (1820-1850).”  Toplumsal 
Tarih.  No. 120, Aralık 2003.  pp. 76-79; Earle, Edward Mead.  “American Missions in the 
Near East.” Foreign Affairs. April 1929, Vol. 7 Issue 3.  pp. 398-417; Erhan, Cağrı.  Türk-
Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri.  Ankara:  İmge Kitapevi Yayınları, 2001; Howard, 
Harry N.  “The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations.”Middle East Journal. 30:3.  
1976:Summer.  pp. 291-310; Köprülü, Orhan F.  “Tarihte Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri.”  
Belleten.  LI/200; Macar, Elçin.  “Ortadoğu Yardım Örgütü.”  Toplumsal Tarih.  No. 120, 
Aralık 2003.  pp. 80-85; Özbek, Pınar.  “US-Turkish Relations and the Effects of American 
Missionary Activities on US Foreign Policy Towards Turkey.”  Review of Armenian Studies.  
No. 17. 2008.  pp. 93-116. 
6
 See:  Field, op. cit., pp. 165-175. 
7 
 
Empire, during the 1870s.7 
World War I saw the United States and the Ottoman Empire on opposing sides after the U.S. 
entered the war in 1917.  Even though the two states never fought, official relations were 
severed in 1917 and not fully restored until 1927.  During that ten-year period unofficial 
relations continued, at the civilian level of Commissioner, and on the military level of Rear 
Admiral.  Consequently, Rear Admiral Mark Bristol, High Commissioner of the U.S. 
delegation in Turkey after August 1919, became an important factor in preserving Turkish-
American relations between 1918 and 1927.8 
During the same period, the increasing global stature of the U.S. garnered attention in 
Turkey, both negative and positive.  The 1915 Armenian Deportations and Massacres issue, 
taken up by the Armenian diaspora and its supporters in the U.S., caused political problems 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, prevented Congressional ratification of the Lausanne 
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Treaty, and delayed official U.S. recognition of the nationalist Turkish government.  On the 
part of the Turkish Nationalist government in Ankara, their attempts to attract U.S. 
investment in Turkey broadly failed.9 
The 1930s, on the other hand, witnessed an increase in mutual interest, especially on the 
Turkish side.  The first official U.S. Ambassdor to the Turkish Republic, Joseph Grew, was a 
strong proponent of the Turkish Nationalist project, but the historical conjuncture in the U.S. 
(the Great Depression, the Nye Committee Senate investigations into the U.S.’ WWI 
munitions industry, strong isolationist public sentiment) made realizing the Turkish need for 
financial and military aid impossible.  Grew had first interacted with members of the Turkish 
nationalist leadership during the Lausanne Treaty negotiations, and was favorably 
impressed.10  Grew’s positive opinion continued during his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to 
Ankara, and to the extent that he even participated in a pro-Turkish film intended for 
American audiences; in this film Grew stood side-by-side with Mustafa Kemal as first the 
Turkish President, then the U.S. Ambassador, addressed speeches extolling the progress of 
the Turkish nation to the viewers.11  Despite such attempts to increase the stature of Turkey in 
American eyes, overall progress in Turkish-U.S. relations was sparse during the 1930s, and 
consisted mostly of technical aid and training provided by U.S. advisors.  On the other hand, 
enough progress was made by the end of the decade for the completion of a Turkish-
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American Trade Agreement in April 1939.12 
 
1.2.2.  WWII:  A Deepening Mutual Interaction 
 
WWII did not produce an immediate official change in the relationship between the two 
nations, but both sides began to show signs of heightened awareness of, interest in, and even 
need for aid from the other.  The Turkish government was, from the onset of the war, 
sympathetic towards the Allied cause,13 but not in an overt and public manner that might 
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disconcert the Nazi leadership.  The Turkish military was in no way prepared for industrial, 
total war14 and, therefore, the Turkish leadership had to be extremely wary of provoking a 
military that was, from May 1941, perched on its doorstep.15 At the same time, Turkey had to 
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maneuver according to the terms of the military agreements it had made with Great Britain 
and France after the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939; in June 1941, after the Nazi 
occupation of Greece, Ankara also signed a friendship and non-aggression pact with the 
Germans.16 
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Initially, WWII appeared to be the Turkish leadership’s worst-case scenario as the Nazis 
allied with Russia, Turkey’s traditional regional enemy, then in the guise of the Soviet Union.  
Operation Barbarossa came as great relief to Ankara and, step-by-step, as the war progressed 
and the Germans were driven back towards Central Europe, Turkey became more and more 
explicitly friendly to the Allies.  By 1943, the Turkish government was providing covert 
support to the Allies, and the Allies were providing materials, vehicles, planes, and training to 
Turkey.17  1944 was marked by increasingly acrimonious negotiations between the Allies, 
especially the British and the Soviets, and the Turkish leadership regarding Turkey’s entry 
into the war.18 In August 1944, however, the Turkish government severed ties with the Nazis.  
The same was done in regard to Japan in January 1945.  On 23 February 1945, Turkey 
declared war on Germany, but never became militarily involved in the conflict.  
Throughout the war, Turkish relations with the United States developed an ever-increasing 
depth, especially as concerns about the Soviet leadership’s ultimate aims became more 
pressing than the Nazi threat.  Until December 1941, relations between Turkey and the U.S. 
had focused on the issues of chromite supplies, with the aim of increasing those going to the 
Allies and decreasing those going to Germany, Turkish-U.S. commerce and Turkish inclusion 
in the Lend-Lease Program, and possible U.S. support for a South Balkan security pact 
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including Turkey.19  The chrome issue was determined by the Turkish need to maintain its 
own delicate economic balance, as well as appease the desires of the Allies and the Germans.  
Turkish-U.S. trade remained tied to the conflict of interest between British and American 
commercial aims.  The Balkan security pact idea was, in the course of events, eliminated by 
the Italian, and subsequent German, invasion of Greece, and the parallel Nazi assumption of 
control in Bulgaria.   
After the U.S. entered the war in December 1941, the Turkish government took steps to 
indicate its favorable inclination towards not only the Allies, but specifically towards the U.S.  
This attitude was not limited to purely military matters.  In the press, in public events, in 
trade, the Turkish government looked for ways to express its preference without entering into 
excessive risk of Nazi invasion or attack.20  In 1942-1943, the U.S. began to assert its own 
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right to interact with the Turkish government on non-military issues, a not-so-subtle violation 
of the British opinion that Turkey belonged in the British sphere of influence.21  Towards the 
end of 1943 and into 1944, British and U.S. views on the necessity of Turkish bellicosity also 
reflected divergence as, during the same period, Turkish authorities showed a marked desire 
to deal directly with the U.S. instead of the British.22 
As 1944 wore on, the Turkish-American relationship also began to take on new complexities.  
A partnership that had, in 1940, been based mostly on commerce and strategy, began to take 
on moral and ethical aspects by 1944.  In the middle of 1943, for example, the issue of how 
the Nazis were paying the Turkish government for commodities was broached; gold from 
Swiss banks was utilized by the Germans for this purpose, and the source of that gold was 
already under examination.23  The effort to track gold and other valuables looted by the Nazis 
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took on a more official dimension in 1944.  According to documents found in the College 
Park National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)records, on 26 February 1944, 
the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey presented to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs a copy 
of the declaration released on 22 February 1944 by Henry Morgethau, the U.S. Treasury 
Secretary.  That declaration concerned the use by the German government of looted gold and 
other assets to pay for international transactions.  The same document goes on to explain that 
in October 1944, the U.S. Ambassador had subsequently provided a second note to the 
Turkish government, this time concerned with Resolution VI of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement and the need for the Turkish government to enact controls warranted by the 
Agreement. 24   The issue of German assets in Turkey, whether financial, industrial, or 
technical, would remain a subject of focus in U.S. government relations with Turkey until at 
least 1947.  Thus, in addition to the wrangling concerning Turkish entry into the war, 
chromium shipments to Germany, cessation of official relations with the German 
government, and material aid to Turkey from the Allies, new issues related to more subtle 
financial and ethical aspects of the struggle against the Nazis began to take on greater 
importance. 
1945 began with the Turkish cessation of official ties with Japan and, one month later, 
declaration of war against Germany and Japan.  These developments were quickly 
overshadowed in March when the Soviet government informed the Turkish government of 
the Soviet intention to not renew the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and 
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Neutrality.  This provided confirmation of long-standing Turkish suspicion towards the 
ulterior aims of wartime Soviet attitudes towards Turkey.  For Turkish-American relations, 
the war’s remaining months were dominated by apprehensions concerning Soviet intentions 
towards Turkey, and further negotiations concerning the Lend-Lease agreement between 
Turkey and the U.S., as well as deciding how much of the Lend-Lease Aid would come from 
the U.S. and Britain respectively.25 
 
1.2.3.  The Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, and the Emergence of the Cold War 
 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) death on 12 April 1945, and Vice President Harry S. 
Truman’s accession to the United States Presidency, created broad uncertainties for U.S. 
policies towards its foreign partners.  Initially, the main concern was whether the new 
President would continue FDR’s policies, especially towards the USSR.  Despite Truman’s 
famous stormy first meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, U.S. policy 
towards the USSR remained largely what it had been under FDR.  Only over time, and 
through increasing irritation and dismay sparked by Soviet actions, did Truman change to 
more confrontational policies.26 
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Through the end of 1945 and into 1946, relations between the U.S. and the USSR continued 
to worsen as a combination of conflicting security interests, ideological differences, and 
mutual incomprehension grew first into tension, then aggressive posturing.  The opening 
United Nations Conference in San Francisco had the effect of turning U.S. public opinion 
against the Soviets27; the hard bargaining at the Potsdam Conference and the first uses of the 
atomic bomb increased both sides’ mistrust of the other’s intentions28; the September 1945 
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London Conference of Foreign Ministers exacerbated these trends when essentially no 
agreements could be reached. 29  At the December 1945 Moscow Conference some 
compromises were reached through superficial concessions, but the political atmosphere in 
the U.S. had changed since the previous summer, and Secretary of State Byrnes found his 
Moscow accomplishments attacked by both the press and Congress.30 
The consequences of the stumbling 1945 conferences led, through additional tensions and 
disagreements, to the Cold War’s emergence in 1946.  As of March 1946, the Truman 
Administration, in response to domestic pressure, observed Soviet behaviors, George 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” the crisis over Iran, and other factors, began to see the Soviets as 
potential enemies rather than as contentious allies. 31   After further experiences with 
contradictory Soviet negotiating behavior in Germany, intransigence in the U.N., and 
renewed threats towards Turkey, the U.S. resigned itself to more assertive unilateral activity:  
“… American leaders, by the summer of 1946, simply were no longer willing to trust the 
Russians.”32 
After casting aside the need for full bilateral cooperation with the Soviets, however, the 
Truman Administration then confronted an American public, and its Congressional 
representatives, who did not necessarily see the same reality or embrace the same opinion 
concerning U.S. postwar aims.  The Truman Administration, as well as the State Department 
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and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had determined that the Soviets should be understood as an 
opponent and competitor for global influence during 1946, but the U.S. public did not see 
foreign policy as an important issue in the 1946 elections.33After the 1946 elections and the 
resulting Republican control of Congress, the Truman Administration needed to convince the 
U.S. public and Congress that the USSR constituted a serious enough threat to warrant the 
expenditures necessary for deterrence.34 
Subsequently, when the British government informed their American counterparts in 
February 1947 that the British government could no longer foot the bill for Eastern 
Mediterranean security, U.S officials recognized the opportunity to forge a new, more active 
peace time foreign policy, implicitly aimed at the USSR, and with the consent of Congress 
and general domestic opinion.35  The Truman Doctrine, declared by the President to a special 
joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, intended to sway the American public into 
supporting a more activist foreign policy, and the expenditures it would mandate.36 
Furthermore, the contemporary economic crisis in Western Europe, and the potential for 
Soviet allies to exploit that crisis, gave Truman the opportunity to create a broader aid 
program after Congress had been convinced of the need for the aid to Greece and Turkey. In 
order to provide desperately needed aid to Western Europe’s economies and move towards 
the unification of the non-Soviet zones in occupied Germany, a second statement of 
Truman’s activist foreign policy came in George Marshall’s June 1947 address to Harvard’s 
graduating class.  This proposal offered broad economic aid to European countries, both in 
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the Western and Eastern occupied zones, that offered plans and budgets for their needs.37 
The Marshall Plan was a strategic success for U.S. policy makers because the Soviet 
leadership had to display its true intentions in accepting or declining the program.  When the 
Soviets rejected the Plan, and then embarked on a strident campaign to persuade its satellites 
to take the same action, the conflict between U.S. and Soviet intentions became overt.  No 
longer would U.S. officials be concerned with negotiating policy towards the economic and 
political issues still facing Western Europe.  The Soviets would be left to deal with their 
satellites as they were able, but any Soviet involvement in the Western zone would be 
rejected.38 
Ultimately, the Marshall Plan and its promulgation to Western Europe helped pave the way to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  The primacy of economic worries in 
Europe, which led U.S. officials to formulation of the Marshall Plan, also led to the British 
initiative that became NATO.  By mid-1947 U.S. officials realized that the U.S., British, and 
French occupation zones in Germany needed unification in order to stimulate Europe’s 
general economic recovery.  French officials, understandably, saw the re-vitalization of the 
German economy as a worst-case scenario, and opposed the idea.  In order to overcome 
French concerns, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin developed, over several months, the 
idea of a Western European security pact that would include the U.S. and Canada.  This 
concept was formally presented to the French and Benelux governments in early 1948, and 
resulted in the Brussels Treaty, the precursor to NATO.39  The U.S. initially reacted slowly 
because of the domestic election-year political atmosphere, but after the Berlin Crisis erupted 
in June 1948, U.S. officials immediately moved to formulate the agreements that officially 
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established NATO in 1949.40 
In substance, NATO was designed to create Western European confidence in U.S. resolve to 
stay in Europe in order to defend against a hypothetical Soviet invasion.  However, it also 
was meant to soothe French worries that the German economic recovery needed for the 
resurrection of Western European societies threatened French security and sovereignty.  
Thus, NATO embodied the U.S. attempt to overcome a variety of economic, military, and 
strategic puzzles in Western Europe.41 
On the other hand, because NATO’s formation as a military alliance was originally just as 
important for its psychological and strategic dimensions, logic mandated inclusion of other 
regional actors crucial to the Western European periphery, especially once Italy was admitted 
to the alliance.  Even though U.S. officials generally saw the strategic necessity of Turkish 
inclusion in NATO, limited U.S. resources made such a step unviable until well into 1951.42 
In early 1951, U.S. officials’ fear of neutralist sentiment in the Eastern Mediterranean, the 
strategic need to protectthat region’s oil reserves and NATO’s southern flank, and the U.S.’ 
general trend towards greater threat projection in light of the ongoing Korean War made 
Greek and Turkish admission to NATO propitious.After Secretary of State Acheson proposed 
the two counties’ inclusion in July 1951, Turkey and Greece were officially admitted to 
NATO in February 1952.43 
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1.3.Turkey in U.S. Post-War Foreign Policy 
 
The long process that brought Turkey into NATO started, at the very latest,44 towards the end 
of WWII.  After Harry S. Truman assumed the U.S. Presidency, and WWII was brought to a 
victorious conclusion, Turkey did not recede as an issue in U.S. foreign policy; on the 
contrary, as the months passed, Turkey’s place in U.S. postwar global strategy became 
increasingly salient.  As U.S. leaders grappled with the difficulties and responsibilities of 
their hegemonic international stature, the Turkish leadership endeavored to bring Turkey’s 
importance, interests, needs, and potential role to Washington’s attention 45 ; as events 
conspired, and geopolitical Great Power politics turned into the Cold War, U.S. officials 
became more aware of Turkey’s vital place in U.S. strategy. 
Ankara’s efforts, ironically, were greatly aided by its traditional enemy, Moscow.  By issuing 
vaguely threatening demands for both land (a return to the pre-1923 Turkish-Soviet border in 
North East Anatolia) and bases in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits, the Soviet 
leadership succeeded in providing an argument for increased strategic aid to Turkey; this 
argument was eagerly taken up by both the Turkish leadership and those in the U.S. 
government who supported granting more aid to Turkey.   
For American officials, Turkey’s immediate importance stemmed from geography.  The 
Turkish Straits, i.e. the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, have been strategic waterways since 
antiquity, but the global bipolar situation that emerged from WWII also made Turkey 
important for other reasons related to geopolitical military strategy.  At the Potsdam 
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Conference, the issue of the Turkish Straits was brought up for discussion, but in light of the 
British position concerning Suez, and the U.S. position towards Panama, no headway was 
achieved.46  At that point, U.S. officials also still expected the Eastern Mediterranean to be a 
part of Britain’s sphere of influence.47 
In the waning months of 1945, it became clear that a Soviet invasion of Turkey was not 
imminent, but U.S. officials began to see Turkey much more in terms of regional and 
geopolitical strategy.48By January 1946, President Truman was convinced that the Soviets 
wanted to dominate Turkey, and he expressed determination to prevent the Soviets from such 
a venture.49 
As the months passed in 1946, and U.S. officials became more irritated by Soviet 
intransigence at the negotiating table, U.S. planners and military officials became further 
convinced that Turkey held a vital strategic place in U.S. plans for a possible conflict with the 
Soviet Union.  Turkey’s fundamental importance came from its close proximity to the USSR, 
its ability to brunt a first Soviet attack and harry Soviet attempts to extend a hypothetical 
conflict into the greater Eastern Mediterranean, and to potentially counterattack into critical 
areas containing the Soviet military-industrial heartland and natural resources.50 
The first major result of this new focus on Turkey’s strategic value (coupled with British 
inability to cover its military and political responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean) was 
the aid to Greece and Turkey announced by President Truman in March 1947.  Aid to Turkey 
was subsequently included in the Marshall Plan, and large amounts of U.S. military, 
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economic, and material aid began to arrive in a nation which was barely known in the U.S. 
political classes ten years previously.   
In the years following 1947, until Turkey’s inclusion in NATO in 1952, U.S. planners 
struggled to balance their quickly expanding military and strategic responsibilities, in which 
Turkey played the role of “linchpin between Europe and the Middle East,” 51  with the 
resources they had at their disposal.  Turkish officials desired not only more aid in order to 
provide material military support against a potential Soviet assault, but also guarantees that 
the U.S. would support Turkey in such an event.  Even though many U.S. planners and 
officials supported the inclusion of Turkey in NATO after its inception and formation in 
1948-1949, and military aid was provided to Turkey in order to bolster its fighting capacity, 
questions concerning available resources prevented a greater U.S. commitment.52 
In the increasingly fraught global situation after the outbreak of the Korean War,53 U.S. 
planners feared that not giving concrete commitments to Turkey could result in Turkish 
neutrality, which would create a greater power void in the strategically vital Eastern 
Mediterranean.  This concern finally created the political will in 1951 to convince both U.S. 
planners and hesitant NATO allies to offer membership to Turkey, along with Greece.54 
 
1.4.  Historiography on Post-WWII Turkish-American Relations 
 
The academic literature, and especially historiography, on Turkish-American relations in the 
1945-1952 era (and in general) has never been extensive despite the real importance that the 
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relationship has maintained for both sides since WWII.  A variety of reasons exist for this 
analytical paucity.  On the Turkish side, the dominant problem has always been access to 
government documents, or rather the lack thereof.  Even today, access to the official 
documents of the post-WWII era is non-existent.  On the U.S. side, the main problem has 
been a lack of interest in, or awareness of, the Cold War role that Turkey played in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.  Turkey has always been a country that few Americans knew detailed 
information about, and the information that was known was marked by prejudice since 
Americans have maintained their own versions of the “Terrible Turk” myth.55  Furthermore, 
no important works on Turkish-American relations written by an author who is not a citizen 
of either country exist.  The result is a historiography that does not do justice to the two 
nations’ actual relationship.     
 
1.4.1.  Turkish Scholars 
 
Over the past 60 years, the Turkish scholars56 working on Turkish-American relations can be 
divided into three generations, but the overall analytical focus remained on politics, often 
with heavy ideological coloring.  During the late 1950s through the early 1970s, the first 
academic generation to focus on Turkish-American relations emerged and was dominated by 
the professors at Ankara University’s Political Sciences Faculty.  The main figures were 
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Fahir Armaoğlu, Türkkaya Ataöv, Mehmet Gönlübol, Oral Sander, and A. Haluk Ülman. 
These academicians did not write solely on Turkish-American relations, but their analyses of 
Turkish-U.S. affairs have remained some of the best that Turkish academia offers for the 
topic.  These men also saw schooling in the U.S., but usually at a later stage in their 
education.  These authors’ writings are characterized, as suggested by their status as political 
scientists, by an emphasis on the political aspects of Turkish-American relations.   
The first Turkish academic text to directly address Turkish-American relations was written by 
Akdes Nimet Kurat.  This book,Türk-Amerikan Müsaebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış (1800-
1959),57 is brief (only 60 pages), and devotes only five pages to WWII and after.   Given the 
novelty of this subject at the time, though, this well-researched and densely composed text 
constituted a strong precedent for academic study of Turkish-American relations.   
A major Turkish academic text dealing primarily with postwar Turkish-U.S. relations was not 
written until Türkkaya Ataöv’s Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye.58  This text is a product of 1960s 
Leftist intellectual currents, especially Marxism-Leninism, and the specific forms they took 
in the Turkish context.  As a result, the most striking aspect of this text is the direct influence 
on Ataöv’s analysis exercised by William Appleman Williams’s The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy, the founding text of the U.S. Cold War revisionist history school.  Here, an 
important detail is the fact that Ataöv received his Political Science/International Relations 
PhD from Syracuse University the same year Williams’s book was published, in 1959.   
Williams’s book was an immediate influence on academic thought concerning the Cold War, 
and Ataöv must have been aware of the attention Williams’s book attracted.  Ataöv’s text was 
published ten years later, in 1969.  Ataöv also quotes Gar Alperovitz and David Horowitz59 
liberally in his book, but the foundation of Ataöv’s discussion is Williams translated into 
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Turkish.  The second chapter of Ataöv’s text, for example, is essentially a broad summary of 
the second, third, and fourth chapters of Williams’s book.60  The remainder of Ataöv’s text 
frequently refers to the Open Door Policy, and attributes American foreign policy to 
economic factors, which is the key aspect of Williams’s criticism of U.S. foreign policy.61  In 
sum, Ataöv defines NATO as a tool with which the U.S. has gained access to other 
economies, and asserts that Turkey exposed itself to exploitation by entering that alliance.62 
Consequently, the influence that Ataöv’s book has had on the approach that two generations 
of Turkish leftists have taken towards Turkish-American relations must be noted.  Even 
today, this author has experienced Turkish civilians telling him to read Ataöv’s book.  One 
chapter of Ataöv’s book was also published as an article in the journal of Ankara University’s 
Political Science Faculty; at that time A.U.’s was the most influential political science faculty 
in Turkey, and its journal the key publication in Turkish academia.63 
Fahir Armaoğlu published on Turkish-U.S. relations as early as 1966.  His article “Turkey 
and the United States:  A New Alliance” analyzes changes in the international system, such 
as the Moscow-Beijing alliance’s dissolution or Cyprus, and in domestic Turkish politics, 
such as the 27 May 1960 coup.  In his view, those changes required the Turkish-U.S. alliance 
formed after WWII to become more “flexible” and oriented towards NATO in order to create 
conditions conducive to mutual harmony. 64   Twenty-five years later, Armaoğlu also 
published what has become an essential source for studying Turkish-American relations, a 
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 Ataöv pp.  1-19, 117, 144-154, 160-161, 203, 211-212, 273-295. 
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  “Marshall Planından NATO’nun Kuruluşuna Kadar ‘Soğuk Harp.’”  Ankara Üniversitesi 
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28 
 
collection of primary documents concerning Turkish-U.S. relations, and commentary on 
those documents.65  Oral Sander, Armaoğlu’s student, published his main works on Turkish-
American relations in the late 1970s.  His Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-196466 focuses on 
politics, is less dogmatic than Ataöv’s text, and ends with a call for “flexibility” in Turkish-
U.S. relations that is clearly adapted from Armaoğlu.67 
Neither A. Haluk Ülman nor Mehmet Gönlübol, who sometimes collaborated on articles 
concerning Turkish foreign policy, wrote extensively on Turkish-American relations, but 
what they did write was early and important.  Ülman’s Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik 
Münasebetleri 1939-194768 was the first Turkish academic text to focus on Turkish-U.S. 
relations during WWII and after.  Ülman’s book, like Kurat’s, is concise (only 141 pages).  
Mostly a summary of the political interactions between the Turkish and U.S. governments 
during WWII, the author concludes that Turkish-U.S. relations did not truly begin to develop 
until after the war, and that the economic aid provided by the U.S. had greatly benefitted the 
Turkish economy.69 
Ten years after Ülman published his text, Gönlübol published an article on Türkish-U.S. 
relations that indirectly criticizes the ideological stance taken by Ataöv.70  Another lengthy 
Gönlübol article on Turkish-NATO relations is also an indirect answer to Ataöv’s book.71  
That article begins by focusing on the Cyprus issue, but continues to explore the foundation 
                                                            
65 Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açiklamalı). Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 
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of NATO, why Turkey was admitted, the effects that Turkey’s admission to NATO had on 
the country, and the contemporary Turkish debates concerning the United States and NATO. 
Starting in the mid-1970s, another generation of Turkish scholars began to examine post-
WWII Turkish-American relations.  This generation again is dominated by political 
scientists, but has weaker ties to Ankara University.  The main names of this generation 
include Burcu Bostanoğlu, Nur Bilge Criss, Füsun Türkmen, and Nasuh Uslu.  This 
generation’s writings are similar to the previous generation’s in that none of the scholars 
focus exclusively on Turkish-American relations, and that political aspects of the Turkish-
American relationship remain in the forefront of their analyses.  Of the three, Criss has 
written most consistently on Turkish-American relations, but generally as journal articles or 
book chapters.72  Türkmen, on the other hand, did not write on Turkish-U.S. relations until 
the past decade, but has produced a book-length work titled Kırılgan İttifaktan “Model 
Ortaklığa”:  Türkiye ABD İlişkileri73in addition to articles. 
Nasuh Uslu, however, composed what is still the most comprehensive treatment of postwar 
Turkish-American relations, titled simply Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri.74  Drawing heavily on 
political science theory, Uslu provides detailed narratives on all major points of interest in 
Turkish-U.S. relations between 1947 and the end of the 1990s.  For the 1947-1952 period, 
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 See, for example:  Criss,American Turkish Encounters:  Politics and Culture, 1830-1989, 
or Harris and Criss,  Studies in Atatürk’s Turkey:  The American Dimension. 
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Uslu provides a largely chronological and political summary of the events that led to 
Turkey’s admission to NATO; this summary depends almost exclusively on a narrow 
selection of secondary literature for its narrative, and does not show any primary sources as 
references.75  The problem this leads to is evident in Uslu’s conclusion, where he states that 
the essential reason for the formation of the Turkish-American alliance was the Soviet 
threat.76  By the middle of the 1980s, that assertion had come under some doubt, as is evident 
from the debate that occurred between Bruce Kuniholm and Melvyn Leffler on that issue 
(described below).  Although Uslu does refer to the strategic dimension of U.S. thinking 
about Turkey, he does not mention the controversy surrounding the exact nature of the Soviet 
threat towards Turkey or refer to Leffler’s texts.  Consequently, Uslu’s explanation of the 
reasons for, and the initial years of, the Turkish-U.S. alliance is shallow since it does not refer 
to authors and issues that would give it causal and explanatory depth. 
Burcu Bostanoğlu also produced a large work on postwar Turkish-American relations, and its 
method of composition is similar to Uslu’s.  Bostanoğlu used few primary sources while 
composing Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası77 and mostly summarized from a variety of 
secondary sources.  The first 200-plus pages of Bostanoğlu’s book are focused on 
international relations and political science theory; then 100 more pages are devoted to a 
historical summary of U.S. foreign policy.  As a result, the author does not actually take 
Turkish-U.S. relations in hand until page 323.  Only 50 pages actually discuss that topic in a 
general manner, after which the rest of the text analyzes only three specific issues -- Korea, 
                                                            
75
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Cyprus, and the First Gulf War -- in light of the Turkish-U.S. dynamic.  Consequently, 
Bostanoğlu’s text is not so much an attempt to create new information, but rather to create a 
new theoretical framework for understanding Turkish-American relations.  
In the past ten-to-fifteen years new voices have appeared amongst the Turkish scholars 
writing on post-WWII Turkish-American relations.  Gül İnanç (Barkay), Selin Bölme, Pınar 
Dost-Niyego, Barın Kayaoğlu, Burçak Keskin-Kozat, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz are the most 
notable of these, and have produced the most important academic analyses of post-WWII 
Turkish-American relations to appear in the Turkish literature since the 1960s.  These 
scholars are more diverse than the previous generations78 and do not focus exclusively on 
Turkish-U.S. relations, but the work produced by these scholars is generally stronger 
academically in comparison to the previous generations, and often can be referred to as 
broader historical analysis rather than simply as political science. 
Gül İnanç (Barkay), for example, composed the first academic Turkish text to attempt a 
thorough analysis of the WWII-era U.S. FRUS documents concerning Turkey.  This work, 
titled ABD Diplomasisinde Türkiye, 1940-194379 unfortunately covers only four of the war 
years, but was a strong step forward for Turkish academic analysis of Turkish-U.S. relations.  
Şuhnaz Yılmaz has written a number of important articles on Turkish-U.S. relations, and will 
publish a book-length study on Turkish-American relations between 1800 and 1952 in late 
2014.  İnanç and Yılmaz have also collaborated on articles.80  Dost-Niyego, Kayaoğlu, and 
Keskin-Kozat have all contributed strong theses and scholarly articles or book chapters to the 
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 İnanç, Gül and Şuhnaz Yılmaz.  “Gunboat Diplomacy: Turkey, USA and the Advent of the 
Cold War.”  Middle Eastern Studies.  Vol. 48, No. 3.  May 2012.  pp. 401–411. 
32 
 
subject.81 
Other than İnanç, Selin Bölme is the only academician from this generation who has a book-
length study to her name.  Bölme’s İncirlik Üssü:  ABD’nin Üs Politikası ve Türkiye82 is a 
welcome addition to the literature on post-WWII Turkish-American relations, and is, on 
several counts, the best single book that a Turkish academician has produced on the subject.  
The academic quality of the text is strong, and extensive research was performed in several 
archives; many of the documents presented in the text are presented for the first time in a 
scholarly work on Turkish-American relations.  The footnote citations and Works Cited 
section are at international standards for academic scholarship. 
Bölme’s text, unfortunately, does suffer from a problem that has long plagued Turkish 
scholarship on relations with the U.S., an excessive focus on politics.  The results of this 
emphasis are weaknesses in historiography and explanation.  To begin with, the first nearly 
150 pages of the study are devoted to various aspects of general political theory concerning 
military bases, and then specifically the American approach to military bases.  This emphasis 
on theory is unnecessary in a published academic text of this sort.   
After the theoretical sections, the author devotes more than 50 pages to the WWII and post-
WWII developments that led to Turkey’s NATO accession and the establishment of İncirlik 
A.F.B.  Bölme cites a great number of archival documents while explaining the process.83  
For a subject with a literature as extensive as that on the early Cold War, Bölme cites almost 
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none of the major secondary texts on the subject, which leaves her narrative open to errors of 
fact as well as weak in terms of explanatory power.  For example, on pages 159-160, Bölme 
states that the establishment of U.S. policy against proposed Soviet bases in the Turkish 
straits dates from August 1946.  If Bölme had referred to Leffler’s A Preponderance of 
Power, though, she would have noted that U.S. policy opposing Soviet bases in the Turkish 
straits was formulated in July 1945. 84   Bölme also attributes that change to President 
Truman’s being convinced by a State-War-Navy Memorandum to actively oppose Soviet 
expansionist aims; in fact, Truman had already switched to a more aggressive attitude after 
the December 1945 Moscow Conference, memorably declaring, “I’m tired [of] babying the 
Soviets.”85 
Beyond the issue of historical data is the fact that Bölme’s focus on politics deprives the text 
of what should be a strong focus, i.e. explaining in a comprehensive manner the context in 
which Turkey and the U.S. cemented a military and political alliance, won Turkey entrance to 
NATO, and made the decision to build İncirlik A.F.B.  As an illustration, focusing on İncirlik 
A.F.B. would fit neatly into Melvyn Leffler’s Grand Strategy policy framework,86 which 
focuses on power and the need for bases abroad to exert that power overseas.  Bölme, 
however, does not formulate such a framework for her discussion and, instead, provides a 
narrowly political narrative for the occurrences she describes.  Consequently, the reader does 
not understand, for instance, exactly how or when U.S. public opinion became supportive of a 
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more active role in Europe, or how the Truman administration convinced Congress to provide 
aid to Turkey and Greece in March 1947, or for the Marshall Plan.87  Bölme utilizes some 
excellent and important primary source materials, but without stronger foundation in the 
secondary source material, the discussion of İncirlik A.F.B in the early Cold War era depends 
mostly on FRUS documents and NARA Records Groups 59 and 531, and presents little 
secondary literature context for the reader.  Thus, the reader does not obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of İncirlik A.F.B.’s place in the U.S.’s overall policy-making, 
or in the historical juncture, from Bölme’s discussion.88 
Most likely, the reason for the weakness elaborated in the previous paragraph again stems 
from politics, but in this case the author’s politics.  Bölme’s text displays hints of the 
continuing influence that ideology, especially the economic determinism (Leninism) sourced 
in William Appleman Williams via Türkkaya Ataöv, stills holds in much Turkish scholarly 
work on Turkish-American relations.  In the conclusion, Bölme explains the overall 
understanding of İncirlik A.F.B. that her text has related to the reader.  The interesting aspect 
of this explanation is the prominence that the author gives to economic factors:  “… aynı 
zamanda Amerikan askeri gücünün gölgesini hissettirerek kapitalist ekonominin sağlıklı bir 
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şekilde işlemesinde etkili olmuşlardır.”89  This could have been taken directly from Lenin, 
and reflects the same ideology first articulated by Williams, and then transferred to the 
Turkish context by Ataöv.  Bölme apparently cites Ataöv’s book only once, 90  but the 
economic interpretation of U.S. hegemony and need for overseas bases is strongly informed 
by an intellectual stance that, in regard to the issues of NATO and İncirlik A.F.B., goes back 
to Ataöv.  Even the edition of Ataöv’s book that Bölme cites is interesting: Amerika, NATO, 
ve Türkiye was first published in 1969, but Bölme cites a 2006 reissue of the book by İleri 
Yayınları, a Kemalist-left publishing house in İstanbul. 91   The ideology behind this 
publishing house, as well as those who consider themselves Kemalist-leftists, is similar to 
Ataöv’s. 
Finally, a number of other Turkish writers, both scholarly and non-scholarly, have written on 
Turkish-U.S. relations even if it was not their main professional focus.  Scholars like Çağrı 
Erhan and Hakan Yılmaz can be provided as examples.  Erhan’s most important work on 
Turkish-American relations covers only through WWI, and he has written articles on post-
WWII Turkish-American relations, but most of his academic work has concentrated on other 
aspects of Turkish politics. 92   Yılmaz has also written articles on postwar Turkish-U.S. 
relations from time-to-time, even though this subject is not one that he has focused on.93  
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Turkish scholars have authored a number of interesting MA and PhD theses on post-WWII 
Turkish-American relations, as well.94  One other writer that can be mentioned in this context 
is Rıfat Bali.95  Even though he is not a professional academic, and his main emphasis is not 
Turkish-American relations, Bali has compiled and edited several important volumes of U.S. 
official documents concerning Turkey.96 
 
1.4.2.  U.S. Scholars 
 
U.S. scholars writing on post-WWII Turkish-American relations should be classified into 
general tendencies rather than generations.  The first tendency that can be identified is a 
stance that, directly or indirectly, urges more cooperation or interaction between the United 
States and Turkey, usually for fundamentally political reasons.  Since WWII, the majority of 
American writers on Turkish-U.S. relations have adopted this stance.  The first U.S. authors 
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to bring attention to Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII were generally writing in response to 
the developing Cold War atmosphere, and were usually not interested in Turkish-U.S. 
relations per se but rather as an issue that deserved attention in light of the perceived Soviet 
threat.   
In the ten-to-fifteen years after WWII, a spate of journal articles appeared that were authored 
by writers who could be presented as experts on the subject, and who urged more U.S. 
attention and assistance to Turkey. 97 An excellent illustration of this trend is Walter 
Livingston Wright Jr.’s “Truths About Turkey,” originally published in the most influential 
foreign policy journal of the era, Foreign Affairs.98  This article contains many standard 
themes99 seen in other similar commentary:  the Ottoman Empire was brutal and backwards, 
but now far in the past; Turkey is not yet a complete democracy, but is on its way; Turkey 
deserves our help for both their desire to become “Western” and their resistance to the 
Soviets.  Wright also states that he is writing against figures who have “disparaged” the aid 
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program for Turkey.  Other similar articles100 seem to indicate that the level of opposition to 
the idea of aiding Turkey was strong enough to create concern.  This issue will be more 
thoroughly examined below. 
After 1960, U.S. writers also began to produce books urging more cooperation between 
Turkey and the U.S.  Well-known authors on Turkish-U.S. relations include George S. 
Harris, Harry Howard, and George C. McGhee. George S. Harris is a historian who has led a 
double career, one in the State Department and one in the academy.  His most well-known 
work is Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945- 
1971.101   This text, like the articles mentioned above, is a largely political and military 
account of Turkish-American relations.  Covering the period from WWII until the early 
1970s, the only section which really attempts to move into subjects outside of politics is the 
chapter on the 1950-1960 Menderes government, which touches briefly on economic, 
educational, and developmental aspects of the young alliance between Turkey and the U.S.; 
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the eighth chapter also devotes three pages to the Peace Corps’s activities in Turkey and 
Turkish public reaction to that project.102 
Harry Howard, like Harris, was an academic who led nearly parallel lives in academia and 
the State Department.  Howard did spend nearly twenty straight years in the State Department 
between 1942 and the 1960s after starting out in academia, but afterwards alternated between 
academic and official responsibilities.  Howard wrote many articles touching on the issue of 
Turkish-American relations, but the primary text that he authored was Turkey, the Straits, and 
U.S. Policy.103  This book mostly concerns the eras before WWII, reaching that conflict only 
on page 161.  The era after WWII begins on page 210, leaving 70 pages for the discussion of 
U.S. policy towards the Turkish straits in the Cold War era.  Howard’s book, as is natural for 
the subject, is a mostly political discussion of the topic, but it is also one of the key texts 
written on the Straits. 
George C. McGhee, on the other hand, spent most of this career in the State Department even 
though his first profession was as a petroleum engineer.  McGhee was a critical figure in the 
State Department in the years after WWII, became an expert on the Eastern Mediterranean, 
and served as U.S Ambassador to Turkey in 1952-1953.  His most important book is The US-
Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection:  How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO 
Entry Contained the Soviets.104  This text is, as one would assume given the fact that McGhee 
had a long career in the State Department, a study that focuses primarily on the geostrategic 
and political aspects of the Turkish-American relationship in the 1940s and 1950s.  McGhee 
explains in the book’s introduction that the main primary sources that he used were from files 
that he collected while a State Department officer, composed of documents that he had 
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considered important at the time; little additional research was completed for the text.  
Correspondingly, McGhee gives attention to policy-making and diplomacy in the 
contemporary political and military environment, but does not stray far from those limits.  
McGhee is also concerned with supporting Bruce Kuniholm’s perspective in Kuniholm’s 
1981-1985 debate with Melvyn Leffler over post-WWII U.S. policy-making in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 105   McGhee’s book is consequently more important for his personal 
perspective and reflections concerning Turkish-U.S. relations in the post-war period, and the 
bureaucratic and diplomatic anecdotes that he presents for his narrative.   
One other prominent example of government officials who authored important texts 
pertaining to Turkish-U.S. relations is Max Weston Thornburg, who wrote important studies 
on Turkey and Turkish-American issues in the years following WWII as a part of his official 
capacities.  Like McGhee, Thornburg came to government service from the petroleum 
industry.  After WWII, Thornburg headed a research project, sponsored by The Twentieth 
Century Fund, concerning Turkey‘s economy.  The effort resulted in Turkey:  An Economic 
Appraisal, published in 1949 and which has remained a standard, if controversial, reference 
concerning the Turkish economy of the time.106  Thornburg later authored a study, People 
and Policy in the Middle East: A Study of Social and Political Change as a Basis for United 
States Policy,107 in which many sections deal directly with Turkey.  As is evident from the 
title, the book is explicitly intended to recommend ways to implement U.S. policy in the 
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Eastern Mediterranean, and its intended audience is those who are charged with formulating 
and carrying out that policy. 
The other main tendency in U.S. texts on Turkish-American relations is, as one may guess, 
exactly the opposite of the first, to urge less cooperation or interaction between the two states, 
and again based on fundamentally political grounds.  These texts, which are far less 
numerous than the previous group, are often the products of anti-Turkish lobbies in the U.S., 
such as the Armenian or Greek lobbies, or from sympathy for those communities, but have 
just as often come from the left-of-center in U.S. politics.108 
Van Coufoudakis, for example, was born in Greece but is a U.S. citizen.  In a long academic 
career, he achieved the position of Dean Emeritus at Indiana University-Purdue University 
Fort Wayne, as well as Rector Emeritus at the University of Nicosia in Cyprus.  
Coufoudakis’s works are numerous and focus mostly on the Greece-Turkey-United States 
triangle, with specific attention on the Cyprus problem.  As an illustration of Coufoudakis’s 
perspective, his most recent book, published in 2008, is titled International Aggression and 
Violations of Human Rights: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus.109  In 1981 Coufoudakis wrote a 
journal article focused on the post-WWII Turkish-U.S. alliance110; the first historiographical 
reference the reader encounters is to the vehemently anti-Turkish Frank Weber text that will 
be described in the following paragraph.  Moreover, despite the article’s title, the writer 
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focuses more on the Cyprus issue and the problems that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s 
between Turkey and the U.S.  The author generally blames the Turkish side for those 
problems and presents a predominantly negative image of Turkey. 
 One other example can further illustrate the anti-Turkish perspective.Frank G. Weber’s 
study, titled The Evasive Neutral, is an examination of Turkey’s WWII foreign policy that 
mostly relies on British and German archival materials, with little reference to the secondary 
literature on the related topics.111   An Emeritus Professor at Temple University, Weber 
characterizes Turkish foreign policy during WWII as “perplexing and infuriating,” 
“timorous,” founded on “bad faith,” and ultimately successful because of “mere chance.”112  
The single positive outcome noted by Weber is that Turkish behavior during WWII 
emasculated Nazi diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, rendering it “limp, sterile, and 
sour.”113  While portraying the Turkish leadership as sympathetic to the Nazis while Germany 
seemed to be winning the war, Weber essentially summarizes the content of Nazi diplomatic 
reports.  Large sections of the text thus seem to simply reflect the German perspective with 
little or no critical evaluation; the same is true when the author focuses on the British side.114  
The author closes the text by stating that Turkish war time diplomacy “… was a brilliant 
accomplishment by all standards except those of honesty and integrity.”115  In summary, even 
though there is a strain of anti-Turkish academic work in the U.S., little of that work focuses 
specifically on the 1945-1952 period in which the Turkish-American alliance was founded. 
Another interesting aspect of the U.S. literature concerning relations with Turkey is the 
apparent randomness of the authors and the subjects focused on.  Rarely does one come 
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across a U.S. scholar that has devoted a major portion of her or his career to U.S. relations 
with Turkey.  Instead, a number of scholars have, for one reason or another, spent a period of 
time working on Turkish-U.S. relations and then moved on to other subjects.  A prominent 
example is David J. Alvarez.  Professor Alvarez, who still teaches at St. Mary’s College of 
California, began his academic career by composing several excellent texts on Turkish-
American relations.116  After those publications, Alvarez turned to different subjects and has 
apparently never returned to the issue of Turkish-U.S relations.  Robert Cossaboom and Gary 
Leiser have also written important articles on Turkish-U.S. issues, but to which they did not 
add later studies. 117 
Bruce Robellet Kuniholm is another well-known academic who has contributed canonical 
texts to Turkish-American relations, but much of what he has published was not on that 
subject; conversely, most of what he has published does have relevancy to Turkey and the 
Eastern Mediterranean.  Kuniholm started out as a teacher at İstanbul’s Robert College and, 
after extensive education, published the essential text, The Origins of the Cold War in the 
Near East:  Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece.118  As is 
evident from the title, Kuniholm’s study addresses Turkey’s neighbors in addition, so much 
of the text is not devoted solely to Turkey.  The sections of the text that are devoted to Turkey 
comprise the single most important piece of research on post-WWII Turkish-U.S. relations 
even though it is actually focused on the larger Cold War environment.  Much of the post-
WWII years’ official documentation became available to researchers in the early-to-middle 
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1970s, which made Kuniholm’s research groundbreaking.  Additionally, Kuniholm’s original 
research was augmented by the excellent academic standards of his writing.  On the other 
hand, Kuniholm is clearly a diplomatic historian, so the result is a text that sticks close to the 
diplomatic aspects of his subject, and rarely ventures into broader economic, military, 
domestic political, or social topics. 
Kuniholm has produced numerous articles on Turkey, but only a handful directly address 
Turkish-U.S. relations.  Of the other relevant texts, “The Near East Connection:  Greece and 
Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946-1952” is the most interesting.  
Originally a presentation to the Hellenic Studies Program at Ball State University, this slim 
volume essentially picks up where the story in The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East 
leaves off, and only with Turkey and Greece.  The text then provides an explanation of how 
U.S. relations with both countries developed until they were admitted to NATO in 1952.  
This text also shows signs of Melvyn Leffler’s attacks (described below) as it gives much 
more attention to security strategy and military planning than The Origins of the Cold War in 
the Near East does.119   According to Kuniholm’s website at Duke University’s Sanford 
School of Public Policy, he is now working on a book specifically dealing with Turkish-
American relations.120 
Melvyn Leffler can also be mentioned here since several of his works are vital for 
understanding the foundations of postwar Turkish-U.S. relations.  Leffler is one of the 
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preeminent Cold War historians, and he came to writing on Turkey through the attempt to 
define exactly how strategic imperatives in the Eastern Mediterranean informed the decisions 
of U.S. policy makers in the early Cold War era.  In regard to Turkey, and the Eastern 
Mediterranean in general, Leffler asserts that the dictating motivation for U.S. policy makers 
was security strategy, not Soviet behavior.  Authors such as Gaddis and Kuniholm, on the 
other hand, emphasize Soviet behavior as the spur for U.S. policy makers.   
This difference in approach resulted in a series of exchanges between Leffler on the one 
hand, and Bruce Kuniholm and John L. Gaddis on the other, in 1981-1985.  Kuniholm 
published The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East in 1980, and Leffler’s scathing 
review of it appeared in Reviews in American History in 1981.121   Leffler subsequently 
presented a paper decidedly critical of Kuniholm’s book to the Organization of American 
Historians in 1983.122  The following year Leffler published another article on American 
national security strategy, to which both Gaddis and Kuniholm were invited to respond; 
Leffler also wrote a lengthy response to their criticisms.123 
The debate between these three eminent historians warrants comment since their arguments 
are highly relevant to this study.  All three of the historians involved pursued their 
perspective by focusing on what they considered to be the primary actor in the issue:  
Kuniholm utilized mostly U.S. State Department documents and focused on diplomacy in 
order to formulate his arguments; Gaddis focused on strategy but asserted that Soviet actions 
towards Turkey did indeed warrant the steps that resulted in containment; Leffler also pointed 
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to strategy but asserted that Soviet behavior in fact did not warrant the U.S.’s stringent 
response, and that a variety of other factors caused U.S. officials to move unilaterally towards 
containment.  An objective mid-1990s summary of this tempest explains that the issues at 
stake when the terse debate took place still had not received a conclusive treatment.  That 
author continues to mention that the fundamental difference between Gaddis and Leffler boils 
down to who receives the blame for initiating the Cold War:  Gaddis indicts the Soviets, but 
Leffler says that, because the U.S. was the only real actor, U.S. officials took actions to 
preserve U.S. security that had the effect of starting the Cold War.124 
This writer’s view is that, of the three scholars, Melvyn Leffler marshaled the most 
comprehensive evidence, composed the argument with the greatest explanatory power, and 
utilized the soundest logic.  For this reason, the discussion in this study will reflect Leffler’s 
perspective on Soviet behavior towards Turkey post-WWII, and will place the strategic 
calculations of U.S. officials within the larger cultural, economic, military, and political 
historical juncture which created the Turkish-American alliance. 
During that nearly four-year debate with Kuniholm and Gaddis, Leffler produced several 
articles that, amongst other issues, concerned Turkish-U.S. relations in the early Cold War. 
“Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-
1952,” for instance, is one of the key texts on post-WWII Turkish-American relations, and 
provides a wealth of archival documents for scholars interested in Turkish-American 
relations.  However, that article is also Leffler’s only publication that focuses specifically on 
the Turkish-U.S relationship.  Because Turkey was not Leffler’s main focus, only when the 
greater Cold War context required attention to Turkish-American relations did he focus on 
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that issue in later works.125 
Dankwart A. Rustow was also a scholar who did not focus specifically on Turkey, but whose 
interests brought him to the subject, and resulted in a major text on Turkish-U.S. relations.  
Technically a political scientist and a sociologist, Rustow was interested in how developing 
states can make the transition to democratic systems.  This focus led him to Turkey’s 
democratization process.  In addition to several articles that dealt with Turkey and Turkish-
U.S. relations, in 1987 Rustow published Turkey:  America’s Forgotten Ally.126 
Amongst the works discussed in this section, Rustow’s is an exception, possibly because he 
was a sociologist in addition to being a political scientist.  Many authors, of course, have 
written about the various aspects of Turkish society and the changes it has experienced over 
the past 100 years.  Rustow’s text is important for this study because it covers a wide variety 
of issues related to Turkish society, including culture, education, economy, religion, 
technology, and women’s rights, in the context of Turkish-U.S. relations, which is something 
rare in the literature on the Turkish Republic.  Another important aspect of Turkey:  
America’s Forgotten Ally is the fact that the author utilized the expertise of many intellectuals 
concerned with Turkish-American relations in both countries, and interviewed a number of 
figures from the Turkish intellectual and political elite, including Prime Minister Turgut Özal, 
while composing the book.   
This author has found the lack of serious academic attention, outside of political science, to 
the issue of Turkish-U.S. relations remarkable when even today many Turkish people, 
especially from the elite classes, refer condescendingly to their own country as “the 51st 
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State.”  Such phrases suggest a far deeper relationship than just politics, but even in a 
canonical sociology text such as Rethinking Modernity and National Identity inTurkey,127 
almost no attention is given to the interaction between Turkish and American culture.  An 
architectural chapter of Rethinking Modernity and National Identity inTurkey, for instance, 
refers specifically to important İstanbul architectural projects designed by U.S. firms, and 
even mentions the Americanizing “aspirations” of Turkish society, but makes no effort to 
analyze exactly how, why, or from where this trend emerged.128  The competition between 
Anglophile (predominantly the American cultural version) and Francophile segments of the 
Turkish elite is another topic in dire need of academic analysis.                                     
Thus, Rustow’s text is welcome simply for the fact that he takes in hand subjects outside of 
the usual political science realm.  The fifth and sixth chapters of Rustow’s book do focus on 
political facets of the Turkish-U.S. relationship, but the discussion in other chapters 
frequently refers to Turkey’s interactions with the U.S. and to the post-WWII period. 
Possibly the book’s main weakness is its brevity, only 126 pages of text, when a much more 
detailed exploration of the subject would have been apt. 
Other examples of prominent scholars who devoted a great deal of their career to Turkey and 
Turkish-U.S. relations are figures like Richard D. Robinson and John VanderLippe.  
Robinson, as Howard Reed explains in a 1997 journal article, spent much of his early 
academic career either in Turkey or writing about Turkey and its interaction with the U.S.129  
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VanderLippe, an associate professor at the New School, recently published a major 
contribution to the scholarship on the İsmet İnönü era of Turkish politics.130 
Overall, U.S. scholars focusing on Turkish-U.S. relations are extremely few in number, and 
the number of academic works produced by those academicians corresponds.131  Apparently, 
the fact that Turkey is simply one of the many states that the U.S. had established closer 
relations with since WWII contributed to the lack of attention paid to it by American 
scholars.  From Turkey’s perspective, the U.S. was the predominant international actor, the 
nature of the relationship was new, and the other states around it were either old enemies or 
unstable.  The result has been relatively much greater production from Turkish academia on 
Turkish-U.S. relations.Another consequence is that U.S. texts on Turkish-American relations 
in the post-WWII era are rarely academic historiography, but instead are geared towards the 
foreign policies that Turkey and the U.S. have instituted towards each other.  Thus, in the 
literature on Turkish-American relations, Turkish authors have been more numerous as well 
as more prolific, whereas U.S. authors on the subject have tended to compose academically 
stronger texts.  Both sets of authors are preoccupied with the subject’s politics to the neglect 
of the many other issues that comprise Turkish-U.S. relations.132 
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1.5.  Aims 
 
As should be apparent from the above discussion of the literature concerning Turkish-U.S. 
relations, this subject lacks serious historiographical analysis.  Most of the extant works are 
general, focus superficially on momentary political trends, and do little to enable readers to 
understand the fundamental factors that have moved relations between these two states since 
WWII.  The result is a notable inability on the part of most contemporary commentators to 
speak or write in a consistent, incisive, or fruitful manner on Turkish-U.S. affairs.  Only 
recently, on the Turkish side of the equation, have hopeful signs of new analytical approaches 
emerged. 
Accordingly, this study’s essential purpose is to explore a new route to understanding 
Turkish-U.S. relations by focusing on the main State Department figure in the post-WWII 
era, Dean Acheson.  More specifically, this study aims to examine a figure who had vital 
influence not only on post-WWII formulation of policy towards the Turkish Republic, but 
also on how that policy became practice.  In the following chapters, aspects of Acheson’s 
responsibilities, relationships with other U.S. and Turkish officials, attitudes and motivations 
towards issues concerning U.S. foreign policy and Turkey, and personality will be discussed 
in an attempt to define more precisely and fundamentally what calculations went into U.S. 
policy towards Turkey in the 1945-1952 period.  Identifying and analyzing other factors 
influencing Acheson’s decisions concerning Turkey, such as U.S. public opinion and the 
views of Congressional leaders, are additionalelements informing this study’s conclusions.  
Looking at former Secretary of State Acheson will aid in understanding more clearly and 
definitively how the State Department made policy towards Turkey, what the State 
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Department knew about Turkey, and what the opinions of State Department officials 
concerning Turkey and its importance to the U.S. were.    
Melvyn Leffler’s now-canonical text on the early Cold War, A Preponderance of Power, 
provides one of the starting points for this study’s analysis, and illustrates clearly why 
Acheson, while certainly not the only possible candidate, is a crucial and appropriate figure to 
research.  In the Introduction to his text, Leffler explains the role of power in the thinking of 
post-WWII officials:   
  …  military officials and their civilian superiors in the Pentagon operated 
 from assumptions that attributed primacy to geopolitical configurations of power and 
 to war making capabilities.  Military planners assumed that if war erupted it would be 
 protracted; the sidethat had superior industrial and technological capabilities would 
 prevail.  In peacetime, therefore, it was essential to thwart the Kremlin from gaining 
 control of critical industrial infrastructure, skilled labor, raw materials, and forward 
 bases.  The United States had to retainallies across the oceans….  Subsequently, the 
 most important National Security Council (NSC) papers of the Trumanadministration 
 incorporated a geostrategic vision….  Power was defined in terms of the control of 
 resources, industrial infrastructure, and overseas bases….  The task of American 
 policymakers, the CIA advised, was to keep “the still widely dispersed power 
 resources of Europe and Asia from being drawn together into a single Soviet 
 power  structure”….  Winning the loyalty of peoples on the periphery was part of a 
 “sociological” security dilemma whose solution would thwart Communist inroads and 
 Soviet efforts to gain domination over the “Eurasian littoral.”133 
From 1945-1949, Acheson either was an important policy-maker in the State Department (as 
Under Secretary) or an activist working to win domestic support for the Truman 
Administration’s foreign policies;from 1949-1953, Acheson was the single person most 
charged with the execution of the strategy described by Leffler.  Although the relevance of 
such a strategy to a study of the U.S.’ post-war alliance with the Turkish Republic is self-
evident, Leffler’s text only concerns U.S. policy-makers and the early Cold War years in 
general.  This study, on the other hand, is interested in delving further into the details of how 
one policy-maker, Dean Acheson, was involved in making and carrying out policy towards 
Turkey.  Acheson operated with the assumptions concerning geostrategy and power 
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elaborated in Leffler’s text, but that fact elucidates neither how U.S. policy towards Turkey 
was formulated, nor the factors affecting that formulation, in the vital years between 1945 
and 1952. 
In order to provide more comprehensive and precise information concerning early Cold War 
U.S. policy towards Turkey, this study will thus focus on the following key questions: 
 A) What role did Dean Acheson play in the formulation and practice of U.S. 
  policy towards the Turkish Republicduring the Truman Administration? 
Because a comprehensive examination of all the figures involved in formulating U.S. policy 
towards Turkey is not possible within the confines of this study, one key figure will be 
focused on.  Acheson contributed a fundamental influence on U.S. policy towards Turkey 
during the period in question, but despite the clear utility of looking at Acheson in the context 
of Turkish-U.S. affairs, no such analysis has previously been attempted.  This analysis will 
therefore provide a new approach to the subject. 
 B) What did Dean Acheson know or think about the Turkish government and/or 
  its people? 
This information will come from two main sources.  The first source is the clues that can be 
gleaned from official documents regarding how Acheson approached the Turkish issue, and 
the two most important sources for Acheson’s public documents are the NARA archives in 
College Park, Maryland and the Acheson Papers at the Truman Library in Independence, 
Missouri.  This researcher visited both of those archives in order to obtain relevant 
documents.  The published FRUS records comprise another important source of official 
documents relevant to Acheson’s public service career.  The other primary source for 
information about Acheson’s personal views is the books and articles that Acheson wrote 
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about his life and his views on political issues.134 
 C) What motivated Acheson while he formulated and/or carried out policy  
  towards the Turkish Republic? 
This issue naturally requires a certain amount of informed speculation.  The same sources 
used for Question B will be turned to for this issue, but some inductive reasoning must also 
be utilized since humans, including politicians and those serving in official capacities, do not 
always state their motivations openly.  For this reason different aspects of Acheson’s youth, 
upbringing, social status, education and experiences will be mentioned in connection to his 
official capacities in formulating policy.  
 D) What were the concrete results of the decisions that Acheson took and the 
policies he formulated or contributed to? 
Even though this study focuses on the post-WWII era, the nature of the relationship 
established between Turkey and the U.S. has often fluctuated and transformed.  This author’s 
view is that the foundation established in 1945-1952 is the reason for both the successes and 
failures that the alliance has experienced in the intervening 60 years.  Suggestions for a more 
profound understanding of the relationship will be included in the final section of this study. 
A primary reason for this writer’s interest in Turkish-American relations is the evident effect 
that the U.S. has had on the trajectory of the Turkish economy, military, and society over the 
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past 60 years.  Turkey is now in the later stages of industrialization, and its economic, 
military, and political clout is growing quickly.  Many factors have contributed to Turkey’s 
development since WWII, but the influence of the United States manifests itself widely and 
variously in Turkish society, especially on the cultural, economic, and technological levels.  
Turkish society has reacted to this influence in manifold and discrete ways, from full embrace 
to utter rejection; these stances have often taken more tangible forms in the political conflicts 
that gripped Turkish society in the tumultuous decades since Turkey first held free, fair, and 
transparent elections in 1950.  To what extent those electionswere the result of a need to 
present a truly democratic face for its republican superpower ally, which was then in the 
process of forming its own Delian League, is still debated by historians.135  Answers to the 
questions enumerated above will shed new light on whether U.S. officials saw the Turkish 
political system as a real factor in their policy deliberations. 
The process that led to the admission of Turkey to NATO is also known in general terms, but 
mostly in relation to the contemporary international political situation; much less is 
understood about how this decision worked itself out, in specific relation to Turkey, in the 
U.S. political and military bureaucracy of the time.  Turkey was a nation that received little 
official U.S. attention even in the late 1930s.  What U.S. officials knew about Turkey, what 
their opinions about Turkey were, what factors influenced their decisions and to what extent, 
and which officials were more important in the final decision to admit Turkey to NATO are 
largely unstudied and unknown subjects, but the result of which has had important regional 
and global ramifications over the past 60 years.  Recent development in Turkish culture, 
diplomacy, economy, state, military, and society suggest that these consequences will gain 
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gravity in the coming decades.  Therefore, understanding the roots of these changes will help 
academic analysis of the processes that have brought Turkey to where it is today.     
Ultimately, this dissertation advances a new and more in-depth perspective on the foundation 
of the post-WWII Turkish-U.S. alliance.  Implicit in this study’s conclusions are new routes 
for analyses of both the successes and failures in bilateral relations between the two states 
over the past 60-plus years. 
Finally, this author hopes to avoid the political pitfalls that many previous authors on this 
subject fell into to a greater or lesser extent.  To this author’s mind, the most encouraging 
sign in recent Turkish-U.S. studies is the emergence of a handful of scholars who are 
politically neutral and academic.  Deeper comprehension of the true ramifications of the 
Turkish-American relationship can be attained only through non-partisan analysis of its many 
historical manifestations. 
Several notes on archival sources for Turkish-U.S. relations in the WWII and post-WWII era 
are apropos.  The most important is that the archival materials available in the U.S. are vast 
and largely uninspected.  This writer has gone through his own learning process in the 
College Park NARA archives.  As I became familiar with the organization of those archives, 
and at the same time scanned the materials from NARA that have been used in other authors’ 
texts, the realization of how great the potential material for studies of Turkish-U.S. relations 
actually is dawned on me.  This study, for example, utilizes two of the Record Groups from 
the College Park archives.  However, dozens of other Record Groups are relevant to research 
on Turkish-U.S. relations, and to-date, no academic text on the subject has even approached a 
comprehensive examination of the possible NARA sources.  Hopefully, the archival potential 
present for scholars of Turkish-U.S. relations will convince more to devote their effort to 
academic studies of the topic, and to remain in academia. 
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A complicating aspect of Turkish-U.S. relations is the vast amount of documents that are still 
inaccessible to researchers, and on both sides of the issue.  Better-known is the fact that the 
vast majority of official Turkish documents from the WWII and post-WWII era are still 
unavailable to researchers.  In NARA, however, a great percentage (approximately twenty 
percent) of the most interesting documents are still classified, especially in files dated 1947 
and later.136  The Freedom of Information Act will open other sources of information to 
scholars of Turkish-U.S. relations who can wrest new documents from official files.
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 2.0.  FORMULATING AND CONDUCTING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE TURKISH 
REPUBLIC:   DEAN ACHESON, 1945-1953 
 
 
Before examining Dean Acheson, the official that this study is focused on, providing the 
reader background that will serve to emphasize why Acheson had a vital role in formulating 
and implementing policy towards the Turkish Republic after WWII is essential.  
Consequently, the following two chapters will focus on Harry S. Truman’s term as U.S. 
President, and the approach that he took towards conducting American foreign policy while 
negotiating with other actors, especially in the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public, who had 
their own passionately-held views concerning the correct course for the country to take as it 
took on its new role as the world’s preeminent economic, political, and military power.  
 
2.0.1.  President Truman’s Cabinet, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Public Opinion 
 
This chapter will focus on the attitude that U.S. President Harry S. Truman took towards 
foreign policy.  The underlying aim is to elucidate how U.S. foreign policy was formulated 
and implemented during Harry S. Truman’s Presidency in anticipation of discussing Dean 
Acheson’s premier role in that effort.  
 
2.0.1.1.  Truman’s Focus on Domestic Affairs and Economy 
 
A commonplace statement amongst historians writing about Harry S. Truman is the 
observation that he not only was not well-prepared to conduct U.S. foreign policy upon 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) death in April 1945, he also was not terribly confident 
towards or interested in that aspect of his new job.  Truman’s experiences as an elected 
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official had made him an excellent party man, someone who knew the details of how politics, 
from the grassroots to the U.S. Senate, worked, and how to get results from that system.  In 
other words, Truman knew, and was comfortable, only with domestic politics. 
Born into a rural Missouri family, Truman’s life had included work as a farmer, a clerk, an 
officer during WWI, and a haberdasher in Kansas City.  His formal education did not extend 
beyond the high school level, except for some night classes in law.  His knowledge of history 
came not from school, but from his extensive reading on the subject.1 
Truman’s entrance into Missouri politics also was not auspicious.  His first foray came after 
Mike Pendergast (brother to the infamous Tom) convinced him to run for judge of Jackson 
County, Missouri in the early 1920s.  Truman won, but then lost two years later, following 
which, in 1926, he ran for and won (with the support of Tom Pendergast) the position of 
presiding judge.  Through this position, and his steadfast ability to stay clear of the corruption 
that riddled Missouri politics at the time, Truman gradually built his reputation and popularity 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Despite his connection to, and the public’s association 
of him with, Tom Pendergast’s Democratic Party political machine-cum-racket in Kansas 
City, Truman was noted for his rectitude and constant pursuit of the public good.2 
 
2.0.1.1.1.  Senate experiences 
 
In 1934, Truman again benefitted from his connection to Tom Pendergast.  Pendergast’s 
unsavory business affairs caused leading Missouri Democrats to turn down his offer of 
                                                            
1
 Donovan, Robert.  Conflict and Crisis:  The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945-1948.  
Columbia, Missouri:  University of Missouri Press, 1996.  pp. xxii, xv-xvi; Gosnell, Harold 
F.  Truman’s Crises:  A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman.  Westport, Conn.:  
Greenwood Press, 1980. pp. 5, 10, 15, 28-33, 43-44, 52-57. 
2
 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. ix; Gosnell pp. 33-34, 83-94.  Gosnell attributes Truman’s 
first political foray to Jim Pendergast, Mike Pendergast’s son. 
59 
 
support during that year’s Missouri Senate seat election.  Thus, he turned to Truman as a 
candidate who could offer voters a clean reputation; Truman then won a divided race in the 
Democratic primary and easily rode the Depression-era anti-Republican tide to victory 
against the incumbent.3 
Truman continued his same honest political activities in Washington D.C.  During his first 
term, from 1934-1940, Missouri Senator Truman had to avoid appearing to be either 
Pendergast’s puppet or a faceless FDR advocate who had forgotten his home state’s needs.  
Truman pursued his own political goals, independently, when he felt it conformed to his 
ideals, but made sure that patronage went to Missouri, and to Pendergast, when necessary or 
desirable.  At the same time, Truman did not always fall in line with FDR’s wishes.  Even 
though Truman was a freshman Senator, and thus stayed reticent in Senate proceedings, he 
did become closely involved in certain issues, and gained expertise in topics related to 
transportation.  He also paid close attention to farm and labor topics, which were important to 
two of his main constituencies.  At the end of Truman’s first term, Pendergast’s Kansas City 
political machine was broken up and Truman, who refused to repent of his ties to the 
disgraced boss, even resented FDR for impinging on Truman’s prerogatives as a Missouri 
Senator.  In the 1940 Senatorial race, Truman would have a strong, but independent record to 
present to the voters as a balance to the tarnish of his connections to Pendergast.4       
Despite the downswing in Democratic Party political fortunes towards the end of the 1930s, 
Truman won the 1940 Missouri Senatorial contest by following a strategy similar to that of 
his 1934 campaign.  In the Democratic primary, Truman again faced a split competition, 
which allowed him to play to his own strengths, especially his Senate record as a loyal New 
Dealer and the various special interests, such as the farm and labor vote, that comprised the 
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Missouri voting population.  After a narrow 8,000 vote victory in the primary, brought about 
through energetic campaigning, strong organization, and superior strategy, Truman defeated 
his Republican opponent in the general election.  Truman’s sensitivity to Missouri’s voters 
and the issues important to them proved more important than the stigma of his association 
with the Pendergast machine.5  
As Truman’s second term as Missouri Senator began, the deepening crisis overseas started to 
assume greater importance in U.S. politics.  Truman’s greatest role in the following four 
years was a direct result of that crisis, but in keeping with his political expertise and 
preference, that task focused on a domestic concern, the defense industry and its organization 
for the war effort.  As chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National 
Defense Program, popularly known as the Truman Committee, Truman found a role that 
finally garnered him positive national attention.  His activities as head of the Special 
Committee helped save lives and billions of dollars, and got him on the cover of Time 
magazine in 1943.  In sum, Truman’s reputation as “watchdog of the treasury,” built though 
the Special Committee chairmanship, made him a candidate for Vice-President in 1944.6  
  
2.0.1.1.2.  U.S. Vice-President 
 
In the run up to the 1944 election, the question of who would run with FDR as his Vice- 
Presidential nominee threatened to rend the Democratic Party in half.  Henry A. Wallace was 
the Vice-President and, even though FDR’s adamant support for Wallace in 1940 had ensured 
Wallace’s nomination, Wallace had made powerful enemies in the intervening four years.  
Conservative factions in the Democratic Party demanded anyone but Wallace, and an ailing 
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FDR, whom Wallace had aggravated while performing his capacities as chairman of the 
Board of Economic Warfare and presiding officer of the Senate, declined to fight for 
Wallace’s renomination.  Despite Wallace’s real popularity with the Democratic Party’s 
voting base and the 1944 Democratic Convention’s delegates, Truman emerged as a 
compromise candidate between the liberal, New Dealer wing of the Democratic Party and the 
more conservative business, city boss, and Southern wing.  Organized labor, though pro-
Wallace, remembered Truman’s record and played an important role in swinging to Truman.  
For his part, Truman denied wanting the nomination up until the last moment, when he was 
convinced that FDR indeed preferred to have him as his running mate.7 
The choice of Truman as FDR’s running mate was, in reality, a pragmatic choice for the 
Democrats, since the most important characteristic that Truman possessed was that he would 
not lose FDR any voters, and might win him some votes in Missouri.  Truman would also be 
largely alone during the campaign since work relating to the war effort was overwhelming for 
the ailing President; Truman and FDR met only one time in order to discuss campaign 
strategy, and FDR made only a handful of, albeit highly effective, speeches.  Truman’s 
speeches during the campaign gave little attention to U.S. foreign policy even if he did touch 
on isolationism from time-to-time.  Mostly, he stayed close to the domestic issues that he 
knew well.  In addition to the alienation of the Democrat Party’s liberal wing, the other 
important political result from the 1944 election was the fact that the tide seemed to have 
turned against isolationism in U.S. domestic politics.8    
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Truman’s accession to the Vice-Presidency did not bring added responsibilities to Truman, 
nor did it bring him closer to FDR’s inner circle of advisors.  Even though Truman’s ten 
years of Senate experience would have made him a valuable asset to the President, he rarely 
saw FDR during the eighty-plus days that he served as Vice-President.  This also meant that 
Truman had no experience with the administration’s foreign policy or the manner in which it 
was devised and carried out.  On the day that FDR died and he was sworn in as President, 
Truman was still ignorant of the atomic bomb project, a topic concerning which, only weeks 
later, he would be making momentous decisions.  Even though Truman had been active in the 
Senate as per his duties as Vice-President, he knew nothing of FDR’s handling of foreign 
policy.  For example, the reality of what had transpired at Yalta was a mystery to Truman 
despite his role in enabling FDR’s well-known speech to Congress on that conference.9  
As is clear from the above synopsis of Truman’s early life and political career to 1945, his 
experiences were almost exclusively related to domestic American concerns.  However, 
Truman’s focus on such issues is understandable considering his background and the 
opportunities available to someone born into a rural Missouri farming family near the end of 
the 19th century.  Those issues and experiences were principal factors that enabled Truman to 
create a long and successful political career.   
 
2.0.1.2. Truman’s Relationship with the State Department 
 
  The most important Cabinet officer is the Secretary of State.  He is the direct 
 representative of the President for all foreign Ambassadors.  He is also in charge of 
 American Ambassadors to foreign countries.  He must not only be well informed on 
 world affairs, but he must be a man who can distinguish the wheat from the chaff in 
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 the reports that come from all these countries.      
  The President, of course, must be prepared to support his Cabinet members 
 when they need backing.  This is especially true with regard to the Secretary of State.  
 It is immensely important that these two men -- the President and the Secretary of 
 State -- understand each other completely and that they know what their respective 
 roles are.  The Secretary of State should never at any time come to think that he is the 
 man in the White House, and the President should not try to be the Secretary of 
 State.10 
 
Thus, as Harry S. Truman assumed his duties as U.S. President, foreign policy was an 
entirely new endeavor for him, but because of the historical circumstances, foreign policy 
was the predominant issue facing U.S. decision-makers.  To Truman’s credit, he was aware 
of his lack of international affairs expertise. With no comprehensive university education, and 
his sole foray abroad consisting of his wartime experiences, Truman got most of his 
knowledge of foreign peoples and cultures from his readings on history.  Throughout not only 
his political career, but his life, Truman had been immersed in issues that were almost 
exclusively domestic, local, and provincial.11  For this reason Truman desired, when possible, 
to give most of his attention to the domestic issues that he knew best, and leave foreign policy 
to those who were intimately familiar with FDR’s ideas and intentions.12  This meant that 
Truman’s Secretary of State would receive much greater freedom of decision and action than 
those who had filled that position in the past had enjoyed. 
Truman’s first term as President, coming at the conclusion of humankind’s most devastating 
conflict and at the dawn of what was to become the Cold War, was consequently replete with 
foreign policy quandaries.  In order to make up for his shortfall in foreign policy experience 
and knowledge, Truman would work as tenaciously as he always had in order to make 
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informed decisions as best he could.  Upon Truman’s assumption of the Presidency, FDR’s 
last Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, was fully engaged with preparations for the San 
Francisco Conference of the nascent United Nations (U.N.), so Under Secretary Joseph Grew, 
former U.S. Ambassador to both Japan and Turkey, was Acting Secretary.  Truman went to 
Stettinius and Grew, as well as many others in both the civilian and military administration, 
for a crash course in the foreign policy issues facing the United States at that time.  This 
inexperience and openness, however, also led him to being easily swayed by those from 
whom he sought advice.  The initial results were the inauspicious first encounter with 
Molotov, the premature cut in Lend-Lease shipments, and tension with British Prime Minister 
Churchill.  After the conclusion of the San Francisco U.N. Conference, Truman officially 
appointed James F. Byrnes, to whom he felt a personal debt, as Secretary of State even 
though Byrnes also had little experience with foreign relations.  Truman’s aversion to the 
State Department’s professional diplomats probably played a role in his appointment of 
Byrnes.13 
Immediately after Byrnes replaced Stettinius, Truman and his new Secretary of State headed 
to Germany for the Big Three meeting in Potsdam.  Truman did not actually want to attend 
the meeting, but felt that the situation warranted a trip across the Atlantic.  In any event, 
Potsdam was the only summit meeting that Truman attended as President.  Truman prepared 
for the conference with his customary heavy work load, interspersed with socializing and 
relaxation, while crossing the Atlantic.  At the conference Stalin, possibly seeking to utilize 
Truman’s inexperience, moved that Truman be made the conference’s chairman.  Truman 
then depended on his advisors to carry out that role.  For his part, Truman misjudged Stalin’s 
true nature, but by the end of the conference had begun to feel apprehension towards his ally.  
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Potsdam’s results have been debated thoroughly by historians. To be brief, some agreements 
made on key issues eventually disintegrated, and other issues were left undecided.  From 
Truman’s standpoint, the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which Truman 
immediately proposed in the Conference’s opening session, would allow him to devote his 
attention to domestic priorities.  In fact, the account of Potsdam in Truman’s memoirs gives 
the reader a lively impression of Truman’s unease, and his desire to return back to 
Washington and the domestic issues with which he felt more comfortable.  The day that 
Truman termed his “best day” (26 July 1945) at the Conference featured no negotiations and 
was, instead, spent in Frankfurt inspecting American forces in and around the city.14 
In the months following Potsdam, Truman actualized his dislike for diplomacy by giving 
Byrnes a free rein with which to conduct U.S. foreign relations, including with the USSR.  
This situation continued from July 1945 until January 1946, when Congressional, public, and 
State Department pressure, coupled with Truman’s annoyance at not being fully informed 
concerning foreign policy activity and decisions, resulted in Truman’s assertion of his 
authority in diplomatic decisions.  In his memoirs, Truman begins his explanation of the fall 
out with Byrnes by stating that FDR had given Byrnes excessive freedom to act in Byrnes’s 
wartime capacity as head of the Offices of Economic Stabilization and War Mobilization; he 
follows with a restatement of how he believed the relationship between the President and the 
Secretary of State should be conducted, emphasizing that the President made decisions while 
the Secretary advised.  He then launches into a five-page grievance concerning Byrnes’s 
impropriety in executing U.S. foreign policy in the last half of 1946, culminating in the 
famous “my dear Jim” letter that ended with “I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”  After this 
confrontation, Truman asserts that Byrnes began to behave in a manner befitting Truman’s 
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conception of a Secretary of State, but then came to Truman several months later 
complaining that health problems would force him to resign.  Truman convinced him to stay 
on for the coming Council of Foreign Ministers conferences, but for the rest of 1946, 
Byrnes’s foreign policies were more closely coordinated with the President.15 
When Truman reports that Byrnes wanted to resign, he also states that he already had a 
replacement in mind, General George C. Marshall.  Correspondingly, Truman appointed 
Marshall Secretary of State as soon as Marshall returned from China, where he directed the 
unsuccessful attempt to broker peace between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese 
Nationalists.  Truman’s relationship with Marshall was more productive than that with 
Byrnes.  Besides the fact that Truman did not, as he had done with Byrnes, offer the position 
to Marshall out of a feeling of personal guilt, the main reason for Marshall’s successful tenure 
was that Marshall was a man of entirely different stature than Byrnes.  At that time, as he still 
is today, Marshall was considered one of America’s foremost military and political figures, 
and the immense respect he was accorded was unlike that given to any other contemporary 
leader.  Marshall’s announcement to the press, upon arrival in Washington D.C. to take on his 
new job, that his position would be non-political and that he would not become involved in 
political issues served only to increase reverence for his personality.  That announcement also 
eased Marshall’s relationship with Truman, since rumors that Marshall might be a 
Presidential candidate for the 1948 election were rife.  The advantages that Marshall provided 
to Truman were that the two men understood the President-Secretary of State relationship 
similarly, and that Marshall would command respect in the hostile, Republican-dominated 
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80th Congress.16 
In the event, Truman’s choice of Marshall was fortuitous given the crisis that erupted almost 
immediately upon Marshall’s assuming his duties as Secretary of State.  Little more than a 
month after Marshall was confirmed by the Senate, the British government informed the U.S. 
State Department that British finances could no longer bear the burden of aid to Greece and 
Turkey.  The response devised by the Truman administration was, first, a new position on 
foreign policy, later termed the Truman Doctrine, and a program of economic aid to states in 
need, called the Marshall Plan after the Secretary of State who announced it to the world in 
June 1947; the respect that even a Republican Congress felt for Marshall ensured that the 
Marshall Plan, with Truman keeping a safe distance, passed easily.  Throughout the 
remainder of Marshall’s term as Secretary, Truman would follow a similar strategy, letting 
Marshall’s prestige win over legislators, citizens, and foreign leaders who otherwise may 
have been estranged by Truman or by their dislike of Truman.  Marshall was beset by various 
foreign crises during all of his two years leading the State Department.  He performed his 
duties calmly, unflinchingly, and masterfully, and in the process resurrected the State 
Department’s reputation, which emerged from WWII in the military’s shadow and stumbled 
through Byrnes’s term as Secretary.17 
Marshall’s age, the stresses of the position, and his health eventually wore down his ability 
and desire to continue in the office.  Even before becoming Secretary of State, Marshall had 
attempted to retire from public life, only to be called back to service.  After Truman’s 
successful 1948 reelection run, Marshall underwent kidney surgery and Dean Acheson, who 
                                                            
16
 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, pp 266-67; Pogue, Forrest C.  George C. Marshall:  
Statesman.  New York:  Viking, 1987.  pp. 144-151; Stoler, Mark A.  George C. Marshall:  
Soldier-Statesman of the American Century.  Boston:  Twayne Publishers, 1989.  pp. 153-
158; Truman, Memoirs, Volume 1, pp. 493-494. 
17
 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, pp. 354-355; Gosnell pp.343-344; Pogue pp. 151-157, 160-
412; Stoler pp. 154-155, 159-173. 
68 
 
had earned Truman’s attention and trust as Under Secretary of State, accepted the offer to 
succeed Marshall.18 
Dean Acheson assumed his duties in early 1949, after serving as Under Secretary of State for 
Byrnes and for part of Marshall’s term.  In actuality, Acheson spent much of his Under 
Secretary stint as Acting Secretary of State while Secretary Byrnes was out of the country for 
conferences.  Acheson’s term will be described in detail below, so this section will suffice 
with a short summary focused on Acheson’s relationship with President Truman.   
The main advantages that Acheson brought to the position of Secretary were that he had 
worked with Truman previously, had won his trust, knew what Truman expected from his 
Secretary of State, could fulfill that role completely, and even possessed an established 
reputation as a diplomat.  Despite the apparent dissimilarities between Acheson and Truman, 
the two would develop a close working relationship and mutual respect that would endure for 
the remainder of their lives.  Conceivably, the fact that neither one of the men came from 
elite families and both had a similar fondness for rural life enabled the two men to forge their 
bond, even though Acheson had gained entrance to elite East Coast society through education 
and profession,.  Furthermore, Acheson took over the post of Secretary of State at pivotal 
point in world history:  the Berlin Crisis was at its height, China was falling to the 
Communists, NATO’s foundation was only several months away, and the Korean War would 
break out a year later.  Acheson and Truman worked their way through all of these 
overwhelming emergencies together.  After both retired from public life, they continued to 
write each other letters filled with the regard that each felt for the other.19  
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Thus, at the conclusion of his Presidency, Truman’s relationship with the State Department 
was certainly better than it had been in 1945, and the reason for that improvement is found in 
the second and third appointments that he made to the Secretary of State post.  As always, 
Truman learned quickly what kind of person got the results that he was looking for.  
Consequently, his second and third choices for State Department leadership are acclaimed as 
two of the greatest to fill that office.  Those two men enabled Truman to focus on domestic 
priorities while knowing that he would receive close consultation and cooperation on foreign 
policy when the need arose. 
 
2.0.1.3.  Truman’s Relationship with Congress 
 
Through much of his more than seven years as President, Truman had a difficult relationship 
with Congress, especially in regard to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.  Various negative 
adjectives could accurately describe Truman’s interactions with Congress, such as 
antagonistic, acrimonious, or confrontational, despite the fact that Truman enjoyed a 
Democratic majority in both houses of Congress for all but two years of his Presidential term.   
That Truman had spent ten years in that legislative body, and knew many of the members of 
Congress closely and personally, did not change the reality that the interests and perspectives 
of the Executive branch of the U.S. government are not always shared by the Legislative 
branch.  In the foreign policy realm, the President thinks in terms of the nation’s long-term 
interests while Congress thinks first of its local voting constituents.  In order to carry out 
foreign policy, the President depends on the Secretary of State to implement policy, but the 
Secretary must also convince Congress to support the Executive’s programs by underwriting 
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the necessary legislation.20  Throughout Truman’s term in office, he and his Secretaries of 
State experienced enormous difficulties in convincing Congress to support their foreign 
policy prescriptions.     
One of Truman’s first actions as President was to communicate with Congress both 
informally and formally, in an attempt to establish open communication and goodwill.  The 
honeymoon did not last long.  The appointment of James Byrnes as Secretary of State, for 
example, immediately created tension with important Senate leaders.  By June 1945, leading 
members of Congress began to attack his decisions.  After that initial grace period, Truman 
never again experienced simple relations with Congress.21 
 
2.0.1.3.1.  79th Congress:  1945-1946 
 
Truman acceded to the Presidency several months after the 79th Congress had convened and 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives were controlled by the Democrats.  Several 
features of this Congress should be noted, which will also bear on the discussion of the 
following three Congresses.  The first is that the most powerful Congressional committee in 
regard to foreign policy is the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; as he had since 1941, 
Texas Democratic Senator Tom Connally, who had served on the WWII-era Truman 
Committee, headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  From the end of WWII to 
1950, the most vocal figure on the Committee was its Senior Republican member, Michigan 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg.  Vandenberg’s influence on Republican votes for foreign policy 
issues was so vital that Dean Acheson would talk of the need to obtain the Vandenberg “seal 
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of approval” for foreign relations legislation introduced to the Senate.22 
A second important aspect of the 79th Congress was the continuing bipartisan agreement 
concerning foreign relations.  The understanding that foreign policy in a time of crisis should 
be off-limits to politicking was reached by FDR and some Republican members of Congress 
during 1944.  Although foreign policy did briefly emerge as an issue during the 1944 
Presidential campaign, the bipartisan agreement had held, and then was cemented by Arthur 
Vandenberg’s 10 January 1944 speech openly declaring his support for greater U.S. 
involvement abroad.23 
Finally, Congressional members’ political fealties during Truman’s entire Presidency may be 
misleading to the incautious.  A Democratic majority reigned in Congress during the 79th, 
81st, and 82nd Congresses, but many of those Democrats were Southerners, popularly known 
as “Dixiecrats.”  This meant that, even though nominally Democrats, those Congressional 
members may vote with the Republican Party on certain domestic issues, especially 
concerning race or other regional interests and concerns.  Complicating the situation was the 
reality that, if the Southern Democrats voted with the Republicans, the Republicans had de 
facto majorities in both the Senate and the House in the 79th Congress.  On the other hand, 
Southern Democrats were more likely to vote with the Democratic Party on international 
subjects.24  
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As mentioned, President Truman’s initial efforts to create a positive working atmosphere 
between the Executive and Legislative branches had been welcomed warmly.  By the time 
Congress met after the 1945 summer recess, however, the war had ended and the issues 
pressing members of Congress had wholly changed.  Furthermore, criticisms asserting that 
Truman was not his own man had emerged.  In order to establish his own Presidential 
authority and create distance between FDR’s legacy and his own administration, Truman 
presented a 21-point plan which he regarded his “Fair Deal.”  This domestic policy initiative 
met with partial success and partial failure as only about half of the plan’s proposals were 
eventually passed.  For their part, Republican Congress members interpreted the plan as the 
reignition of the antagonistic relations between the Executive and Legislative branches that 
had existed during FDR’s era.  Overall, Executive cooperation with Congress became 
difficult.  Throughout 1946, the situation remained the same as Truman was forced to 
constantly cajole, and sometimes berate, Congress into working on the legislation that he 
desired.25 
Truman’s relations with Congress also took a turn for the worse on the foreign policy front.  
By the closing months of 1945, Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes were already 
concerned about potential Senate reaction to their foreign policy decisions.  In a 19 October 
1945 memorandum to President Truman concerning a message to the Turkish government 
about Soviet demands on the Turkish Straits, Byrnes mentions that he had chatted with John 
Foster Dulles on the way to the London Foreign Ministers conference.  The result of the 
conversation was that he thought it necessary to confer with the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations about an issue proposed for the message that would entail U.S. 
commitments abroad.  This note is interesting because Dulles was not a Senator at the time.  
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Dulles had gone to the London Conference as an advisor on the strength of his foreign affairs 
knowledge.  He had also been Thomas Dewey’s foreign affairs advisor during Dewey’s 1944 
Presidential campaign and an advisor to the U.S. delegation (which included Arthur 
Vandenberg) at the 1945 San Francisco U.N. Conference.  In other words, Byrnes thought 
that Dulles had enough influence with Vandenberg, or shared such similar opinions, that the 
issue in the message could cause difficulties with Senators powerful in the Foreign Relations 
Committee.  Since the Democrats had control not only of the Senate but also the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Byrnes’s message awakens doubts about the confidence that Truman 
and Byrnes had in their foreign policy decisions, and in their relations with Congress.26        
The reality was that those doubts were well-founded.  Congress’s recommencement in 
autumn 1945 had brought not only domestic, but foreign policy concerns as well.  Soviet 
actions in summer of 1945 and after brought rising press reaction and pressure from within 
Truman’s Administration.  Congressional leaders, most importantly Arthur Vandenberg, felt 
increasing concern about Secretary Byrnes’ approach to cooperation with the Soviets.  After 
Byrnes’s controversial return from the December 1945 Moscow Conference, Truman began 
to give more direct attention to foreign policy while continuing the policy of bipartisan 
foreign policy deliberations.27   
As 1946 dawned, criticism of Byrnes’s handling of the Moscow Conference, Soviet behavior, 
Stalin’s 9 February 1946 speech, and the continuing issues of sharing atomic knowledge 
with, and making a loan to, the Soviets inspired an aggressive speech from Arthur 
Vandenberg.  Rhetorically asking the Senate “What is Russia up to now?,” Vandenberg urged 
the President’s administration to take a firmer stance towards the USSR.  The next day, 
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Byrnes also gave a speech indicating that U.S. policy towards the Soviets would feature less 
flexibility and more expectations.  Disillusionment and pressure began to force a change in 
the tenor of U.S. foreign policy.  Congress played its role in this development not only 
through Senator Vandenberg’s oratory, but also through the various political factors shaping 
Congressional votes.  The essential development for foreign policy was that, if President 
Truman wanted to pursue the policies that he and the Secretary of State thought necessary, he 
had to pay close attention to the mood in Congress.  During 1946 this increasingly meant 
vocal, overt opposition to Soviet actions, and eventually identifying the USSR as the new 
enemy.  Frustration with and distrust of Soviet actions during the mid-1946 Paris Council of 
Foreign Ministers Conferences also helped drive the Truman Administration towards this 
conclusion.28 
As the mid-term elections drew near in 1946, Truman was besieged by a number of domestic 
and foreign conundrums that affected his relationship with Congress.  Problems with 
demobilization, the domestic economy, labor, Southern Democrats, and accusations of 
Communist infiltration in the U.S. government all hovered around the Truman 
Administration.  Overall his public popularity had plunged dramatically in the space of just 
one year.  The omens did not bode well for his relationship with the 80th Congress.29 
 
2.0.1.3.2.  80th Congress:  1947-1948 
 
The 80th Congress, even though it featured the only Republican majorities that Truman would 
face, and even though Truman would label it the “Do Nothing Congress” during his 1948 
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campaign, passed some of the most important legislation in U.S. history.  Truman devoted 
entire chapters in his memoirs to describing the difficulties he experienced in working with 
Congress on both domestic and foreign policies, but he reserved special ire for the 80th 
Congress, even providing a list detailing that convention’s malfeasance.30  
During the 80th Congress, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was led by Republican 
Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who had already become a prominent figure in the 
Committee during the previous Congress.  So prominent, in fact, that he spent nearly two-
thirds of 1946 abroad attending conferences.  Even though he spent not a single day 
campaigning for reelection, he achieved victory in the 1946 by a margin of more than 
500,000 votes.31   
Vandenberg and Tom Connally, who was now the minority leader in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, were both included in foreign policy deliberations and conferences by 
the Truman Administration.  This effort was directly intended to enable and continue in the 
80th Congress the bipartisan foreign policy that had emerged from WWII. Vandenberg, for 
his part, wanted to continue the bipartisan foreign policy, and he would dominate Senate 
foreign policy concerns during the 80th Congress.  Vandenberg also succeeded in having 
Ohio Senator Robert Taft, the most prominent Senate Republican in relation to domestic 
issues, added to the White House’s conferrals with the Senate on foreign policy.  For the first 
half of 1947, relative cooperation existed between the Executive and Congress.32 
Immediately upon convention, the 80th Congress was beset by foreign policy issues of 
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unprecedented importance.  The first arrival was the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, then 
the Marshall Plan through the second half of the 1947 and into 1948.  Truman, despite the 
Republican majority in Congress, had success in ensuring these historical initiatives’ 
enaction.  Added to these Congressional issues were various foreign crises in China, Europe, 
Palestine, and elsewhere.  Largely because of the care that the White House and State 
Departments showed in collaborating with Vandenberg, Taft, and the rest of Congress, as 
well as the immense respect that Marshall commanded, foreign policy issues did not become 
sectarian during the 80th Congress.33 
Truman’s domestic policy, in contrast, was met by tendentious Republican obstruction after 
May 1947.  Despite the numerous domestic scandals that grew in proportion as the weeks and 
months passed, Truman adroitly focused attention on Congress in the 1948 campaign.  
Quietly, Truman and his advisors had worked out a Congressional strategy, geared towards 
the 1948 campaign, directly after the 1946 mid-term elections.  In the end, the plan 
succeeded, helped by Republican inability to unite and Dewey’s hesitation to attack foreign 
policy issues.  The 1948 election season was remarkable in that Truman was able to make 
Congress’s record over the previous two years a significant issue.34 
 
2.0.1.3.3.  81st Congress:  1949-1950 
 
The 1948 Presidential election featured not only the miraculous Truman victory. Truman also 
brought Congress with him, and the 81st Congress thus featured a return to Democratic 
majorities in both houses of Congress.  Tom Connally once again assumed leadership of the 
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with Arthur Vandenberg returning to minority leader 
status.  Vandenberg did retain his Senate preeminence in foreign affairs.  Another advantage 
for Truman was Dean Acheson’s return to the State Department in order to fill Marshall’s 
place as Secretary of State.  Acheson already had years of experience working with Congress, 
and had established his reputation.  Acheson would prove extremely capable as Secretary of 
State, but his stature would suffer domestically because of the McCarthy-era Communist 
witch hunts.  That period gained its name from the activities of Joseph McCarthy, who 
represented Wisconsin in the Senate from 1947-1957.35 
During 1949-1950, Truman would once again face stringent Congressional obstruction on 
domestic policy despite the apparent Democratic majorities.  Overall, most of the President’s 
major initiatives, especially concerning agriculture, civil rights, and welfare, saw little or no 
success in Congress.36   
Foreign policy during the 81st Congress, as was the case during the 80th Congress, was again 
marked by momentous developments.  Shortly after assuming his new post, Secretary 
Acheson was charged with finalizing the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding document of 
NATO, and guiding the treaty to Congressional ratification.  Other foreign policy issues 
remained vital -- China, the continuing Berlin Crisis, Soviet attainment of atomic weapons, 
and the outbreak of the Korean War occupied Truman and Acheson’s foreign policy 
deliberations.  Until 1950, foreign policy was implemented with bipartisan support from 
Congress.37 
Unfortunately, domestic U.S. politics meant the death of bipartisan foreign policy in 1950.  
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The most important factor was Arthur Vandenberg’s contraction of cancer, which debilitated 
him in 1949, and finally took him out of Congress in 1950.  Without Vandenberg’s steady 
hand, Senate Republicans fell under the divisive sway of Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft.  1950 
was again the mid-term election year, so Taft took the initiative to lead a broad attack on the 
Truman Administration.  Truman and Acheson successfully fended off the initial broadsides, 
but the conviction of Alger Hiss and the arrest of Klaus Fuchs gave Republicans endless 
material with which to attack the Administration as soft on communism.  Following those 
scandals, Joseph McCarthy began to assail various Truman Administration figures, including 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, as communists or communist sympathizers.  This meant 
that U.S. foreign policy also came under extreme criticism.  Despite the efforts of Truman 
and Acheson, bipartisan foreign policy became more and more difficult to maintain.  The 
decision to commit U.S. forces to Korea without Congressional approval exacerbated the 
decline towards a partisan foreign policy.38 
By the 1950 mid-term elections, a confluence of domestic and foreign developments 
damaged Truman’s fortunes and caused a serious deterioration in his relationship with 
Congress.  After triumph in the 1948 campaign, Democratic majorities were reduced in both 
houses of Congress.  The final two years of Truman’s presidency were to be trying, and his 
relationship with Congress contentious.39 
 
2.0.1.3.4.  82nd Congress:  1951-1952 
   
The 82nd Congress again convened with reduced Democratic majorities in both the Senate 
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and the House, and Tom Connally once again heading the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations.  The reduction in Democratic legislators also meant that the Republican-Dixiecrat 
majorities grew in both houses.  Immediately after the new Congress convened, Senator Taft 
gave notice that Congress’s modus operandi had changed by assaulting President Truman’s 
foreign policy in Korea and elsewhere.40   
Even during the last two years of his Presidency, Truman worked to maintain positive 
relations with Congress despite his increasing frustration.  In recognition of the 
Congressional reality, Truman set a new tone in his inaugural speech, emphasizing the 
perilous international situation rather than his Fair Deal domestic program.  Afterwards, 
domestic priorities would be tied to the communist threat, security, and/or the Korean War if 
possible since those issues guaranteed favorable treatment from Congress.  Of course, not all 
domestic economic and social problems could be tied to the Communist threat, and even 
some that were, such as the national uproar over Truman’s firing of General Douglas 
MacArthur, hurt Truman’s domestic approval.  Senator Taft took the MacArthur issue to the 
extreme by suggesting President Truman’s impeachment, but the issue was not raised in the 
Senate.  Scandals continued to erupt.   By the end of Truman’s term as President, few of his 
Fair Deal proposals were enacted by Congress.41  
In foreign relations, the Korean War would remain the dominant issue facing the Truman 
Administration.  On the subjects of foreign policy and security, the Korean War made a more 
ambitious defense spending program possible.  The presence of armed conflict with the 
Soviet bloc also made appropriations for European defense feasible.42 
At the beginning of the 1952 Congressional term, Truman once again promoted a bipartisan 
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approach to foreign policy and emphasized the Communist threat, but his own missteps and 
domestic troubles crippled the effectiveness of his efforts. Despite the political situation, he 
continued to fight for Congressional bills and work as hard as he always had.43 
Overall, President Truman’s difficult relationship with Congress had important repercussions 
in the years that followed his administration, for the Cold War in general, and for U.S.-
Turkish relations specifically.  Richard Freeland’s controversial and ground-breaking 
academic study The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism44 convincingly argues 
the thesis that the Truman Administration’s inability to convince Congress that tariffs, and 
economic protectionism in general, would fundamentally hinder Europe’s post-WWII 
economic, military, and political recovery forced a change in focus from economic aid to 
military aid.  For the same reason, the European Recovery Program was allowed to 
prematurely expire and the administration began to focus on European rearmament through 
NATO. 45   In other words, intransigent stances from Congress forced the Truman 
Administration into a foreign policy towards Europe somewhat different from their original 
intention; in order to convince Congress to support the necessary legislation, the Truman 
Administration was forced to emphasize the Communist Threat.  Foreign policy in general 
was forced towards the right side of the political spectrum.46  This emphasis, in turn, framed 
the context in which the Turkish Republic came to the attention of a broad swath of the 
American public.47  Aid to Turkey, and eventually alliance with Turkey, became closely 
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associated with the effort to thwart the Soviet Union, for better or for worse. 
 
2.0.1.4.  President Truman’s Relationship with the U.S. Military 
 
The issue of President Truman’s relationship with the military is not easy to divide into 
chronological periods or trends because the issues that caused interaction between the 
Executive branch and the military services did not alter fundamentally from the end of WWII 
to the culmination of Truman’s Presidency.  Since this summary is not intended to be 
comprehensive, all of the various subjects or even regions that the Executive-military 
relationship concerned in the 1945-1953 period will not be mentioned.  Instead, the 
discussion will be limited to only the most important developments, i.e. the effort to unify the 
armed forces and the post-WWII military planning that eventually turned into global strategic 
military preparation as the Cold War emerged.  Both of these issues will be examined with 
their overall relevancy to Turkish-U.S. relations in mind.   
To begin with, as in his relations with Congress, President Truman had some advantages with 
which he could approach his relationship with the branches of the U.S. armed forces.  
Foremost was his status as a WWI veteran who had served with distinction in that conflict.  
His experience as a soldier enabled him to understand more fully the way of life and the 
mentality of soldiers as well as develop leadership and organizational skills.  That 
background also facilitated Truman’s cultivation of strong relationships with Missouri 
veterans groups in Jackson County and across the state.48   
An additional advantage was Truman’s experience in the Senate.  During his second term, 
Truman gained membership in the Senate Military Committee.  He immediately grasped the 
opportunity to launch a committee charged with investigating the defense industry, later 
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given the moniker “Truman Committee,” that gave Truman’s name national prominence.  
That committee would also provide Truman with insight into how the U.S. military’s 
organization might be improved under increased civilian authority.49  
Truman was highly aware of both his military-related experiences and the manner in which 
those experiences could help him improve the capacities of the U.S. military as President.  In 
his memoirs, Truman described his Senatorial and Presidential relationship with military 
officials thus:   
  From the time I became President I made it plain, in my relations with the 
 military, that I was interested in the details of actual administration as much as the 
 larger objectives.  I had implicit faith and trust in Marshall, but I took the position that 
 the President, as the Commander in Chief, had to know everything that was going on.  
 I had had just enough experience to know that if you are not careful, the military will 
 hedge you in.                            
  It had long been customary for the ‘high brass’ in the Army and Navy to ‘take 
 over’ the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as well as the military 
 committees of the two Houses.  I knew this for I had been on the military committee 
 in the Senate….                        
  I should make it clear that these very capable officers did not try to get around 
 the President on major policies.  The Chiefs of Staff were always most cooperative.  
 But on the administrative level the military usually tried to take over, especially in the 
 management of purchases where vast sums of money were being spent.  I knew, for 
 example, that Army and Navy professionals seldom had any idea of the value of 
 money.50 
Though Truman had a deeply personal connection to the military, his professional 
responsibilities were primary because he tried to deal honestly with the requirements of his 
duties.  As a politician, as a legislator, and as the President he had come to be aware of 
problems in the military hierarchy, especially the lack of a unified military command.  To 
that end, he embarked upon the project of forging a single command mechanism for the U.S. 
armed forces.  This project would greatly complicate his relationship with the various 
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branches of the military as the branches competed for authority and funding.51 
 
2.0.1.4.1.  Unification of the U.S. Armed Forces 
 
Consequently, Truman experienced a number of bureaucratic, legislative, and personal battles 
with the military.  Subjects such as demobilization, control of the atomic bomb, and universal 
military training all became difficult and disputed issues in the years following WWII.  The 
most contested of all these issues was the unification of the military branches under what 
would become the Defense Department.  Some steps towards unifying the military’s 
command structure had already been taken during WWII.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
for example, were a wartime innovation that grew out of a need for better coordination with 
the British.  The JCS also featured planning functions in the Joint Strategic Survey 
Committee (JSSC) and the Joint Staff Planners.  Towards the end of the war, another military 
coordinating committee, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), was 
created in order to facilitate cross-department postwar policy planning.  This committee 
featured a number of subcommittees, including one dealing with the Near and Middle East.52  
An important aspect of the Truman Administration’s postwar planning problems was the fact 
that the issues were multifaceted, neither purely political nor purely military.  For that reason, 
political decisions also needed input from the military in order to ensure more comprehensive 
and prescient decisions.  The June 1945 Soviet note to the Turkish government, for example, 
inspired geostrategic military questions, and the JCS provided suitable advice for the Truman 
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Administration’s response.53 
According to Truman, late summer 1945 also provided the first opportunity to begin moving 
towards unification of the military command structures.  The end of hostilities, in course, 
forced the various armed forces branches to begin efforts to preserve as much as possible of 
the resources and authority that they had been given, out of necessity, during the war.  
Because the total would be much more limited than during the war, however, each branch 
would naturally attempt to emphasize its own importance relative to the others.  To that end, 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal asked for permanent increases in strength for the Navy 
and Marines, and suggested a cabinet-level civilian-military coordinating committee.54 
Forrestal’s initiative set off a chain reaction which resulted in Truman’s December 1945 
message to Congress that, amongst other things, recommended the unification of all the 
armed forces into a single Department of Defense.  The interservice struggles over turf 
continued for more than a year before Secretary Forrestal and Secretary of the War 
Department James Patterson were able to agree on a comprehensive plan.  The Congressional 
legislation for this plan, called the National Security Act of 1947, was finally approved in late 
July 1947, nearly two years after Secretary Forrestal set events in motion.  Through this act 
the JCS was accorded official legal status.55 
In addition to founding the Department of Defense, the National Security Act of 1947 
established several other U.S. governmental organizations that would have immediate bearing 
on U.S. policy towards Turkey.  The first was the National Security Council (NSC), 
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comprised of the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of the Defense, Army, Navy, 
and Air Force Departments, amongst others.  Furthermore, under the aegis of the NSC was, 
for the first time, a comprehensive peacetime foreign intelligence gathering organization, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).56 
Efforts to streamline the new Department of Defense resulted in more conflict amongst the 
military branches, including the famous “Admirals’ Revolt” of 1949. The attempt to impose 
unity and cooperation on the U.S. military branches even claimed a victim, Secretary of the 
Defense James Forrestal, who suffered emotional instability from the stress associated with 
the project and committed suicide in 1949.  Eventually, the National Security Act 
Amendments of 1949 brought more clarity to the Defense Department’s command structure.  
For Truman, working with the military on the issues of funding and organization became 
more and more difficult as his term progressed.  Even though the effort to reorganize the U.S. 
defense establishment took several years of energy and turbulent relations with the U.S. 
military, Truman eventually achieved most of his goals.57 
 
2.0.1.5.  Truman, Strategic Planning, and the Turkish Republic 
 
Truman’s efforts towards reorganizing the armed forces had several different vital aims, but 
the most important for the Turkish Republic, in historical hindsight, would be the increased 
coordination of strategic planning functions.  As Truman asserts in his memoirs, the National 
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Security Act of 1947 was an essential military and intelligence reform.  The Act officially 
established the JCS and the NSC, and greatly aided communication amongst the various 
branches of government that were concerned with national security.58   
 
2.0.1.5.1.  The 1947 National Security Act 
 
Already during WWII, U.S. military planning had undergone a metamorphosis from narrow, 
isolationist attitudes to awareness of modern warfare’s global nature.  This transition was 
given urgency by the failures, difficulties, and hurdles that U.S. military planning 
encountered when the U.S. joined the hostilities, but also by the fact that, for the first time, 
the U.S. military had to plan on a truly worldwide scale.  The JCS and the JSSC, from their 
conception, were planning and coordination bodies charged with advising on matters that 
touched both the military and political spheres.  In the closing years of the war, the JCS 
began to produce strategic studies formulating the military’s opinion towards various issues 
that also had political ramifications.59 
An interesting element in the wartime JSSC planning and strategy studies was the approval 
given to cooperation with the Soviet Union.  Positive relations with the Soviets, and granting 
the USSR a sphere of interest in Southeast Europe, was originally emphasized by the JSSC as 
necessary for both prosecuting the war and securing the postwar peace.  In early 1945, this 
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interpretation began to change when the JSSC asserted that Soviet control of Europe did not 
accord with U.S. interests.  Concurrently, by the end of 1945, JSSC strategic papers had 
openly embraced a global perception of U.S. security needs.  Also important was the 
recognition that foreign military assistance would be an aspect of military-political policy; the 
establishment of a SWNCC subcommittee responsible for policy towards foreign military 
assistance, called the Rearmament Subcommittee, would prove ineffective in the growing 
interservice rivalries for funding.  The result was that planning for foreign military assistance 
would remain uncoordinated for many years.60 
From the end of WWII until the 1947 National Security Act, the JCS continued to function as 
advisors to the Truman Administration on the military aspects of political issues, even though 
they did not have an officially-defined role.  Also playing an advisory role on military and 
political matters was the SWNCC, which had been constituted in late 1944 in response to 
organizational difficulties experienced with policy towards Europe.  After WWII, both the 
JCS and SWNCC saw expansion in their duties and size.  As the Cold War emerged, the need 
for more comprehensive coordination of military, intelligence, and policy issues became 
urgent.  The perceived Soviet threat greatly motivated the Truman Administration’s 
legislative push for military-political coordination, which resulted in the aforementioned 
National Security Act of 1947.61 
Once granted official status in the military-political decision-making hierarchy, both the JCS 
and SWNCC retained vital functions.  The JCS kept its direct access to the President even 
though it was technically now subordinated to the Department of Defense.  The JSSC also 
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retained its role as policy planning advisor to the JCS.  The SWNCC underwent a title change 
in order to reflect changes brought about through the reorganization of the U.S. military 
branches; thus, the Air Force was added and the “W” dropped as the group became the State-
Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC).  SANACC became directly 
connected to the NSC, along with the CIA.62 
After 1947, political and military objectives were more successfully balanced in the policy 
recommendations prepared by the NSC, while rivalries amongst the services still hampered 
greater efficiency in the JCS.  In all, the NSC did not realize its potential as policy-
recommending institution until 1950 and the eruption of the Korean War, when President 
Truman was forced to seek more help in conducting U.S. military operations.63 
In sum, the organizational initiatives pursued by President Truman resulted in more unified 
and coordinated military branches as well as greater communication between the political 
decision-makers and the military-intelligence branches of the government.  In these 
initiatives, Truman was generally successful in creating a more organized and efficient 
political-military communication apparatus despite the infighting and turf battles the process 
inaugurated. 
 
2.0.1.5.2.  U.S. military strategic planning and the Turkish Republic 
 
Finally, the post-WWII push for military-political coordination also had implications for U.S. 
conceptions of the Turkish Republic.  Overall, the most important change that occurred in 
U.S. planning was the development of a more global concern for U.S. security.  Awareness of 
the military implications of airpower, long-distance power projection and weapons delivery, 
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aircraft carriers, and in August 1945, atomic weapons, served to force a redefinition in U.S. 
strategic thinking.  As mentioned above, the JSSC, during 1945, had begun to redefine U.S. 
interests in relation to the other main power that emerged from WWII, the Soviet Union.  
This change in U.S. planners’ conception of the USSR would, by extension, bear directly 
upon the U.S. military’s strategic judgment of the Turkish Republic.  As a result, the military 
side of official U.S. planning was originally more forceful in identifying that Turkey was 
important to U.S. strategic aims, and that Turkey should be provided U.S. assistance of all 
forms in order to develop its capacity to resist Soviet encroachment and ensure Turkey’s 
adherence to the U.S.-led Western bloc.64      
As early as 1943, studies produced by the JSSC addressed issues related to the Turkish 
Republic, and furthermore identified the U.S. need for international bases in regard to overall 
national defense planning.  Later, the JCS began looking at tactical issues concerning Turkey 
in the months immediately after the European stage of WWII came to a close.  One of the 
JCS’s roles was to help develop U.S. military strategy and contingency planning; in that 
capacity, the JCS were important in identifying Turkey as a strategically vital country for the 
U.S. soon after WWII.  For the Potsdam Conference, for instance, the JCS and JSSC 
contributed (contradictory) opinions concerning the strategic importance of the Turkish 
Straits.  In October 1945, a subcommittee of the JCS, the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), 
composed a report that explicitly connected Soviet behavior, Turkish sovereignty and 
geostrategic importance, and U.S. security.  The same concerns were reiterated in JCS reports 
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and communications in early 1946.65 
One issue that concerned U.S. military planners was the need for foreign military assistance 
and overseas bases.  In late 1945, the SWNCC, at the request of the Navy and War 
Departments, began looking at the interrelated military assistance and basing rights questions, 
and presented its report in January 1946 as SWNCC 202/2.  That report approved arms 
assistance for “almost every independent nation except Germany and Japan,” and noted U.S. 
strategic concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean.  That report was weakened by the fact that 
the authors provided no overall strategic goals or framework into which their 
recommendations could be placed or understood.  This failing was a symptom of a larger 
problem, the manner in which the Truman Administration might justify sending various types 
of military assistance to nations outside of the Western Hemisphere.  This deficiency proved 
fatal in Congress for initial Truman Administration attempts to provide military assistance to 
Turkey, which had requested U.S. military advisors in late 1945.  After minor changes, 
SWNCC 202/2 was approved by the Navy, State, and War Departments in March 1946, and 
became the Truman Administration’s first post-WWII policy statement on foreign military 
assistance.  However, the only aid forthcoming to Ankara was several small Eximbank loans 
in late 1945 and the first half of 1946 as the U.S. military proved to be ahead of the State 
Department on the issue of providing military aid to Turkey.66 
In a similar time frame, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) also began developing 
comprehensive war plans that focused on the Eastern Mediterranean as the region most likely 
to ignite a new world war.  These reports were initially not submitted to the JCS, but were 
later used by the Joint Staff Planners, the committee providing the link between the JWPC 
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and the JCS, to create strategic war estimates that discussed Turkey’s possible role.  In March 
1946 the JCS sent a note to Secretary of State Byrnes explaining, among other things, 
Turkey’s importance to U.S. national security.  The same month, the JWPC began a series of 
war plans titled PINCHER.  This was the first war plan developed by the JCS.  The initial 
installment of this series, compiled in March-April 1946, illustrated the increasing 
importance that U.S. military planners were attributing to the Caucasus Mountains-Black Sea 
area as a base for hypothetical U.S. offensives against the primary Soviet industrial regions.  
The PINCHER series would eventually include a study specifically on the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  Other reports featuring Turkey also appeared.  A 26 July 1946 JCS report 
attempted to predict Soviet behavior and the resistance that the Turkish military might be able 
to assert if the USSR were to invade.  The JCS’s August 1946 “Griddle” study focused on 
Turkey as well.67 
Not until the midpoint of 1946, in the aftermath of the 7 August Soviet note to Turkey 
concerning the Montreux Agreement, did the U.S. State Department catch up to the U.S. 
military in recognizing the urgency of aiding Turkey militarily as well as economically.  
Even though the 15 August 1946 meeting between Truman and a variety of military and 
civilian officials now looks like a critical juncture in the U.S. attitude towards Turkey, the 
trends that resulted in that transition had been initiated long before, especially on the military 
side.  The JCS followed up that historical meeting with a 23 August 1946 note urging arms 
sales to Turkey, which was defined as “the most important military factor” in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  If the Soviets gained a base on the Turkish Straits, it would be tantamount to 
Soviet “military dominance” of Turkey and the eventual decline of U.S. influence in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.  The same JCS memorandum also helped to press upon civilian 
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officials the necessity of providing military aid to Turkey.68 
Earlier in 1946 U.S. military planners had begun the work of convincing civilian officials that 
Turkey was of vital importance to U.S. security.  Leffler, for example, describes how the U.S. 
Army’s main planner, General George Lincoln, used his position as advisor to Secretary of 
State Byrnes at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers to communicate the Eastern 
Mediterranean’s essence to U.S. security.  Overall, as military planners developed their 
strategic concepts and as U.S.-Soviet relations worsened during 1946, the U.S. military’s 
recommendations were central in bringing Turkey’s importance to overall U.S. security 
planning to U.S. civilian official attention.  What must be noted is that this interest did not 
develop from direct threat of Soviet force against Turkey, despite the emphasis that has been 
given to the 1945 and 1946 Soviet notes to Ankara concerning the Montreux Convention, the 
Turkish Straits and bases, and Kars and Ardahan.  Instead, U.S. military planners recognized 
the strategic importance that Turkey held in a region that featured “power vacuums” that 
could, at some future point, be exploited by the USSR for military advantage.  The JCS began 
to push for economic and military aid to Turkey as a possible strategic partner.69 
By late 1946, the Truman Administration removed limitations on military assistance going to 
Turkey (along with Greece and Iran), a subject that both military and civilian officials now 
agreed upon.  Accordingly, military planners continued to emphasize Turkey:  a 6 November 
1946 SWNCC subcommittee discussed aid for Greece and Turkey.  By the end of 1946,  
conviction of Turkey’s vital importance to U.S. security was evident in the highest civilian 
officials as Secretary of State Byrnes declared Turkey a U.S. “outpost.”  Eventually, the basic 
text for President Truman’s 12 March 1947 “Truman Doctrine” speech came from a State-
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War-Navy subcommittee tasked with preparing foreign policy information.70   
Another issue that Truman had to think about was foreign aid for the U.S.’s economically 
ailing allies in Europe.  This was not an issue of purely humanitarian nature.  U.S. planners 
saw the state of Europe’s economies as crucial to keeping Western Europe out of the Soviet 
camp.  Furthermore, military and civilian officials now concurred on the need to aid states in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Turkey.  However, in order to provide that aid, both the 
public and Congress had to be convinced of the aid’s necessity. 
Therefore, the next important turning point occurred in February 1947, when the U.K. 
government informed the State Department that Britain no longer had the resources to police 
the Eastern Mediterranean.  Interestingly, in the weeks before the British note, U.S. military 
planners completed further studies that highlighted Turkish importance to U.S. military 
strategy.  The JCS committee Joint Logistics Plans, for example, created an overview of 
Turkish airfields suitable for U.S. military purposes.  The Joint Staff Planners also provided 
an outline war plan to the JCS that again featured Turkey’s potential role if hostilities broke 
out between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.71 
The British note thus provided the impetus that would make funding the plans related to 
Turkey more possible.  The flurry of activity that resulted from the British note first produced 
the Truman Doctrine which, in addition to approving large amounts of aid to Greece and 
Turkey, justified the provision of aid to countries around the world in order to combat the 
communist threat.  The aid to Turkey approved through the Truman Doctrine initiative began 
in July 1947 after agreement upon a bilateral aid package.  Subsequently, the American 
Mission for Aid to Turkey (AMAT) was set up, which featured U.S. Army, Navy, and Air 
Force advising bodies, but overall joint civilian and military supervision.  The second result 
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was the Marshall Plan, which proposed large amounts of aid to other European countries.  
Congress was convinced through the crisis atmosphere and bipartisan lobbying to approve 
both plans.  Thus, new precedents were established for the provision of U.S. financial and 
military aid abroad.  On the other hand, Congress remained an impediment to action since it 
had put strict limits on that aid.  From now on, however, the State Department would be more 
forceful than the soldiers in pushing for military assistance to the Turkish Republic.72   
The Marshall Plan always encountered some measure of opposition from Congress. Heavy 
lobbying and circumstances helped get the original European Recovery Program (ERP) 
passed, but it was slated for a life of only four years.  Furthermore, since the ERP was an 
economic plan, the Truman Administration also had to create methods of providing military 
aid to allies.  By 1949, large amounts of foreign military aid had gained Congressional 
approval, but that aid was not connected to a comprehensive plan.  The Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act (MDAA), signed into law in October 1949, was the first global U.S. military 
assistance program since WWII’s Lend-Lease program.  From that Act, Turkey would 
receive additional military equipment after the JCS had indicated a need for $100 million in 
aid for Turkey.  U.S. administration and supervision of its Turkish program would continue 
under joint civilian and military control, but now shared between the State Department and 
the Defense Department. The MDAA would also result in the renaming of the Turkish 
program as Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT).  The name change 
reflected the merging of the separate U.S. military branches under the Defense Department 
aegis.  According to Rearden, U.S. military officials were the true directors of the U.S. 
military aid program in Turkey.73   
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The AMAT and JAMMAT programs embarked on a top-to-bottom armaments, 
reorganization, and construction program for the Turkish military.  The only essential asset 
that the Turkish military featured was the quality of its soldiers.  Outside of men, the Turkish 
military had to be equipped and trained in every way for modern warfare.  Because of the 
wide spectrum of aid necessary for the resurrection of Turkish military might, economic and 
military aid were often intertwined.  Basic infrastructure such as roads, airfields, and harbors 
had to be constructed in order for the Turkish military to be able to transport and use the 
equipment flowing in from the U.S.  Armaments also began to arrive as in 1948, for example, 
the U.S. provided hundreds of aircraft to the Turkish air force.  The Turkish navy also 
received aid and naval war plans were developed that included cooperation with Turkish 
forces.74  
In terms of overall war planning, U.S. military officials were concerned about differences in 
strategic thought between themselves and their Turkish counterparts.  For that reason, U.S. 
military advisors took steps to ensure that not only the plans, but the strategic concepts and 
even military mentality of the Turkish forces would be more compatible with those of the 
U.S.  A thorough implementation of that approach was thwarted until 1952 by the lack of 
resources available to the U.S., as well as by a lack of full JCS and State Department support 
for cementing a closer alliance with Turkey. During 1950 and 1951, the State Department and 
lower-level U.S. military officials played a stronger role in promoting the alliance with 
Turkey that eventually resulted in Turkish admission to NATO.  Upper-level U.S. military 
officials, specifically the JCS, did not relent until May 1951.75 
The Korean War awakened a new awareness of U.S. vulnerability in policy makers.  By 
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1950, Truman Administration officials sensed that Congress would not extend the ERP 
(Marshall Plan) beyond its four-year life.  The Korean War added urgency to this concern:  in 
essence, the war made Soviet intentions seem even more aggressive and sinister.  This meant 
that greater urgency was needed in the build-up of Western European defensive capabilities.  
Without U.S. aid, that increased pace in military preparation appeared impossible.  The 
solution devised by the Truman Administration was to link economic aid with military aid.  
The result was the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized economic, military and 
technical aid, and under Title II of its provisions, provided $400 million aid to Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran.  In effect, the Mutual Security Act combined the Marshall Plan and the 
MDAA, and superseded both by creating an agency that oversaw all forms of U.S. foreign 
aid.76    
Consequently, the role that U.S. military planning played in focusing official U.S. concern, 
both civilian and military, on the Turkish Republic’s integral importance to global U.S. 
security is clear.  Even though a year lapsed before both the civilian and military sides of the 
U.S. government recognized Turkey’s potential security role, that span of time may have 
been longer without U.S. military planners pushing for that awareness. 
 
2.0.1.5.3.  Summary 
    
President Truman’s relationship with the U.S. military was not as comfortable as one might 
assume considering Truman’s personal history and political views.  Reforms in the military’s 
hierarchy, supported by Truman, aided the military’s command, control, and planning 
structure.  Those reforms did not emerge quickly or easily, and caused numerous political 
scandals as well as military and bureaucratic infighting.  However, from the military’s 
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enhanced planning facilities came strategic recommendations that not only enabled the 
Truman Administration to more effectively shape foreign policy, those recommendations also 
emphasized Turkey’s importance to U.S. national security, and aided efforts to provide 
assistance to Turkey.  Eventually those labors would be one factor that led to Turkey’s 
accession to NATO.  Thus, military matters had the effect of focusing more attention on 
Turkey, and on Turkey’s importance to U.S. security, than might have been the case 
otherwise.  
 
2.0.1.6.  Truman’s Knowledge of the Turkish Republic 
 
Because this study focuses on explaining how Dean Acheson figured in the conduct of U.S. 
relations with Turkey during the Truman Administration, dwelling briefly on Truman’s 
knowledge of that country is appropriate.  All of the indications are that, despite Truman’s 
heavy reading in history, his knowledge of Turkey was minimal.  Even though Truman 
mentions that the Turkish Ambassador, H. Ragıp Baydur, was one of the first foreign 
emissaries to meet him after he became the President,77 Truman gives little indication that he 
knew a great deal about the country.  Certainly, from his background, there was little reason 
for him to have specific knowledge of a nation so far removed from the issues of Jackson 
County, Missouri.78   
                                                            
77
 Truman, Memoirs, Volume 1, p. 68.  Truman noted that Baydur came to the White House 
on 19 April 1945. 
78
 Joseph M. Jones, in The Fifteen Weeks, includes an anecdote from Acheson in which he 
explains Truman’s surprising knowledge of the Middle East and Central Asia.  After an 
extended pronouncement on both regions’ history and the various attempts of the Great 
Powers to possess the Turkish Straits, President Truman answered Mrs. Acheson’s query 
about where his knowledge came from by explaining that he always had glasses, which 
meant that, as a child, he read books instead of playing sports outside; see:  Jones, Joseph M.  
The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947).  New York:  The Viking  Press, 1955.  pp. 
65-66.  
98 
 
Truman mentions Turkey several times in his memoirs, but provides no interpretive comment 
that would enable a historian to speculate about Truman’s conception of that country and 
culture.  During the Potsdam Conference, the issue of Soviet demands towards Turkey came 
up, but Truman had little to say while Churchill and Stalin dominated the discussion. Instead, 
Truman, when the issue of revising the Montreux Convention was forwarded, deferred the 
issue for further study.  When Soviet territorial demands towards Turkey were taken in hand, 
and the issue of the Turkish Straits entered the conversation, Truman responded with a 
general comment on European history and waterways, and then averred that the territorial 
issue was a problem that concerned only Turkey and Russia, and the Straits issue was an 
international problem that could be dealt with through mutual agreement to revise the 
Montreux Convention.  When the Turkish Straits was brought up again later on in the 
Conference, Truman did not express additional knowledge of the issue.  As a whole, Truman 
played little role in the discussions that touched on Turkey.  Later in the year, when asked by 
the press about his proposal for the Turkish Straits, Truman stated that the issue was in the 
hands of the Council of Foreign Ministers; at another point, he indicated a purely strategic 
understanding of the Straits.79 
Truman also discusses Turkey in relation to his description of why the U.S. government 
became more suspicious, and consequently more firm and less conciliatory, towards the 
USSR in 1946.  Truman prefaces this discussion by stating that, in 1946’s early months, the 
USSR “threatened the peace of the world.”  Then he goes on to explain the events, and his 
reactions to, Soviet behavior that led to the March 1946 crisis concerning Iran, which he saw 
Turkey as connected to.  After the section concerning Iran, he turns to Turkey, which he 
describes in the historical context of ancient Russian designs on the Dardanelles and 
Bosporus Straits.  After reiterating what occurred at Potsdam in relation to the Turkish 
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Straits, Truman summarizes the events surrounding the July 1946 Soviet diplomatic note to 
Turkey proposing a revision in the control regime over the Straits; this was, in reality, an 
extension of the conversations on the topic at Potsdam, but Truman interprets the note in the 
context of mid-1946 and increasing suspicions concerning Russia’s designs on its neighbors.  
He wraps up his discussion of the issue by noting communications between the Turkish 
government and the U.S. government concerning the incident, U.S. attempts to shore up 
Turkish morale, and the reality of Turkey’s military and economic condition.  At the end of 
the section, Truman blames the Soviets for Turkey’s tenuous situation.80 
Several pages later, Truman summarizes the reports hastily prepared after the February 1947 
British diplomatic note stating their intention to discontinue economic aid to the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  The reports were presented to him on 26 February 1947 by Secretary of State 
George Marshall and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson; General Eisenhower provided 
a study from the JCS.  Truman couches the studies’ conclusions in ideological terms, stating 
that providing aid to Greece and Turkey meant valiant risk, taken in order to aid free peoples 
in their struggle against the forces of oppression.  The next day Truman, flanked by Marshall 
and Acheson, convened with Congressional leaders to explain the situation; the most 
important attendees were Arthur Vandenberg, having just assumed chairmanship of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Tom Connally, the past and future leader of the 
same Committee.  In that meeting, the Congressional leaders were successfully convinced of 
the necessity of aiding Greece and Turkey in Britain’s place, and to support the financial 
outlays that this would entail.  In the remainder of his memoirs’ second volume, Truman 
mentions Turkey only in passing connection to other issues.  At one point he does provide an 
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interesting comment:  while discussing the context for the Point Four Program, he mentions 
specifically that U.S. aid to Turkey involved technical training for Turkish heavy-machinery 
operators and advice for the Turkish Department of Roads and Bridges on “organization and 
procedures.”81    
In general, Truman’s discussion of Turkey, and the early 1947 crisis which led to the Truman 
Doctrine, does not reveal any special knowledge or interest that he might have had in Turkey.  
He never mentions the names of any Turkish political figures (other than Baydur), for 
example, nor does he provide any anecdotes concerning the country, its people, or its leaders.  
Rather, his ideas seem easily attributable to his penchant to read history and then connect that 
history to maps in a strategic manner.  The well-known anecdote about how Truman gave a 
lecture to his advisors on the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean is an 
excellent illustration of how and why Truman would have given attention to Turkey.82 
In other Truman documents provided to historians, a different picture of Truman’s 
knowledge concerning the Turkish Republic does not emerge.  In his post-politics life-long 
correspondence with Dean Acheson, for instance, Truman mentioned Turkey twice, and then 
only to point out the justness of his ideas.  Truman’s private papers also contain only a 
handful of references to Turkey and, similar to his letters to Acheson, occur only when he 
defends actions or views that he held during his Presidency.83  In addition to his memoirs and 
personal papers, several other archival sources are relevant to Truman’s knowledge of 
Turkey.   
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2.0.1.6.1  Foreign Relations of the United States volumes 
 
Documents published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes for 
Truman’s Presidency provide remarkably sparse material for divining what President 
Truman’s personal ideas concerning the Turkish Republic were.  This is true despite the 
importance of the issues that gripped U.S. foreign policy during his term as the Chief 
Executive.  Truman’s policy was to trust his Secretary of State to inform about important 
developments and get his opinion for decisions that affected policy.  For that reason, in the 
FRUS records there are numerous notes stating to the effect that “President Truman informed 
the Secretary that he had read the memorandum, agreed fully with the proposed course of 
action, and instructed the Secretary to take the action(s) necessary to carry out the policy.”  
Consequently, Truman’s opinion concerning Turkey is observed only in the rare case that a 
diplomatic announcement was required.  
Amongst the FRUS documents, the closest that the researcher comes to obtaining Truman’s 
personal opinion concerning Turkey is in 1949, when he sent a personal message to Turkey’s 
President İsmet İnönü.  To be sure, the message is formal and diplomatic, but Truman was 
someone who expressed what was on his mind.  The message is dated 26 April 1949, and was 
given to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, to forward to President İnönü.  One 
portion of the message repeats some of the text of the 12 March 1947 Truman Doctrine 
speech, and emphasizes that the sentiments expressed -- especially the description of Turkey 
as a free people threatened by external enemies -- were Truman’s own feelings, not only U.S. 
government policy.  The message ends by asserting that the North Atlantic Pact was intended 
to provide security for the signees, which would also benefit Turkey, and that U.S. concern 
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for Turkey’s security was in no way diminished.84 
 
2.0.1.6.2.  President Truman’s public papers 
  
President Truman’s public pronouncements, almost by definition, also do not provide insight 
into his own opinions concerning Turkey.  Starting in 1945, Turkey did appear as a topic in 
his speeches, but never took on the character of a subject that he spoke effusively about.  Key 
word scans of those papers are interesting only for the fact that, in the vast majority of cases 
in which Turkey appeared in President Truman’s public pronouncements, it was as a part of 
the phrase “Greece and Turkey.” 
In a 27 January 1949 press conference, Truman made an interesting observation in response 
to a question concerning the Point Four Program that he had announced during his recent 
inauguration speech.  Truman explained that the Point Four Program was an idea that had 
been developing since the Aid to Greece and Turkey program was designed, and that since 
the Greece-Turkey aid issue he had spent “most of my time going over to that globe back 
there, trying to figure out ways to make peace in the world.”  This comment fits exactly into 
what we know of how Truman read information and then applied that information to tools, 
such as maps, in order to formulate policy.85 
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2.0.1.6.3.  Documents concerning Turkey in Truman’s Presidential Files at the Truman 
 Library 
 
In Truman’s Presidential files at the Truman library, essentially all of the materials that relate 
to Turkey are reports provided to Truman by various officials, often concerning the strategic 
significance of the country to U.S. foreign policy and the assistance needed to aid the Turkish 
government.86  These reports would provide information of a similar type to the historical 
reading that Truman had obtained over the years, and that he applied to his analysis of 
foreign policy problems. 
Because of the limited information that we have concerning Truman’s personal knowledge of 
Turkey while he was President, dwelling on some of the exceptional events or documents is 
appropriate.  Two groups of documents at the Truman files provide more interesting 
knowledge -- and more importantly, proof -- concerning what President Truman knew or 
thought about the Turkish Republic, its leaders, and its people. President Truman’s Official 
File (OF) contains several resources that are relevant to this route of inquiry.  OF File 86 
contains documents relating to Turkey.  The folder marked simply “OF 86” contains the 
general documents, but three other files, “OF 86-A Endorsements for Ambassador to 
Turkey,” “OF 86-B American Mission for Aid to Turkey,” and “OF 86 Miscellaneous” all 
contain documents that show direct attention from President Truman. 
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In “OF 86,” for instance, one stapled group of papers is Truman’s radio address to the 
Turkish people on the occasion of the 25th foundation of the Turkish Republic, 29 October 
1948.  Truman did not write the speech, but he marked it for reading ease when he recorded 
the speech for transmission.  At the end of the first paragraph, Turkish President İnönü is 
referred to, and written in pencil above İnönü’s name is “Inonu,” i.e. it was a reminder of 
how Truman should pronounce the Turkish President’s name.  Other markings are commas to 
indicate pauses and a “u” written above the “ü” in the name “Atatürk.”  A slightly earlier 
copy of the same speech has Truman’s textual changes handwritten on the copy along with 
his signature, indicating that the changed version could be used for press distribution in 
Turkey.  In that signed version of the text, the names of President İnönü and Atatürk are not 
marked for pronunciation.  The information in the speech’s text is largely ideological, 
stressing the shared values and mutual cooperation of the two countries, along with general 
historical reflections.  The rest of the files in OF 86 contain documents on a smattering of 
topics, and none enlighten us concerning Truman’s thoughts about or understanding of 
Turkey.  
Finally, the Confidential File (CF) at the Truman Library also has many documents that 
concern Turkey.  Boxes 26, 29, 38, and 56 contain documents concerning the provision of aid 
to Turkey in 1951-1952, the admission of Turkey to NATO, and other topics.  Some of these 
documents have been published in the FRUS series, but some have not.  Most importantly, 
almost none of these documents reflect Truman’s ideas about Turkey, and the few that do are 
diplomatic in nature.  It should be noted that this discussion of the documents at the Truman 
Library is not exhaustive, but comprises a strong cross-section of the available material.  
More materials related to Truman’s views on Turkey may also exist at the National Archives 
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in College Park, Maryland.87 
One other interesting document is found not in Truman’s files, but in Dean Acheson’s papers 
at the Truman Library.  In an 18 November 1949 conversation between President Truman, 
Secretary Acheson, and the Shah of Iran, the Shah began to probe for ways to request aid -- 
both equipment and financing for equipment -- from the U.S.  The Shah brought up the 
possibility of Lend-Lease for Iran, or even inclusion in the Marshall Plan.  When the Shah 
was informed that the Marshall Plan applied only to countries in Europe, 
  [t]his led the Shah to observe that he did not think Turkey was a country in 
 Europe. The President pointed out that Turkey had been considered to be in this 
 capacity, partly for geographical reasons, but primarily because of the prior legislation 
 providing aid for Greece and Turkey which arose out of special circumstances and 
 which was incorporated into the Marshall Plan legislation.88      
 
The rationalization that the President uses to separate Iran and Turkey, even though they are 
geographically neighbors, is interesting.  Truman was not able to provide a more fundamental 
or persuasive reason for defining Turkey as eligible for Marshall Plan aid.  
 
2.0.1.7.  Summary:  Truman and the Turkish Republic 
 
In light of all of the above, Truman’s knowledge of Turkey does not seem to have been 
extensive when he became President, and given his preference to leave foreign affairs to his 
Secretary of State, the idea of Truman expending large effort to expand his knowledge of 
Turkey seems unlikely. The information that Truman knew about Turkey came mostly from 
situations that required him to give attention to Turkey while President, and from the advice, 
information, or recommendations on strategy that officials in the civilian and military 
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administration offered to him.  His strong reading habits, and the numerous governmental 
reports containing information about Turkey that crossed his desk while President, mean that 
he must have acquired a great deal of factual knowledge about Turkey in the course of 
performing his duties.  However, that information does not seem to have translated into any 
more interest about Turkey since none of the documents in the files, his correspondence with 
officials, or letters to friends reflect strong or interested ideas about that country.  These 
appearances, coupled with the fact that Truman depended greatly on the State Department for 
foreign policy, makes the U.S. Secretary of State far more important than President Truman 
for our understanding of how U.S. policy towards Turkey was formulated and carried out 
during the 1945-1953 Truman Administration. 
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2.1.  U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 
   
 
The third section of this study examines U.S. public opinion towards foreign policy in 
general, and the Turkish Republic specifically, during the Truman Administration.  Before 
looking closely at the 1948 Presidential election, a watershed in the history of the U.S. 
Democratic Party, the general foreign policy attitudes of the American populace will be 
examined, as well as their ideas concerning U.S. aid for the Turkish Republic.  After 
analyzing the 1948 election for its relevance to U.S. public opinion towards Turkey, some 
general conclusions will be presented in order to once again anticipate the following two 
chapters that concern Dean Acheson.  
Additionally, this chapter will venture a thesis concerning another phenomenon stemming 
from the subjects examined in the following pages.  That issue is the general hostility that 
U.S. liberals, progressives, and militant leftists displayed towards the Turkish Republic, and 
towards the policy of U.S. aid for that country, during the Cold War.  For that reason, the 
author will devote space to exploring exactly how the U.S. political atmosphere in the late 
1940s may have contributed to the formation of long-term impressions about the Turkish 
Republic amongst American liberals specifically, and amongst U.S. citizens more generally, 
at the end of the chapter. 
 
2.1.1.  Shifts in U.S. Public Opinions Concerning U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1953 
 
2.1.1.1.  Primary Intellectual Shifts 
 
While examining shifts in U.S. public opinion during the late 1940s and early 1950s, a brief 
explanation of the contemporary intellectual trends in U.S. society is appropriate.  As is well 
108 
 
understood, the Franklin D. Roosevelt era in U.S. politics is generally referred to as the “New 
Deal,” after the economic program that he inaugurated in an attempt to bring the U.S. out of 
the Great Depression.  Economically, that attempt was a mixed success, but it had long-term 
consequences for U.S. intellectual and political culture.1  
The New Deal itself emerged from the liberal wing of U.S. political traditions, but was more 
of a transitional phase between the classical economic liberalism of the 19th Century and the 
individual-centered liberalism that emerged especially in the 1960s.  This last incarnation is 
the “liberalism” that Americans now generally associate with the term today.  As for the 
liberalism of the Roosevelt and Truman eras, Alan Brinkley has termed it “reform 
liberalism,” and associates it with the period from the first decades of the 20th Century to the 
years after WWII.2  
Reform liberalism, because it was a transitional phenomenon, is necessarily difficult to define 
precisely.  The contemporary adherents of reform liberalism initially referred to themselves 
as progressives, and many different concepts and ideas were associated with the movement.  
Several key tenets embraced by the academicians, activists, artists, civil officials, 
intellectuals, journalists, and politicians (i.e. mostly social and professional elites) who 
identified themselves as reform liberals can be identified, though. One is the necessity to 
ensure the welfare of individuals, and to protect the powerless from the excesses of the 
powerful, especially from the monopolistic capitalists of the early 20th Century.  A second 
concept was the need for the government to intervene into the economy when necessary, and 
in order for the government to take action, the state (which Americans generally refer to as 
the “federal government”) needed to possess the institutions and power that would enable the 
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Executive to act quickly and decisively.  This was the issue upon which the most divisive 
legislative battles were fought during FDR’s tenure as President.3 
Those battles had several vital consequences as FDR’s administration engaged in WWII, and 
then as Harry Truman assumed power after FDR’s death.  To begin with, at exactly the same 
moment that the U.S. emerged as the primary economic and military force on the global 
stage, U.S. political elites were engaged in intense debates about the basic structure of the 
U.S. economy and state.  These arguments were conducted not only through the election 
process, but also through the press, through the judiciary, and through the Congressional 
struggles that consumed so much of both FDR’s and Truman’s energy and time.4 
Secondly, after 1938, the Republican Party’s national fortunes began a long upswing that 
would not be exhausted until Dwight Eisenhower’s eight years as President in the 1950s.  The 
continuing conservative political trend meant that, during WWII, many of the New Deal’s 
programs and initiatives were dismantled by a Congress aggressively hostile to FDR.  Many 
of the officials associated with the New Deal, such as Thomas Corcoran, Thurman Arnold, 
and Leon Henderson, either left government or were forced out of their positions by 1944.  In 
their place came figures with more conservative ideas, like Jesse Jones, who took over as 
Secretary of Commerce for Harry Hopkins in 1940. 5   The replacement of liberals by 
conservative officials continued under President Truman. 
Third, the liberals themselves experienced a broad change in the focus of their political 
concerns.  Whereas in the 1930s liberals generally accepted a need to regulate corporations 
and to attack monopolistic organizations, during WWII these concepts fell out of favor.  In 
their place, liberals began to favor fiscal regulation, and an emphasis on the government’s 
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role in manipulating the national economy when necessary.  Part of this change came from 
the realization, brought upon them by the massive conflict with the centralized states of Nazi 
Germany and fascist Italy, and by increasing awareness of the actual nature of Soviet state 
and society, that state decision-making powers did not always result in increased freedom for 
the citizens.  Another change in attitude resulted from close cooperation with figures from the 
business world while managing the massive increases in industrial output for the war effort.  
The coordination of that industrial output created ties between industrial corporations and the 
military, which eventually changed the complexion of the U.S. economy.  The failure of 
federal agencies to prevent this development, as well as the emergence of a massive 
economic sector, the infamous “military-industrial complex,” 6  that government agencies 
would have great difficulty regulating, further decreased liberal hopes that government could 
prove an effective regulator and planner for the national economy.  Increasingly, liberals 
began to focus on increased consumption, as well as fiscal policy, as the solution to U.S. 
economic problems, rather than regulation of the producers.7 
By 1945, then, the U.S. national political scene looked quite different than it had in the 
1930s.  The labor movement, which had worked to establish itself as a political alternative in 
the 1930s, during WWII largely abandoned radical programs in order to forge a moderate 
alliance with the Democratic Party and the liberals.  U.S. liberals, as a broad political 
definition, had lost most of their influence within the federal government and also moderated 
their views on how the economic and social problems that faced the country could be solved.  
The Democratic Party, despite the fact that it retained the Presidency and apparently 
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controlled Congress, emerged from the war greatly weakened and facing not only an adverse 
political tide but also a reevaluation of its professed ideological platform.8 
Between the end of WWII and the Republican victory in 1952’s Presidential Election, the 
Democratic Party was forced to shed some political baggage in response to the changing 
American political atmosphere; at the same time, new alliances were forged.  This enabled 
the Democrats to preserve a narrow victory in the 1948 Presidential election and would 
establish the Party’s long-term post-WWII course.  The most important elements that broke 
away from the Democratic Party were the militant leftists and uncompromising New Dealers 
who formed Henry Wallace’s hope for the 1948 campaign.  The Southern Democrats, who 
would gain the appellation “Dixiecrats” from Strom Thurmond’s 1948 splinter party, would 
also largely desert the Democratic collaboration.   
On the other hand, the Democratic Party forged a strong compact with moderate, pragmatic 
labor groups, with African-Americans (and other minorities) in the first salvos of the civil 
rights struggle, and with the dwindling community of progressive farmers.  Along with that 
new coalition also came some new issues to replace the concepts that had ceased to dominate 
liberal discussions.  The domestic concerns, already mentioned, were concentrated on fiscal 
policy to manipulate the economy when necessary in order to create full employment and 
high levels of consumption (fundamentally Keynesian) and on civil rights.  Internationally, 
and most importantly for this study, liberals became internationalists and supporters of the 
effort to stymie Soviet expansionism; in essence, as the increasingly conservative U.S. voting 
population also became more and more disturbed by the USSR’s behavior, the Democratic 
Party was forced to adjust its ideological platform.9  Most liberals and leftists were able to 
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make the same adjustment, but some would not. 
Liberal intellectuals were not automatic supporters of the Truman Presidency, for several 
reasons.  To begin with, Truman was not a visionary, but rather a pragmatic machine 
politician whose success rested on toil and compromise.  This meant that Truman would not 
always stick to ideals that liberals approved of.  In foreign policy, liberals were greatly 
disappointed in Truman’s refusal to accept a modus vivendi with the Soviets.  More 
superficially, liberals were looking for strong leadership from the Democratic Party but found 
little to be impressed by in Truman’s subdued, awkward public presence.10 
As the Cold War emerged in the years following WWII and the U.S. left-of-center 
fragmented into bickering, competing elements, several trends manifested themselves.  Some 
liberal elites, despite their overt ideological independence, became steadfast proponents of 
the American system, but remained on the left side of the political spectrum.  Others migrated 
to the right of the political spectrum, sometimes by long, tortuous routes.  Some of those 
intellectuals began their “long march” by setting out to battle “neutralism” amongst 
intellectuals -- both American and Western European -- in much the same way that U.S. 
military planners focused their worries on regional power vacuums.  Most staked out a 
position of varying intellectual emphasis near the political center.11 
Naturally, no mention of the early 1950s in relation to U.S. intellectual culture can omit 
reference to Joseph McCarthy and his opportunistic, self-glorifying, and divisive quest to 
expose and expel Communists, real and imagined, from American government and society 
wherever they may have lurked.  Ironically, Harry Truman gave some of the initial impetus to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
half of 1945 and during 1946; see:   Buckley, Gary J.  “American Public Opinion and the 
Origins of the Cold War: A Speculative Reassessment.”  Mid-America:  An Historical 
Review.  Vol. 60.  Jan. 1978.  pp. 37-42. 
10
 Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 41-51; Pells pp. 56-63. 
11
 Pells pp. 71-83; 96-107; 117-147. 
113 
 
the anti-Communist witch hunts of the late 1940s and early 1950s, but the U.S. Congress had 
featured a House committee, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, tasked with 
identifying potential subversive elements since 1938; in 1945 it became a standing 
committee.  In 1947, shortly after proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, President Truman 
authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation to examine the fidelity of both current and 
potential federal government employees.12 
Few U.S. liberal intellectuals stood firm against the campaign to root out ideological 
opponents in its original incarnation.  Then, the revelation that some Communists, like Alger 
Hiss, had indeed been active at the highest levels of government increased popular belief that 
a threat existed.  Consequently, the first five years of the 1950s marked a dreadful era in 
American intellectual and political history as many former leftists either gave compromising 
testimony to the McCarthy-era investigation panels or found themselves involved in cerebral 
contortions to justify some aspect of the identification, public shaming, black-listing, and 
even executions (Ethel and Julius Rosenberg) that occurred.13 
No matter the tinge of the personal ideological preferences, by the 1950s most U.S. liberal 
intellectuals had moved away from the ideals of the 1930s, and embraced some sort of 
accommodation with the U.S. economic, political, and social system.  New fears, such as that 
of the awesome power inherent in modern states and the potential of mass movements to gain 
control of that power for nightmarish and destructive ends, forced liberals towards 
compromise and defense of what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. labeled “the vital center” in 
politics.  Fear moderated the triumphal possibilities that the war had provided to the U.S.14 
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2.1.1.2.  U.S. Public Opinion Trends 1945-1953 
 
Against this general backdrop, public perceptions were also undergoing change.  Public 
opinion polling, in the 1930s and 1940s, was emerging as an important tool with which 
politicians could measure public reaction to current events and political policies.  During and 
after WWII, the U.S. federal administration turned to public opinion polls in an attempt to 
discern more clearly what the American people thought about topics relevant to WWII and its 
aftermath.15  
The single most important development of the WWII and post-WWII eras in U.S. foreign 
policy was the change in U.S. attitudes from a predominantly isolationist to a predominantly 
interventionist, or activist, mindset.  This metamorphosis was led by the Roosevelt and 
Truman Administrations, but world events provided large amounts of legitimacy for the 
administrations’ chosen path.  The first great deviation from isolationism occurred early in 
WWII as the public, over a period of two years, grew to favor the Lend-Lease Plan; by 1944 
strong support for active American participation in international organizations emerged.  In 
relation to trade, U.S. citizens were not as favorably inclined towards U.S. participation or 
compromise in order to facilitate world trade, but significant majorities of the population did 
favor the idea of an international body to regulate trade and hypothetical U.S. membership in 
such an organization.  Majorities also, in an abstract manner, favored increased U.S. buying 
and selling of products internationally. U.S. citizens came to accept more U.S. international 
involvement during the war, but more importantly, once that shift transpired, U.S. public 
opinion remained firmly in support of U.S. international activism for more than twenty 
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years.16   
Of the foreign policy issues that faced U.S. citizens after WWII, U.S. relations with the 
Soviet Union eventually proved to be the most important.  Before the war most U.S. citizens 
did not have a favorable opinion of the Soviet Union, and developments during the war 
would alter that perception only slightly.  Predictably, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 
June 1941 and the subsequent U.S. entry into the war after the Japanese assault on Pearl 
Harbor, U.S. citizens did begin to feel more strongly that the U.S. and the Soviets would 
cooperate to preserve peace at the conflict’s conclusion, but that positive feeling appeared, at 
the most, among only 50 percent of the population.  After the war, that opinion declined 
quickly.  This generally negative attitude towards the Soviet Union was undoubtedly 
compounded by the fact that most U.S. citizens had little concrete, factual information about 
the USSR, even near the war’s conclusion.  In general, U.S. citizen attitudes towards Russia 
reflected the advances and reverses of the Allied war effort or issues related directly to U.S.-
Soviet relations.  Interestingly, opinion poll data also indicated that, as late as 1944, upper- 
and middle-class Americans, as well as Americans well-informed about the Soviet Union, felt 
greater trust and optimism towards the USSR than Americans with lower income levels and 
less information concerning the USSR.17 
After WWII’s conclusion, American attitudes towards the Soviet Union turned progressively 
more negative.  In June 1945, a large majority of Americans expressed a desire for the USSR 
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to join the effort against Japan.  Similarly, shortly after the war’s conclusion Americans still 
held positive views of what was achieved at Yalta, and even disapproved of the anti-Russian 
tone of Churchill’s March 1946 Iron Curtain speech.  By 1949, however, U.S. citizens’ 
feelings had turned overwhelmingly to distrust of the Soviet Union.  One poll, taken between 
March and May 1947, attempted a psychological analysis of respondents’ opinions.  That 
poll’s results reflected generally negative opinions towards, as well as expectations of, 
Russia.  Gallup polls, taken in a similar time frame, indicated developing American 
apprehension that the Soviets were expansionist.  Additionally, Americans began to feel that 
Russia was winning what had, by the late 1940s, already been labeled the “Cold War.”  Not 
surprisingly, U.S. citizens also began to support both increased expenditures to promote the 
U.S. perspective internationally and curbed sales of U.S. manufactures and resources to 
Russia (although there was a shift in attitudes concerning mutual trade between the U.S. and 
Russia in the second half of the 1950s).18 
Harry Truman mentions in his memoirs that isolationism began to sprout anew as the war 
drew to a close in 1945.  However, this isolationism would never again display the strength 
that it had before the war.  By 1949, when the NATO pact was finalized, clear majorities of 
U.S. citizens had decided that the U.S. role in the world affairs was justified and suitable, 
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despite the massive changes in foreign policies that the previous four years had entailed.19 
Finally, public concern about foreign policy was an issue in the 1948 Presidential election, 
but only a minor one.  The party that based its existence on a foreign policy issue, the 
Progressive Party of Henry Wallace, garnered only slightly more than one million votes out 
of the nearly 50 million that were cast.  This party, and its leader, will be explored in more 
depth below in order to elucidate the era’s, and U.S. public opinion’s, relevance to official 
U.S. policy towards Turkey in the postwar years.  The most important issues in the 1948 
election proved to be domestic, civil rights and labor rights, the topics which Harry Truman 
rode to victory.20 
 
2.1.2.  U.S. Public Opinion Polls Concerning U.S. Aid to Turkey 
 
Even though U.S. officials recognized relatively soon after WWII that Turkey would become 
an important U.S. concern, they were confronted with a highly problematic dilemma.  At a 
time when Congress was overtly and vocally attempting to erect every sort of obstacle to the 
Truman Administration’s policies, and when the U.S. public, tentatively expressing a 
newborn support for more active U.S. foreign policies, was unsure of the Administration’s 
direction or of the world political situation, how would Administration officials be able to 
convince the American people that a need to send to Turkey not only economic aid, but also 
military aid, existed? 
In the face of such a situation, public opinion polls became one way that U.S. officials could 
judge what U.S. citizens knew about Turkey and whether support for aiding that country was 
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present.  U.S. officials, both civilian and military, recognized in 1946 that US citizens knew 
little about Turkey and thus would be unlikely to understand its importance or support 
sending it aid.  Subsequently, Truman Administration officials apparently sponsored 
campaigns to inform the press and leaders of public opinion about Turkey, and about issues 
related to Turkey, in order to inject desirable information into the U.S. public space.  James 
Forrestal, for example, referred to at least two separate occasions -- the August 1946 crisis 
concerning the Soviet Dardanelles note, and the February-March 1947 Greek-Turkish aid 
crisis -- when such decisions were taken.21 
As a result, the Truman Administration commenced successful public information campaigns 
to inform the public about the necessity for aid programs for Turkey.  Because of the 
suddenness with which the Eastern Mediterranean crisis burst onto the American public’s 
consciousness, no time for a broad informational effort to support the Greece-Turkey aid 
proposal existed, but newspaper editors across the country supported it.  Thus, some time 
passed before the Truman Administration’s informational efforts would have their full effect.   
Directly after the March 1947 pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine and the aid to Greece 
and Turkey, U.S. citizens’ views on the proposal were mixed, and Gallup statistics showed 
slightly less support for Turkey.  American Institute of Public Opinion data showed that aid 
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to Greece and Turkey was supported by a majority of both Democrats and Republicans, and 
by larger percentages of the highly-educated.  However, when the questions asked of 
respondents separated Greece and Turkey, Turkey consistently saw less support than Greece 
(the questions being the same otherwise).  A small majority thought that providing economic 
aid to Greece and Turkey would not make war with the USSR more likely, but a small 
majority also thought that military aid to those countries would make U.S.-Soviet conflict 
more likely.  Only a minority of Americans thought that the Turkish government was 
supported by its own citizens, but most had no opinion on the issue.  Support for military aid 
to both Greece and Turkey emerged only later.22 
A clear example of the importance that the Truman Administration gave to public opinion 
polls is found in President Truman’s Confidential File at the Truman Library archives.  
Attached to a memorandum dated 16 April 1947 is a confidential copy of public opinion data 
recently gathered by Elmo Roper.23  The memorandum was written by Presidential Assistant 
John Steelman and intended for Dean Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State, and for 
President Truman.  The memorandum has a note, written in Truman’s hand, at the bottom of 
the page indicating that he and Acheson had discussed the memorandum.  Also attached to 
the memorandum is a letter from Elmo Roper, dated 10 April 1947, explaining that the data 
included with the letter (in booklet form) was collected according to the specifications that 
Steelman’s office had expressed to Roper and Earl Newsom.  As Roper explains, the poll’s 
intent was “to find out the words and arguments people use in describing their reactions” to 
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the Greece-Turkey aid proposal.  The poll’s foreword states that the data compiled was drawn 
from a representative survey of more than 500 people in eleven different U.S. cities and 
towns on 28 and 29 March 1947, including cities like Birmingham (Alabama), Brockton 
(Massachusetts), Clarksburg (West Virginia), Cleveland (Ohio), Fort Worth (Texas), and 
Sioux Falls (South Dakota).24 
 In summarizing the poll’s conclusions, Roper says that “well over a majority” of the 
respondents favor the Greek-Turkey aid proposal either completely or with reservations, but 
that a large minority, around 25 percent of the public, are opposed to the proposal either 
completely or with reservations.  Another ten-to-fifteen percent of the public had not formed 
definite ideas concerning the Greece-Turkey aid plan.  The most common objection to the 
proposal was that such schemes should be carried out through the U.N.; the most commonly 
expressed approval for the plan was that it would combat Communism.  Roper cautions that 
because of the small size of the sample, the percentages derived from the data should not be 
trusted as totally accurate.  Furthermore, the poll’s intent was to identify the vocabulary and 
logic used by people to justify their ideas concerning the Greek-Turkish initiative rather than 
to identify what percentage of the population had certain opinions.25 
The most interesting aspect of the Roper data is the responses that specifically referred to 
Turkey.  Because the pollsters were aiming to collect information about the citizens’ ideas, 
they made it possible for people to express their answers in more detailed fashion, and they 
then compiled those answers into general categories.  As an illustration, when those who 
expressed some level of dissatisfaction with the Greek-Turkish aid plan were asked to 
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elaborate on exactly what they disliked, no more than five percent thought that Turkey did 
not need or deserve aid.  When those who responded favorably to the proposal were asked 
why they thought the initiative was formulated, again very few people thought that Greece 
and Turkey’s help during the war provided the reason, no more than four percent.  When 
those who expressed opposition to the plan were asked what would make the proposal 
palatable, only a minute percentage, 1.4, stated that removing Turkey from the aid package 
would convince them.26   
The Roper poll information is interesting because it shows clearly that Turkey was not a 
major issue driving U.S. citizens’ views of President Truman’s provision of aid to Greece and 
Turkey.  Whether they were for or against the proposal, few U.S. citizens were swayed by the 
presence of Turkey in the program.  This suggests that in the 1948 election, Turkey could not 
have been an issue about which many U.S. citizens cared, and indeed Turkey rarely appeared 
in that year’s election campaign rhetoric.  The one candidate who tried to make Turkey an 
issue in the campaign was Henry Wallace, but because the Roper survey does not make clear 
the political allegiances of the citizens that were polled, assuming a connection between those 
who supported Wallace, i.e. the militant left wing, and those whose views concerning 
President Truman’s Greece-Turkey aid package were determined by Turkey’s inclusion does 
not appear warranted, even if it is a distinct possibility.27 
In June 1947 the Marshall Plan was suggested by the Secretary of State, and public opinion, 
though already somewhat prepared by the commotion that surrounded the Truman Doctrine 
and the aid to Greece and Turkey, showed only hesitant acceptance, or even awareness, of 
that initiative.  Initial press reaction to the proposed plan was overwhelmingly positive, and 
governmental information activities, in tandem with efforts from the press and national and 
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local figures, eventually attained a 70% approval rating for the Marshall Plan after one year.28 
Polls later in 1947 and in 1948 showed a continuing increase in support for aid to Turkey.  
Opinion surveys from February 1948 showed a nearly twenty percent increase in support for 
U.S. military aid to Turkey.  Although, in data gathered in early 1948, U.S. citizens evinced 
by far the least awareness that the U.S. had more than 1,000 soldiers in Turkey from amongst 
the six countries (France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Palestine, and Turkey) that the U.S. had 
that many soldiers in.29 
By mid-1948, U.S. public opinion had shifted to a slight majority favoring sending soldiers to 
Turkey in the event that the country was in danger of falling into the Soviet orbit, and the 
percentages in favor were within four percentage points of the views expressed on the same 
issue with regard to France, Italy, and Greece.  Nearly 30 percent of respondents opposed 
sending soldiers to Turkey, again essentially the same as in regard to the other three countries 
mentioned.  Thus, in one year’s time, ten-to-twenty percent of the U.S. population positively 
altered its opinion in regard to the idea of aiding Turkey militarily or sending American 
soldiers to Turkey, and those polled in 1948 made no fundamental distinction between 
Turkey and other Western European states.30   
Consequently, the polling information that exists for U.S. public opinions concerning Turkey 
in the years 1945-1952 generally focuses on the narrow issues of U.S. economic and military 
aid to that country.  Judging from the small number of people whose opinions hinged on the 
presence of Turkey in those years’ political debates, few Americans of that time were 
strongly focused on Turkey as a political issue.  This appearance is further underlined by the 
lack of opinion poll data concerning U.S. views on Turkey after 1948. 
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2.1.3.  The 1948 Presidential Campaign, Henry A. Wallace and Anti-Communism, and 
Turkey 
 
The 1948 Presidential Campaign was notable for the ideological split that occurred in the 
Democratic Party over the New Deal’s legacy.  Harry Truman, ideologically, was not the 
same kind of Democrat as FDR.  This difference manifested itself most clearly in foreign 
policy, where Truman’s initial tendency to embrace FDR’s accommodations to the Soviets 
had given way to intense suspicion of Soviet intentions, and then to outright opposition to 
Moscow’s attitudes as the Cold War emerged in 1946.  That change in foreign policy angered 
the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, who had expected Truman to continue FDR’s 
policy of compromise with Stalin.  Consequently, after the resounding Republican victory in 
the 1946 midterm elections, Truman appeared beleaguered as confident Republicans attacked 
him from the right and a swath of previously loyal Democrats derided him from the left.  It 
was precisely those disillusioned liberal Democrats who provided most of the support for 
Henry Wallace’s 1948 Progressive Party candidacy for the U.S. Presidency.31 
The “seeds of revolt,” as Harold Gosnell put it, were cast into the furrow during the 1944 
election campaign, when FDR refused to openly state that he did not want Henry A. Wallace 
to be his Vice Presidential candidate.  Instead, he vacillated, and left the decision to the 
“Byzantine” intrigues of the Democratic Party bosses.  In the Democratic Convention, held in 
mid-July 1944, Wallace came out ahead on the first ballot, but then was decisively defeated 
on the second.  As mentioned above in Chapter Two, the Democratic business interests, 
Southern Democrats, and city bosses were opposed to Wallace on ideological grounds, while 
the New Dealer segment of the party, the liberals and progressives, supported Wallace.  
Wallace, according to contemporary polls, enjoyed great popularity with the Democratic 
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rank-and-file, but that powerful opposition defeated his nomination. Two major results came 
out of this development:  first, Harry S. Truman, a more pragmatic and realistic politician 
than Wallace, became U.S. President upon FDR’s death nine months later; second, the liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party, disgusted and bitter at the machinations which defeated their 
man, became estranged from the organization, and consequently gave rise to the Progressive 
Party experiment, led by Wallace, in the 1948 Presidential election.32 
The four years between the 1944 and 1948 elections were a landmark in the Democratic 
Party’s 20th Century history.  The coalition of voting blocs that gave FDR victory in four 
presidential elections was a complex patchwork of interests that, in retrospect, was kept 
together only by FDR’s political abilities.  One essential segment was a block of voters that 
would today be termed “leftists”:  progressives, liberals, and left wing idealists of all stripes, 
including avowed socialists and Communists.  Several public organizations represented this 
group in U.S. politics during the 1940s, especially the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO).  Because the CIO had strong local organizations, it provided vital grassroots work to 
supply votes for the 1944 Presidential election.  Concurrently, strong Communist influence 
existed in the CIO’s organizational hierarchy and membership.33  
As 1945 passed into 1946, and the Truman Administration’s policies towards the Soviet 
Union became, step-by-step, more antagonistic, the liberal voting bloc of the Democratic 
Party began to react.  The left wing of the Democratic Party had expected Truman to continue 
FDR’s policy of compromise with Stalin, so their disappointment grew as the months passed 
in late 1945 and early 1946.  Winston Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” speech of March 
                                                            
32
 Blum, John Morton, ed.  The Price of Vision:  The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946.  
Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973.  pp. 31-36, 360-371; Gosnell, Harold F.  Truman’s 
Crises:  A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman.  Westport, Conn.:  Greenwood Press, 
1980. p. 194; MacDougall, Curtis. D.  Gideon’s Army, Vol. 1:  The Components of the 
Decision.  New York:  Marzani and Munsell, 1965.  pp. 5-11; Walton, Richard J. Henry 
Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War.  New York:  The Viking Press, 1976.  pp. 15-22.   
33
 Westerfield p. 212. 
125 
 
1946 elicited fury from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party since President Truman 
appeared to have approved the speech’s hostile tone.  By the middle of 1946, the Democratic 
Party liberals were loudly criticizing the Truman Administration’s foreign policy.  The 
Truman Administration figure who most clearly represented the Democratic liberals was 
Secretary of Commerce Henry Agard Wallace.34 
 
2.1.3.1.  Who Was Henry A. Wallace? 
 
Today, Henry Wallace is barely remembered in U.S. society even though he was a prominent 
figure of the 1930s and 1940s.  In fact, during those decades Wallace was the most important 
and influential Democratic politician after FDR, and Wallace’s importance to U.S. liberals 
and progressives in the 1930s and 1940s is difficult to overstate.  In his memoirs, for 
example, Wallace attributes the following to Eleanor Roosevelt in the wake of the 1944 
election: 
  When I saw Mrs. Roosevelt, she told me that the liberals looked on me as the 
 outstanding symbol of liberalism in the United States.  She said that any program they 
 worked up ought to be passed on by me.  She said that she was going out to the CIO 
 convention on November 20 and she wanted to know whether I would head up a 
 greatly broadened PAC [political action committee].  She felt that Sidney Hillman 
 was not suitable for heading up such a broad liberal organization.35  
Wallace does not give the reader reason to think that he exaggerated or distorted Mrs. 
Roosevelt’s words, especially since he explains that, later the same day, he called Mrs. 
Roosevelt and told her that he could not take on such a role because it would damage the 
cause of both the Democratic Party and American liberalism.  Interestingly, today Eleanor 
Roosevelt is well remembered for the liberal and progressive causes that she fought for, while 
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Wallace is largely neglected, but at the time, Wallace was a major force in U.S. politics.36 
 
2.1.3.2.  Wallace’s Biography 
 
Henry Agard Wallace was born into a rural Iowa family steeped in scientific farming, 
Calvinist religion, and agrarian progressivism in 1888.  Wallace displayed an early proclivity 
for science and plants, and was encouraged in that pursuit by George Washington Carver, 
whom he met at Iowa State Agricultural College, where Wallace’s father taught.  Wallace 
consequently became absorbed in improving farm technology and yields, and researched in 
fields as diverse as demography, economics, genetics, and mathematics.  In the 1920s, 
Wallace’s father, Henry C. Wallace, served as Secretary of Agriculture under both Warren 
Harding and Calvin Coolidge.  During the same decade, the younger Henry Wallace put his 
scientific endeavors to use in the market and founded a highly successful hybrid seed 
company.  Wallace also became editor of the Wallace family’s widely-read weekly Wallaces’ 
Farmer.37 
At the same time, Wallace was developing his political views.  Wallace’s upbringing in a 
household that espoused non-doctrinaire Calvinist and progressive agrarian ideals, along with 
his scientific mindset, made Wallace an adherent of Thorstein Veblen’s argument that the 
production of abundant food was held back by monopolist capitalist industry.  Wallace, like 
Veblen, advocated the power of technology to create a better society, and opposed 
monopolistic practices.  This perspective also led him to support internationalism and oppose 
tariffs.  However, because of their rural viewpoint and the U.S. political atmosphere in the 
early 20th Century, Wallace’s family found much to criticize in both of the major U.S. 
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political parties.  In 1912 they supported Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party.    
Wallace originally registered as a Republican but disliked their agricultural policies, so he 
supported Robert M. La Follette and the Progressive Party in 1924, and even promoted the 
formation of a third party in 1928.  Although Wallace was an internationalist for most of his 
life, during the 1920s he professed isolationist views.  While writing editorials for Wallaces’ 
Farmer, Wallace developed cogent opinions on economic and political issues related to 
agriculture, which also brought him to FDR’s attention; their first meeting occurred after the 
1932 Democratic Party Convention.  Wallace served for a full term as Secretary of 
Agriculture before he changed his party affiliation to Democrat.38  
 
2.1.3.3.  Secretary of Agriculture, 1932-1940 
 
During the 1932 election campaign, Franklin Roosevelt turned to Wallace for advice 
concerning farm issues.  Wallace’s name, by that time, was associated with agricultural 
expertise through his own accomplishments, through the family farm weekly, and through his 
father’s stint as Secretary of Agriculture.  Wallace’s moderate reform ideology also fit well 
with Roosevelt’s.  Henry Wallace was highly successful as Secretary of Agriculture, 
especially when the importance of farm policy to alleviating the Great Depression’s effects 
on farmers is considered.  At the time, he was considered one of the most effective 
Agricultural Secretaries to have held the office.  Both his position and his achievements 
subsequently made Wallace a frontrunner for the Vice Presidency in 1940.39 
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2.1.3.4.  U.S. Vice President, 1940-1944 
 
FDR chose Wallace as his 1940 Vice Presidential candidate for several reasons.  First of all, 
John Nance Garner, FDR’s Vice President during the first two terms of his Presidency, was a 
Southern Democrat, and served to maintain that important bloc of Democratic votes.  Garner 
had openly opposed some of FDR’s policies during the second term, however, and FDR 
decided that he wanted a more liberal Vice Presidential candidate.  Wallace was certainly 
that.  Despite the fact that Wallace was not one of the “New Dealers,” as those figures close 
to FDR were referred to, FDR forced the 1940 Democratic Convention to accept his choice of 
Wallace as running mate, and even threatened to withdraw his own candidacy if Wallace was 
not accepted.40 
The zenith of Wallace’s political influence occurred in 1940-1944 while serving as the U.S. 
Vice President.  Initially, FDR gave Wallace few responsibilities, but as the global conflict 
widened to include the U.S., the need for war preparation gained urgency.  Correspondingly, 
Wallace was made chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), which developed 
into one of the most important wartime governmental agencies.  For eighteen months, 
Wallace put his ideals to work for the war effort.  Along with his BEW duties, Wallace also 
spoke publicly on various issues confronting the nation.  During WWII, Wallace’s 
pronouncements on foreign policy reflected what was understood as the U.S. liberal attitude 
towards a variety of issues, a perspective that has been described as a “worldwide New Deal” 
that, at the same time, turned a blind eye to “the nature of the Soviet state.”  His ideas 
concerning the postwar peace meant that national states should be willing to transfer some 
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sovereignty to an empowered U.N.41 
While performing his responsibilities as BEW chairman, Wallace allowed his religiously-
tinged zeal to overcome more pragmatic, political judgment, which resulted in clashes with 
Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, two powerful 
administration conservatives.  This conflict played out in public, and the resulting scandal 
embarrassed FDR and forced him to replace the BEW with another newly-created agency, the 
Office of Economic Warfare, in mid-1943.  Wallace was not asked to head the new office, 
and went back to his Vice Presidential duties and public speaking.42  The series of events 
which resulted in Harry Truman being nominated as FDR’s 1944 Vice Presidential candidate 
was described above.  Wallace’s term as Vice President ended in January 1945, and FDR 
made him Secretary of Commerce, in place of his antagonist Jones, a month later. 
 
2.1.3.5.  Secretary of Commerce, 1945-1946 
 
Wallace’s conflict with Truman did not occur immediately upon Truman’s accession to the 
Presidency.  Truman kept Wallace on as Secretary of Commerce, the position to which FDR 
had appointed Wallace, with Truman doing the hatchet work. 43   Wallace’s Commerce 
Secretary duties were domestic, but it was his opinions concerning foreign policy that caused 
his conclusive rift with President Truman.   
By the last quarter of 1945, Wallace began to voice opinions concerning foreign policy as he 
grew concerned that President Truman would not conduct a policy of reconciliation with the 
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Soviets.  In the beginning of 1946, Wallace began to express his opinions concerning U.S. 
foreign policy with more volume, and also bluntly criticized Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” 
speech.  After Churchill’s speech, Wallace sent a letter to Truman concerning steps that the 
new U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Walter Bedell Smith, could take to reverse the worsening 
relations between the two countries; Truman politely thanked Wallace for the note and then 
filed it away.  In July 1946 Wallace took it upon himself to pen a lengthy letter to President 
Truman again expressing concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy towards the 
USSR.  Then, in September of the same year, Wallace and Truman experienced a 
misunderstanding concerning a Wallace speech that seemingly criticized the U.S. approach to 
relations with the USSR.  In the ensuing hubbub, Byrnes, who was trying to conduct the Paris 
Council of Foreign Ministers meetings while Wallace’s publicly expressed opinions 
undermined his negotiating stances, threatened to resign unless Wallace was ousted from the 
Cabinet; Wallace, for his part, agreed to cease pronouncing on foreign policy only until the 
Paris talks had concluded.  Truman, under pressure from Byrnes, decided to demand 
Wallace’s resignation.  Wallace did so, and proceeded to continue his foreign policy speeches 
from the public sphere.44 
Here, it should be noted that Wallace was not an advocate for the Soviet system.  Rather, he 
supported Soviet-American cooperation and promoted a number of other idealistic 
approaches to U.S. foreign policy according to what was understood, at the time, as liberal 
prescriptions for those problems.  One scholar notes that the speech which led to Wallace’s 
resignation from Truman’s cabinet departed in significant ways from contemporary liberal 
                                                            
44
 Blum pp. 37-46; Byrnes, James F.  All in One Lifetime.  New York:  Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1958. pp. 370-376; Donovan, Robert.  Conflict and Crisis:  The Presidency of 
Harry S Truman, 1945-1948.  Columbia, Missouri:  University of Missouri Press, 1996.  pp. 
219- 228; Hamby, “Henry A. Wallace,”  pp. 157-159; MacDougall pp. 59-80; Truman, Harry 
S.  Memoirs, Volume 1, pp. 496-502; Walker pp. 117-130, 132-146, 149-159; Walton pp. 25-
30, 50-51, 80-82, 89-95, 98-116, 125-127, 129-130. 
131 
 
thought because it accepted Soviet and American spheres-of-influence, a Realist concept; 
correspondingly, Wallace did not speak glowingly of Soviet society in the September speech, 
which caused concern amongst his Communist adherents.  Truman’s ejection of Wallace 
from the Administration sparked outrage from the U.S. left, and convinced liberals that 
Truman had finally rejected the New Deal.  Wallace would soon become editor of the New 
Republic, a flagship publication of the American liberal left.45  
 
2.1.3.6.  Wallace’s Third-Party Campaign for the Presidency, 1947-1948 
 
Wallace would not remain attached to Realist ideas.  Instead, ideology -- his own as well as 
that of his advisors -- would dominate Wallace’s understanding of the contemporary political 
environment in 1947 and 1948.  Liberals who did not agree with Wallace’s stances, mostly 
more moderate, pragmatic, and realistic liberals, formed the Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) a progressive, but anti-Communist political organization.  The ADA, formed 
in early January 1947, had a precursor, the Union for Democratic Action (UDA).  During 
WWII, the UDA was the only prominent liberal group to remain anti-Communist.  Though 
this stance caused friction between the UDA and other liberal and leftist groups during the 
war, after the war other liberals, disenchanted with the Communists’ behavior domestically 
and Soviet actions in general, slowly began to move towards the UDA’s position.  That trend 
was cemented by the worsening international situation in 1946 and the disheartening result of 
that year’s elections.  The ADA, in the words of one scholar, was comprised mostly of 
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“middle- or upper-middle class” men with college education who supported New Deal 
policies, and was never able to attract significant working-class or minority support.  ADA 
members, though remaining dedicated to reform, understood and backed the necessity for 
“bargaining and compromise” in relation to national politics.  Eleanor Roosevelt was the 
ADA’s most visible original member.  The foundation of the ADA, coming one week after 
the foundation of the Progressive Citizens of America, also made the split in the U.S. liberal 
community official.  One author termed this development, and the following two years, as 
“nothing less than a civil war amongst the liberals of America.”  The ADA, subsequently, 
would campaign vigorously against Wallace throughout the 1948 election year.46   
Despite the widening rift in the American liberal community, Wallace remained convinced 
until late 1947 that the correct path to expressing his ideals nationally was from within the 
Democratic Party, and through an effort to move the Democratic Party towards more 
progressive ideals.  Because Wallace’s potential support came from sectors of the voting 
population that supported the Democratic Party, President Truman’s advisors were forced to 
monitor Wallace’s activities closely during 1947.  Consequently, for most of 1947, Truman 
did not respond publicly to Wallace’s attacks on his administration’s foreign policy, but some 
of Truman’s political decisions reflected a desire to solidify sections of voters that the 
Democrats thought Wallace threatened.47 
One of the key issues that marked the division between ADA liberals and Wallace supporters 
was the Truman Doctrine and the provision of aid to Greece and Turkey.  The primary group 
representing leftist liberals, the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), had emerged in late 
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December 1946 from the merger of two competing liberal organizations.  The PCA was 
further to the political left of the ADA:  the ADA had emphatically condemned Communism 
and Communist involvement in its organization, but the PCA had refused to take the same 
step.  The PCA, directly after President Truman’s 12 March 1947 speech, condemned it as a 
first step towards global annihilation, whereas 250 delegates to the ADA’s 30 March 1947 
organizational conference “overwhelmingly approved” the President’s initiative. Later in the 
month, when President Truman also announced the beginning of a program to investigate the 
loyalty of Federal employees, the PCA immediately attacked the proposal and the ADA 
approved it.  In short, ADA liberals understood that, while the Greek and Turkish 
governments may not have measured up to U.S. democratic ideals, the alternative was far 
worse and U.S. influence would work for better ends.  Even then, many prominent liberals, 
such as Elliot Roosevelt, Samuel Grafton, Fiorello LaGuardia, and Freda Kirchwey, did not 
like the idea of supporting the “reactionary” Greek and Turkish governments.  Wallace 
echoed that general sentiment, but accomplished this by abandoning the brief flirtation with 
Realism that he experienced in September 1946.  As Hamby explains, Wallace depended on 
moral and political ideals for his arguments, not on pragmatic evaluations of U.S. strategy.48 
Wallace voiced his opposition to the Truman Doctrine the day after Truman’s historical 
Congressional address.  Wallace’s speech is notable for several reasons.  The most prominent 
is the fact that he lambasts the idea of providing aid to Turkey in a speech that was broadcast 
nationwide on NBC.  Here is an excerpt of the speech as provided in Richard J. Walton’s 
study: 
  Americans agree with President Truman that we must aid the people beside 
 whom we fought….  Why are we speaking only of $400 million when the need is far 
 greater?  Why is $150 million of those $400 million to be given to Turkey which 
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 was no ally of ours and which is in no urgent need of food and supplies?       
  All Americans agree with President Truman that freedom is the most cherished 
 of human goals, and should be helped to grow in all countries.  These same 
 Americans ask:  How does support given to the undemocratic governments of Greece 
 and Turkey aid the cause of freedom?        
  Turkey is a nation which fought against us in the First World War and which 
 in this war refused to help the United Nations.  Turkey fattened herself off the 
 Germans and the allies by offering her vital supplies of chrome to the highest bidder.  
 Out of these sales she built up a gold reserve of a quarter of a billion dollars.  Turkish 
 neutrality lengthened the war by months.  Turkey was a haven for Nazi leaders at the 
 war’s end.  It is utter nonsense to assert today that the Turkish government is 
 representative or democratic.  Turkish sources say that the $150 million that President 
 Truman proposes to give Turkey is to be used to maintain her army of a million men   
 -- equivalent to 7 million men in terms of the United States.                                 
  I strongly recommend economic aid to Greece….49 
This speech’s significance comes from the fact that Wallace was the favorite of the 
ideological, progressive left wing of the Democrat Party.  His ideas both provided direction to 
and reflected the general trend amongst his supporters.  This means that the ideas presented in 
this speech concerning Turkey either had wide currency amongst Wallace’s supporters or 
gained currency through his expression of them.  In the excerpt supplied by Walton’s book, 
Wallace used the terms “reactionary,” “remote,” “no ally of ours,” “undemocratic,” and a 
post-WWII “haven for Nazi leaders,” to describe his conception of the Turkish government.  
MacDougall notes that Wallace “… particularly scored the $150 million earmarked for 
Turkey, no ally of the United States in either war…”.  Walton adds that Wallace’s speech 
“touched many Americans” who responded with a wave of letters to Wallace.50          
A second interesting aspect of Wallace’s speech is that even though much of what he states 
concerning the Turkish leadership’s behavior during WWII is inaccurate, those same 
inaccuracies became common knowledge amongst U.S. progressives, and carried on into the 
future.  To compound the problem, Wallace displays no knowledge of the transformation 
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then taking place in Turkish politics.  Without going into details, in 1945 Turkish politics was 
opened to second parties for the first time since 1930, and Turkey’s first multi-party election 
since 1930, though admittedly corrupt, had been held in 1946.  Turkish society had 
experienced broad, top-down reforms in the 1920s and 1930s, and more reforms were 
initiated in the immediate aftermath of WWII.  Wallace does not indicate knowledge of these 
facts, but that information would also have weakened his argument. 
Wallace’s criticism of the Truman Doctrine continued throughout 1947 as he used his 
position at the New Republic to repeatedly attack the Greek-Turkish aid program and, 
eventually, the Marshall Plan.  After Wallace returned from an April 1947 speaking trip to 
Europe, which he also used to attack the Greek-Turkish aid initiative, he set out on a cross-
country speaking tour sponsored by the New Republic and the PCA.51   
Early 1947 also marked the final few months that Dean Acheson served as Under Secretary 
of State, and one lengthy memorandum that came to Acheson’s desk in mid-April detailed 
the proceedings at one of Wallace’s PCA-sponsored speaking events, held in New York’s 
Madison Square Garden on 31 March 1947, immediately before Wallace traveled to 
Europe.52  The aim of the New York meeting was to criticize the Truman Doctrine and 
promote Wallace.  The memorandum’s author was Chester Kerr, who had attended the ADA 
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conference in Washington the day before.53 
Kerr’s description of the PCA rally betrays the indignation of the East Coast liberal elite, 
aghast at the attitudes and methods of the PCA, the more populist, working-class, and 
militant version of the ADA.  Working from sneer-to-sneer, Kerr contemptuously retells the 
event’s entertainments, which included appearances from a “Who’s Who” of the 
contemporary American radical left -- Lillian Hellman, Helen Keller, Zero Mostel, and Elliott 
Roosevelt -- and topped off by a speech from Henry Wallace.  Kerr notes that about 18,000 
people attended the rally and that copies of The Nation, the U.S.’s longest-running leftist 
publication, were being sold to the attendees. 
For the purposes of this study, the interesting aspect of the rally is Kerr’s aside concerning 
one speaker, identified as John Randolph.54  Randolph, according to Kerr, was “…  for 
housing and for the people of Greece, was against Turkey, and ‘tired of fighting.’”55  The 
differentiation between Greece and Turkey catches the eye.  Even in Wallace’s 13 March 
1947 speech, he said more positive things concerning Greece even though Greece still 
featured a monarch.  Why does Turkey deserve blanket opposition, but not Greece? 
Other speakers at the Madison Square Garden rally formulated their own methods of deriding 
the Greek-Turkish aid program.  Harlow Shapley, a Harvard astronomy professor, asserted 
that the motivating force behind the aid package was oil companies, and illustrated his point 
with a regrettable punning explanation of how Greece (“grease”) and Turkey (known to 
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Americans more as a food) were, in his view, symbolic of the real catalysts, i.e. oil 
companies and manufacturers, behind the Truman Doctrine. Elliot Roosevelt characterized 
the Truman Doctrine as a betrayal of his father’s legacy.  Wallace also focused on the alleged 
oil interests behind the Truman Doctrine.  Thus, several of the speakers linked aid to Turkey 
with oil company interests, a favorite topic of the militant U.S. left since WWII.  Shortly after 
the New York conference, Idaho Senator Glen Taylor, who would become Wallace’s Vice-
Presidential candidate in 1948, also told a national radio audience that the Greek-Turkish aid 
program was about oil.56 
While Wallace was in Europe, other PCA members provided statements to support the 
perspective Wallace expressed abroad.  On 10 April 1947, PCA members criticized the 
Greek-Turkish aid program to a national radio audience.  One of the speakers, Eugene I. 
Johnson, described the Greek and Turkish governments as anti-union and those countries’ 
elections as “one-party or military affairs.”57 
Wallace’s cross-country speaking tour, which began in May, was intended as the U.S. sequel 
to his tour in Europe, and it continued for two months.  Walton mentions that, according to 
contemporary media reports, Wallace spoke to around 100,000 people during his May-June 
1947 tour.  Such attendance figures made the event surprisingly successful, especially since 
the attendees were charged an entrance fee.  At some of the venues, the same “show-style” 
used in the 31 March 1947 New York rally was applied for maximum effect.  Wallace’s tour 
attracted a great deal of attention from the U.S. press, most of which was derogatory and 
dismissive, excepting those media sources that felt sympathy for Wallace’s ideals.  
                                                            
56
 MacDougall pp. 129-130, 145. 
57
 MacDougall p. 134.  Because the Turkish government took the first steps towards state-
sponsored industrialization only in the 1930s and WWII then put on hold any other economic 
initiatives that the government had planned, the level of industrialization attained by 1947 
was extremely low.  Therefore, unions would have been non-existent for the simple reason 
that there were so few workers to unionize.  The Turkish political system had also been 
opened to second parties in late 1945. 
138 
 
Democratic Party officials conceded that Wallace’s tour was effective and well-organized, 
and that the citizens attending Wallace’s rallies were not just “rabid left wingers,” but also 
conservatives and isolationists.  The political spectrum covered by the attendees was thus 
worrying for the Democratic Party.  Wallace’s opposition to the Greek-Turkish aid program 
was a prominent feature of his comments throughout the tour.58 
The tour wrapped up with a large rally in Washington D.C. on 14 June 1947, a week after 
Secretary of State Marshall’s famous address at Harvard; this was also Wallace’s first return 
to Washington since he left the Commerce Secretary’s position.  By the time Wallace got to 
Washington, the intensity of anti-Wallace sentiment from the political right resulted in 
judicial initiatives from Congress to have the rally banned.  The day of the rally, Wallace held 
a press conference in which he once again connected the Greek-Turkish aid issue to oil.59 
During the spring of 1947 large crowds of people had turned out to listen to Wallace speak, 
but the situation changed after the Marshall Plan was announced.  Because the Marshall Plan 
focused on economic aid, it appealed to liberal sensibilities, which opposed military aid.  The 
ADA supported the Marshall Plan not only because it matched the ADA’s liberal platform, 
but also because it presented a clear and attention-grabbing issue which could be utilized to 
separate the ADA from the PCA for progressives.  Wallace originally expressed positive 
feelings towards the Marshall Plan, but by mid-July 1947, after the USSR rejected the Plan, 
Wallace focused more on the need to go through the U.N., portrayed the Marshall Plan “as 
the Truman Doctrine in disguise,” and continued to group Turkey in with several other states 
as “reactionary regimes.”  Such stances meant that Wallace, who had already embraced 
foreign policy opinions different than those of the majority of U.S. citizens, began to lose his 
liberal support.  Gradually, distance between Wallace’s foreign policy ideas and the majority 
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of U.S liberals appeared.  In the end, only one prominent New Dealer, Rexford Tugwell, 
supported Wallace’s Presidential bid.60 
For his part, Dean Acheson lent his name and reputation to the Administration’s efforts to 
promote the Marshall Plan and battle Wallace’s efforts to discredit President Truman’s major 
foreign policy initiatives.  Acheson would eventually be an active member of the Committee 
for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, and would speak widely in the effort to 
ensure its passage by Congress.  Acheson’s activities in 1947-1948 to aid the Truman 
Administration will be described in more detail below.61 
The issue of Greek-Turkish aid did surface at times during Wallace’s campaign.  On 29 
December 1947 Wallace announced his decision to run for the Presidency in Chicago.  In the 
speech Wallace gave on the occasion, he mentioned Turkey specifically as a part of foreign 
military aid that he opposed, and that the aid was directly responsible for domestic inflation.  
He also asserted that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan would divide Europe into 
antagonistic halves. Wallace’s opposition to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
would remain his stance throughout the 1948 election season, but at certain points he 
expressed support for U.S. aid to certain foreign states, apparently based on his estimation of 
whether the government was “reactionary” or not.  From the beginning of the campaign, 
Wallace’s support amongst labor was suspect as U.S. labor organizations were already 
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splitting into pro- and anti-Communist camps and hesitant to support the PCA’s third-party 
effort, while even Wallace recognized the essentially “middle-class” character of his 
organization.  Wallace’s candidacy was supported publicly by the PCA, but the infrastructure 
for Wallace’s campaign would be quietly provided by the (U.S.) Communist Party.  Despite 
the fact that Wallace had spent 1947 as its editor, the New Republic opposed Wallace’s 
campaign and Wallace resigned as editor in January 1948, though he continued to pen a 
weekly column for several months.62 
On 19 March 1948, in a radio address intended as a response to President Truman and 
broadcast on all three major U.S. radio stations, Wallace averred that the U.S. was interfering 
in (among other nations) Turkey’s domestic politics.  March 1948 was the point at which 
Truman looked most doomed as Democratic figures across the country deserted him in 
droves, and the effort to convince Dwight Eisenhower to run for the Democratic nomination 
emerged.  Not until Truman began to improve his public appearances in April 1948, and then 
aided by the surprising success of his June 1948 “whistle-stop” train tour, did Truman begin 
to affect public perceptions by presenting himself as a man of the people and a battler.  
Truman’s campaign strategy was also based partially on appealing to ADA-type liberals in 
order to undercut Wallace’s support.63 
The same period, winter and spring of 1948, was the moment when Wallace appeared the 
strongest.  A broad section of the U.S. left turned out to support, and give money to, 
Wallace’s cross-country campaign.  Wallace’s rallies were a mix of theater and revival 
meetings, and were well-received by his audiences as he continued to criticize the Truman 
Administration’s foreign policies.  However, the press coverage of his efforts steadily turned 
negative as rumors about the depth of Communist involvement in his campaign propagated 
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and as international events such as the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Crisis caused 
the campaign difficulties.  Because Wallace refused to publicly criticize the Soviet Union, his 
reactions to the Czech and Berlin developments seemed to respond to Soviet leads rather than 
to his own evaluations.64   
All three of the parties held their conventions in Philadelphia in June-July 1948, with the 
Progressive Party’s held last, in late July.  The Progressive Party convention’s attendees were 
generally younger than those at the established parties’ conventions; each session of the 
Wallace supporters’ convention opened with community singing accompanied by acoustic 
guitar.  The convention itself was marked by a series of gaffes that left the Progressive Party 
(as it was officially named during the convention) vulnerable to the charge of Communist 
sympathies.  The convention platform adopted by the Progressive Party specifically attacked 
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and urged “the ending of American ‘military and 
economic intervention’ in Greece, Turkey, and China,” while labeling the same countries 
“corrupt, fascist.”  Moreover, the 1945 Soviet demands on Turkey seemed to emerge in 
another aspect of the progressive party platform:  one article favored a “unified homeland” 
for several nations, including Armenia.  In sum, even Wallace accepted the similarity 
between the Progressive Party’s platform and that of the (U.S.) Communist Party.65 
During the 1948 campaign, bipartisan support was still publicly maintained by both of the 
major parties.  For that reason, the foreign policy planks of the Democrats and the 
Republicans strongly resembled each other; the Democratic plank mentioned Turkey directly 
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in relation to the Truman Doctrine.  Actually, moderate Congressional Republicans had also 
supported the Greece-Turkey aid package and the Marshall Plan.  On the other hand, the fact 
that the Progressive Party based its existence on a foreign policy issue, the U.S. relationship 
with the Soviet Union, added a complicating factor to that equation.  The same issue would, 
throughout 1948, cause even further splintering amongst U.S. liberals, progressives, and 
leftists, the components of the Democratic Party’s left wing.  Because Wallace refused to 
repudiate his Communist supporters, he lost almost all of his anti-Communist liberal support 
during the course of the election campaign.66 
After the summer conventions, the election campaign moved into its final phase.  Throughout 
September and October, Truman’s energetic campaigning continued to win support, while 
Dewey’s calm style failed to inspire voters.  Wallace’s campaign lost steam, as did Strom 
Thurmond’s Dixiecrats. 67   By September labor had had largely abandoned Wallace and 
pledged to Truman after being reluctant to support Truman only three months earlier.  
Recognizing the trend, Truman referred to the Wallace Progressives rarely during the last 
three months of the campaign.  Wallace’s brave trip through the South did not change the fact 
that the civil rights issue belonged to Truman and the Democrats.  Although Truman lost 
several Southern states and some of the traditional Northeast Democratic states, and despite 
the votes lost to Wallace and Thurmond (Thurmond ended up with a slightly larger vote tally 
than Wallace), Truman’s appeals to civil rights, labor, and the farm vote carried him on 
Election Day.  Overall, the Democratic Party proved itself as the majority party in U.S. 
politics.68 
On Election Day 1948, besides assuming that Thomas Dewey would win decisively, pollsters 
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had surmised that Wallace would receive nearly ten percent of the vote in traditionally 
Democratic areas.  These predictions proved erroneous.  Elmo Roper’s poll stating that 
foreign policy was the campaign’s most important issue was as mistaken as his polls 
concerning the candidates.69 
In the end, Wallace’s refusal to disassociate himself from the Communists and his inability to 
appeal to a large swath of the U.S. voting public, especially the liberals that should have 
comprised his natural voting base, ensured that his vote total remained small in the 1948 
Presidential election.  Wallace’s vote tally was so small, in fact, that he was not able to 
deprive Truman of victory, even though the result was, in some places, closer than 
appearances would suggest.  In Wallace’s home state Iowa, he earned only 12,000 votes.  The 
election results, in essence, showed that the Democratic Party did not need total support from 
either liberals or Southern Democrats in order to win a national election.  Furthermore, a 
platform that showed any sympathy for the Soviet Union was decisively defeated.70 
Immediately after the disastrous 1948 campaign, Wallace continued to criticize the Truman 
Administration’s foreign policies because the Progressive Party’s stated aim was to build a 
third party for the U.S. political system.  For example, Wallace publicly opposed both 
President Truman’s Point Four Program and the formation of NATO.  As time passed, 
however, Wallace began to reconsider his foreign policy views and, with the outbreak of the 
Korean War, came to support President Truman’s decision to involve U.S. forces in the 
conflict.71  
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For the purposes of this study, three essential points need to be emphasized.  The first is that 
Harry Truman won the 1948 election on domestic issues and by making the 80th Congress an 
feature of the campaign trail; foreign policy difficulties were not what swayed voters towards 
or away from Truman.  As the aphorism goes, “all politics are local.”72   
Another important note is that Henry Wallace did make foreign policy his most important 
issue.  Even though he lost on the issue, many, if not most, of the people who voted for him 
were an important bloc of the cultural and intellectual elite.  Some of the issues foremost in 
their minds were the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and that meant that Turkey, in a 
direct manner, was introduced to many progressive, leftist Americans as a political issue.  
This author finds the Wallace campaign’s negative and political portrayal of Turkey to be a 
convincing explanation as to how Turkey came to receive generally hostile treatment from 
the U.S. left throughout, and even after, the Cold War.73 
Consequently, much of the post-WWII U.S. dialogue concerning Turkey is of the “glass half 
full or glass half empty” variety.  For reasons connected to domestic U.S. politics, various 
commentators either supported or opposed aiding the Turkish Republic.  Most of the 
commentary cannot be termed “well-informed” since obtaining precise, up-to-date 
information concerning Turkey would have been difficult for U.S. citizens at that time.  Few 
Americans had direct experience with or had travelled to Turkey.  On the other hand, the lack 
of common public knowledge about Turkey mandated that various U.S. officials, or people 
connected to the official viewpoint, write articles extolling the Turkish Republic’s progress in 
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the years after WWII and as the Cold War replaced Soviet-American cooperation.  This effort 
can be seen, at the very least, as a holding effort by U.S. officials to counteract the 
perspective on Turkey promoted by Wallace and other U.S. leftists who opposed the Truman 
Administration’s foreign policies.  
The article authored by Walter Livingston Wright Jr. and mentioned above in Chapter One is 
an example of that phenomenon.74  Written for the most influential foreign policy journal of 
the time, and appearing in January 1948, i.e. in the middle of the push to pass the Marshall 
Plan through Congress, Wright’s article is clearly material meant to persuade any influential 
elites that might be wavering.  Furthermore, the article was written in reaction to an article in 
The Nation from Harold Laski, a Marxist scholar and British politician.  Even today, The 
Nation is a left-of-center publication, and Laski portrayed Turkey as a “partially feudal 
dictatorship” in the context of condemning U.S. imperial projection into the Mediterranean.  
Context is again important since Laski’s article was published on 29 March 1947, only days 
before Wallace flew to London to begin the Western European speaking tour which he used 
to attack Truman Administration foreign policies, and which inspired angry denunciations 
from across the U.S. political spectrum.  Wright’s article was published at almost the same 
moment that Wallace announced his decision to run for President.  For that reason, Wright 
refers to Wallace directly, and to Wallace’s claim that Turkey could not be trusted during the 
war and so did not deserve U.S. aid.  Wright rebuts Wallace’s statement strongly and then 
denounces the inaccuracy of Wallace’s assertions.  In other words, Wright’s article is 
manifestly polemical, and intended for an educated audience at the beginning of an election 
year.  
Finally, if foreign policy was not the determining issue in the 1948 election, and if Turkey 
was an issue that received only limited attention, why did certain segments of the American 
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progressive left develop anti-Turkish opinions?  Why did the State Department still give 
attention to Turkey as a topic for debate in the domestic political sphere?  Why did articles 
reiterating Turkey’s fealty to Western ideals repeatedly appear in policy journals in the ten-
to-fifteen years following WWII? 
The overall problem, in relation to Turkey, that comes out of the U.S. political atmosphere in 
the late 1940s is that Turkey was not a vital aspect of the debates surrounding, first, the 
Truman Doctrine, and then the Marshall Plan.  Turkey does appear in the debates 
immediately following the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine, but then seems to recede, 
only to appear from time-to-time when the more militant U.S. left wanted to express 
opposition to what they saw as the betrayal of the New Deal, increasing U.S. belligerence 
towards the USSR, and U.S. interventionism.  Furthermore, Turkey was sometimes seen in a 
more negative light than Greece in relation to the same aid packages.  The reasons for these 
phenomena are difficult to ascertain and await further research for elucidation.  This study’s 
concluding chapter will also discuss the topic further.75  
 
2.1.4.  Summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the U.S. public’s perception of the Turkish 
Republic in the years following WWII, and in the U.S. cultural and political context that 
existed at the time.  In relation to this theme, several trends can be identified.  The first is 
that, even though most U.S. citizens did not possess a great amount of information 
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concerning Turkey, there was a small, but culturally and politically significant section of the 
voting population that opposed providing aid to Turkey.  This perspective was largely liberal 
in character, even left wing, and saw the Truman Doctrine as a campaign to preserve U.S. 
economic and military strength against the USSR.  In the same period of time, that liberal 
perspective was undergoing broad change as liberals were forced to adapt to the realities of 
U.S. hegemony abroad and a conservative political trend at home.  Consequently, the liberal 
coalition that existed during the New Deal’s apogee in the 1930s splintered as WWII drew to 
a close.  Those who maintained idealistic evaluations of how the U.S. should interact with the 
USSR were more likely to oppose the Truman Doctrine, the Greece-Turkey aid package, and 
the Marshall Plan.  The Marshall Plan elicited greater support from U.S. liberals, but the 
more ideological and militant leftists saw the Marshall Plan as a continuation of the Truman 
Doctrine’s anti-Soviet effort.  The pro-Wallace and anti-Marshall Plan perspective was 
decisively rejected by American voters in 1948. 
However, the failure of Wallace’s crusade also meant less space in the Democratic Party for 
idealists and visionaries, whether intellectual or otherwise.  This was a reflection of the new 
reality, that the U.S. would be a world power, and domestic politics began to reflect this fact.  
Realpolitik became the salient motivating force behind the foreign policy of both the major 
U.S. political parties.  The rise of realpolitik meant the demise of left wing politics in the U.S. 
as an important force, and the experience of Henry Wallace’s movement in 1944 and 1948 
heralded this development.  The U.S. left did not totally disappear, naturally, but was exiled 
to the academy, to publications with extremely limited readerships, and to small pockets of 
resistance in places such as New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, to reappear in somewhat 
different costume during the turmoil that accompanied U.S. involvement in Vietnam during 
the 1960s and early 1970s.   
Even though this liberal and left wing voting bloc may have been small in number, they had 
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influence on U.S. public opinion.  This bloc was comprised of academics, cultural figures, 
entertainers, and even, in the case of Henry Wallace, prominent politicians.  Thus, their 
influence was strong enough to cause concern amongst government officials who were trying 
to portray Turkey as a steadfast friend in the effort to rebuild the world after WWII and to 
preserve U.S. security.  Concern amongst administration officials and certain cultural figures 
about the U.S. public’s lack of knowledge about Turkey, and that public opinion might be 
swayed by anti-Turkish sentiments emanating from the liberal left, was a second trend 
stemming from U.S. public perceptions of Turkey in the 1945-1952 period. 
Third, because the segment of voters that opposed U.S. aid to Turkey was so small, and 
because most Americans knew so little about Turkey, U.S. aid to that country never became 
an overriding, polarizing issue for the voters.  Probably this was just as well for U.S. officials 
since they were unsure of how to portray the developing relationship with Turkey to the U.S. 
public.  Consequently, the information that did appear in the U.S. public space was largely 
either newspaper reports concerning events of note in Turkey, or academic articles, such as 
the Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. article mentioned above, 76  intended for a largely 
intellectual audience closely concerned with foreign relations. 
Two implications for U.S. domestic attitudes towards Turkey result.  Primarily, this meant 
that opposition to a closer relationship with Turkey came from the liberal or left wing 
intellectual classes, who retained an essentially political interpretation of U.S. support for the 
Turkish Republic that was formulated for them in 1947-1948 by Wallace, and then lingered 
on as ideology.  Second, domestic opposition to U.S. support for Turkey has been, since 
WWII, ideologically-based, and not founded on military-strategic calculations or arguments 
concerning the effect of U.S. aid and influence on Turkish society.  Because few people, even 
intellectuals, knew concrete information about, or had direct experience of, the Turkish 
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Republic, arguments about U.S. support for that state were necessarily couched in the 
political rhetoric of the Cold War.  
This fundamentally political attitude of U.S. liberals and progressives towards Turkey can be 
criticized in several ways.  Foremost is the general lack of self-examination concerning what 
U.S. intellectuals knew about the Turkish Republic.77  As an illustration, one of the authors 
quoted extensively in this chapter, even though an Ivy League graduate, widely published, 
and a university educator, is still able to state offhand that “Turkey had aided the Nazis in the 
war.”78  The same author, whose book was published in 1976, is overtly sympathetic to the 
liberal left cause in the text cited.  Another author, a Harvard graduate, an emeritus professor 
at the University of Texas, and an erudite scholar of U.S. 20th century intellectual history, 
mistakenly writes that Turkey was, like Greece, suffering a civil war after WWII (!).79  If 
America’s intellectual and professional elites are prone to such basic factual errors 
concerning Turkey, then what can be expected of wider U.S. society? 
Furthermore, Wallace supporters and anti-Turkish liberals were, in essence, allowing a 
domestic U.S. political controversy to color their evaluation and perception of a foreign 
country.  The decision to provide American aid to Turkey and other countries was a decision 
made by the U.S. government, and no other actor; the people who made the decision to 
provide that aid were U.S. citizens.  Wallace, on the other hand, justified his arguments 
against providing aid to Turkey through reference to the Turkish government’s supposed 
behavior during WWII, or to the hue of Turkey’s political system.  In other words, U.S. 
liberals who opposed the provision of aid to Turkey conflated a domestic political issue with 
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the reality of a different culture, a different society, on the other side of the planet, which 
happened to be important to U.S. foreign policy in the historical juncture, and about which 
they possessed limited or erroneous information.  Wildly inaccurate claims, such as the 
accusation that Turkey harbored Nazis at the end of WWII,80 were the clearest expression of 
this logical fallacy. 
The 1948 U.S. Presidential election was a turning point in U.S. political history.  It was the 
first Presidential election held after the emergence of the Cold War and the identification of 
the USSR as a competitor, enemy even, rather than as an ally.  For the first time civil rights 
and labor were vital campaign issues.  The Democrats cemented their claim to being the party 
which represented the American masses.  The liberal left wing of the Democratic Party was 
forced to moderate its political demands or become politically obsolete.  Most of all, 
however, the Democratic Party’s 1948 victory led to President Truman’s appointment of 
Dean Acheson as Secretary of State.81 
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2.2  DEAN ACHESON, THE FORMULATION OF POST-WWII U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 
AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 
   
 
The final two sections of this study will be devoted to exploring the relationship between 
Dean Acheson and the U.S. decision to pursue a post-WWII alliance with the Turkish 
Republic.  Chapter 2.3 is generally descriptive and explores the information that this 
researcher has gathered in order to more completely understand the different facts of 
Acheson’s character, his relationship with President Truman, and the policy context in which 
Acheson constructed the eventual Turkish-American alliance. 
Chapter 2.4 is more analytical in nature.  That chapter’s aim is to define the extent to which 
Acheson was responsible for the trajectory of Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII.  As a result, 
it focuses on Acheson’s activities as Under Secretary of State in 1945-1947 and as Secretary 
of State from 1949 to 1953. 
During Truman’s Presidency, four different men served as the Secretary of State:  Edward 
Stettinius, James Byrnes, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson.  Even though any of these 
men would be worthwhile examining for their opinions on Turkish-U.S. relations, Dean 
Acheson is the most interesting for several reasons.  First, Acheson not only was the longest-
serving of the four Truman Administration Secretaries of State, he was also Under Secretary 
of State for Stettinius and Byrnes, and for the first six months of Marshall’s tenure.  By the 
time Acheson became Secretary of State in January 1949, he had already spent 6.5 years near 
the summit of State Department decision-making.1  
Furthermore, Acheson was the Secretary of State when NATO was officially formed in 1949, 
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when the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was passed by Congress, when the Mutual Security 
Act became law, and when the decision to admit Turkey to NATO was made.  All of the 
above situations mean that Acheson had intimate knowledge of the bureaucratic decision-
making processes that resulted in the Turkish-U.S. alliance.  His relevance for this topic does 
require caveats because he was at the top of the State Department’s decision-making 
hierarchy for most of the 1945-1952 period, which means that he may not have had strong 
involvement in lower-level policy-formulation.  What this means is that recommendations on 
policy were formulated by lower-level State Department officials and then brought to 
Acheson for action.  How much involvement Acheson had in the deliberations of lower-level 
officials would have changed according to the topic and situation, even though Acheson was 
known for his work ethic and rapport with those working under him.  Acheson’s perspective 
must be understood in that context.  This also means that the military side of planning was 
outside of Acheson’s direct experience.  However, because of the essential role that he played 
in the 1945-1952 State Department, Acheson’s role in Turkish-American relations is vital.  
At this point it is worth quoting at length how Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas’ history of 
six key figures in the post-WWII U.S. government, men who later came to represent the 
American “Establishment,” describes Acheson: 
  [Acheson] entitled his memoirs Present at the Creation, and though he was 
 rarely accused of excess modesty, the phrase actually understates his role.  Indeed, he 
 was the architect of the creation he describes, a man who was more responsible for the 
 Truman Doctrine than President Truman and more responsible for the Marshall Plan 
 than General Marshall.2 
That explanation alone makes clear that understanding Acheson is essential for 
comprehending how postwar U.S. policy towards the Turkey was formulated and expressed.  
In congruence with that aim, the discussion below of Acheson’s biographical information, his 
relationship with President Truman, and his influence on U.S. foreign policy after WWII will 
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focus on issues relevant to discussing his involvement in U.S. relations with the Turkish 
Republic, and should not be construed as a comprehensive exploration of Acheson’s 
biography, character, or political experiences. 
 
2.2.1.  Acheson’s Biography, Personality, and Positions during Truman’s Tenure 
 
2.2.1.1.  Acheson’s Youth, Education, and Legal Career 
 
Dean Gooderham Acheson was born into a religious Scotch-Canadian family in Connecticut 
during the last decade of the 19th Century.  His father was an Episcopal pastor and his family 
was, during his youth, of modest, although increasing, means.  From his parents he acquired 
British manners as well as the Anglophile bearing that would mark his adult personality.  
Acheson’s childhood was marked by a freedom that ended when his father enrolled him in 
Groton, a rigorous private school run by an Episcopal clergyman, which educated mostly the 
children of the U.S. Eastern seaboard Brahmins.  At Groton, Acheson studied a curriculum 
modeled on that of British public schools, which emphasized the Classics, English, European 
history, some quantitative sciences such as chemistry, mathematics, and physics, and religion.  
The other outstanding component of a Groton education was athletics.  Acheson felt 
constricted by Groton’s rigidly structured system, did not excel academically, and acquired a 
reputation as a free spirit.  From Groton, Acheson acquired an understanding (if not actual 
practice) of discipline, but worldly experience also augmented and tempered his natural 
rebelliousness and self-confidence.  Despite Groton’s ordered system, or maybe because of it, 
Acheson professed an attachment to strong democratic ideals at an early age and disclaimed 
the arrogant attitudes of American elites.  Acheson’s progressive political ideas further set 
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him apart from the other, more conservative Groton pupils.3   
After Groton, Acheson went on to Yale, where he was known more for his wit and social 
activities than for academic achievement.  Acheson’s aversion to study at Yale seems to have 
been a reaction to the strictly ordered life he experienced at Groton, as well as a subconscious 
desire to mingle with the wealthy scions that comprised his peers.  For his efforts he was 
tapped for Scroll and Key, the second-most prestigious senior society at Yale.  Acheson also 
continued to cultivate an interest in contemporary progressive politics, and he included the 
Young Turks amongst his sources of inspiration.4 
Consequently, it was not until Harvard Law School that Acheson found his intellectual 
calling, as well as the sphere of activity through which he might express his ideals.  Acheson 
began Harvard Law School in much the same manner as he had conducted his life at Yale, 
but this changed in his second year.  In the first term, Acheson took a class from Felix 
Frankfurter, which permanently altered his attitude towards intellectual endeavors.  Acheson 
learned from Frankfurter the power of ideas, and their potential to bring about social change.  
To put it simply, Frankfurter inspired Acheson, and through Frankfurter, Acheson saw that 
the law was an intellectual exercise through which he could realize his goals and beliefs.  
Furthermore, Frankfurter was a proponent of law as the practical application of experience to 
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relevant problems and issues.  That is, he did not see law as an abstract, logical process, 
detached from the realities of human society, and Acheson readily absorbed this perspective. 
For Acheson, the realization of his own intellectual prowess, combined with this 
understanding of the legal profession, coincided with and magnified his beliefs concerning 
how a person should conduct a just and productive life:   
  …  the law held even more for Acheson:  he saw its evolution as a mirror of 
 the economic and philosophical forces that ordered a community; when those forces 
 changed, he came to believe, so too should the laws.5    
Finally, the friendship that Acheson developed with Frankfurter would have great impact on 
Acheson’s career, since it was through Frankfurter that Acheson became clerk to Supreme 
Court Associate Justice Louis Brandeis.  In order to take that opportunity, Acheson and his 
young family moved to Washington D.C. in 1919.6 
As Brandeis’s clerk, Acheson continued to develop his ideas concerning law and society, and 
his intellectual abilities.  According to Acheson’s biographers, Brandeis had several 
formative influences on Acheson, and his stature bolstered ideas that had already begun to 
blossom in Acheson’s mind.  Brandeis, first of all, believed that the powerless in society 
deserved the law’s protection, but also understood the need for large business structures.  For 
that reason government had to play the role of referee, and establish the middle ground upon 
which the economy and society would be able to function more successfully.  This of course 
agreed with Acheson’s pragmatic democratic attitude.  On the other hand, Brandeis did not 
believe that the law should be set in stone, forever unchangeable.  Even though certain eternal 
moral truths did exist, the law should respond to the changing needs of society, and no one 
ideology or system of belief could provide a guide for society.  Finally, Brandeis also 
perceived an educative aspect of law, a function which could promote understanding and 
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compromise in the conflicts that society experienced.7 
Acheson, however, considered a different mentor, whom he encountered through his 
association with Justice Brandeis, as the “greatest” man that he had met:  Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Holmes was also on the Supreme Court, and Brandeis and 
Holmes lived close to each other.  As a result, Acheson was able to spend significant time 
with Holmes, from whom he absorbed knowledge; Acheson even took notes on their 
conversations.8 
Holmes, of course, is widely considered one of greatest jurists that the United States has 
produced, and his influence is still strongly felt in the U.S. legal profession.  For Acheson, 
Holmes was akin to a deity.  Holmes’s opinions concerning the function of law in society 
also shaped and reinforced Acheson’s.  For Holmes, the essence of the law was pragmatism, 
and the needs of contemporary society provided guidance for the law.  The implication of this 
was that Congress and state legislatures had the right to legislate as they saw fit.  Another 
implication was that one’s own ideology should not color one’s legal judgments, and that a 
case should be decided according to the facts of that case, not according to “general 
principles.”  For Holmes, as well as for Acheson, legal judgments depended on “rationalism 
and restraint.”9    
The ideals that Acheson began to develop at Harvard Law, and under the influence of 
Frankfurter, Brandeis, and Holmes, found their outlet not only in his practice of the law.  In 
his second year of clerking for Brandeis, Acheson toyed with the idea of becoming a labor 
lawyer, but ended up in a young Washington D.C. firm named Covington and Burling.  
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Subsequently, Acheson worked as a lawyer in Washington D.C. throughout the 1920s, and 
steadily built his reputation as a brilliant appellate lawyer who could rescue cases given up as 
hopeless by others.  By the end of the 1920s, Acheson also began to dabble in politics as a 
means of expressing his ideals outside of his profession.  During Acheson’s youth, American 
progressives were inspired by the Republican Party of Theodore Roosevelt.  The 1920s 
Republican Party of Presidents Harding and Coolidge had diverged from earlier progressive 
values and become isolationist, against U.S. participation in the League of Nations, anti-
labor, and trade protectionist.  For Acheson, this meant a swing to the Democratic Party.  
Acheson expanded his social contacts through his professional and political activities, and 
associated with Senator Robert M. La Follette Sr. through one of the social clubs of which he 
was a member.10 
Because his liberal ideals and somewhat caustic personality would never be palatable to a 
majority, Acheson quickly understood that elected office would not be a career possibility for 
him.  However, he had identified other routes through which he could take part in the nation’s 
political life, and campaigned energetically on behalf of the local Democratic Party beginning 
in the latter half of the 1920s.  His campaigning, his acquaintances, and his reputation all 
gained him closer access to the leaders of the Democratic Party, but it was especially Felix 
Frankfurter, one of FDR’s closest advisors, who brought Acheson to the new President’s 
attention shortly after he was inaugurated in 1933.11 
Thus, Acheson’s first position in public service came during the initial Franklin Roosevelt 
Administration.  Initially denied the position of solicitor general by a grudge that the 
Attorney General held against his father, Acheson was picked to fill the position of Under 
Secretary of the Treasury, which he assumed in May 1933.  This office immediately became 
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more complicated when the Secretary of the Treasury, William Woodin, fell ill, and Acheson, 
a lawyer with little experience in finance, became Acting Secretary of the Treasury.  The 
situation did not last for an extended period of time as Acheson clashed with FDR over a 
legal formality:  he argued that the President had no legal right to buy gold at a price above 
that established by law, whereas FDR wanted him to simply accept the necessity of the move 
and approve it.  After a strenuous fight, Acheson followed the President’s orders, but the 
struggle, coupled with press leaks, resulted in Acheson’s resignation from the Treasury in 
November 1933.  Acheson’s insistence on the letter of the law cost him his first government 
position.12 
That first difficult experience piqued Acheson’s interest in public service, but his willingness 
to stand up to FDR also won Acheson a sound reputation in Washington legal circles.  Over 
the following few years, Acheson continued his excellence as an appellate lawyer and his 
political efforts for the Democratic Party.  At the same time, his ideas concerning the correct 
behavior for government officials also experienced change.  In 1937, only four years after his 
principled stand against Roosevelt on the gold price issue, Acheson felt sympathy for FDR’s 
position in the famous “court-packing” episode.  In 1938, while eulogizing Supreme Court 
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, Acheson echoed Cardozo’s assertion of the government’s right 
to pursue “legitimate ends by methods honestly conceived and rationally chosen.”  Acheson’s 
perception of law -- that it functioned through pragmatic reason and in response to society’s 
needs -- found its political reflection in FDR’s policies.  In sum, Acheson had become a New 
Dealer even if he was reluctant to state as much.13 
Circumstance again brought Acheson back to FDR’s attention.  In January 1939, FDR 
nominated Acheson’s Harvard Law mentor, Felix Frankfurter, to the Supreme Court.  
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Frankfurter almost immediately asked Acheson, who had remained his close friend over the 
previous twenty years, to act as counsel during Frankfurter’s confirmation hearings in front of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.  After the successful conclusion of the hearings, Frankfurter 
took Acheson with him to the White House in order to pass on the good news to FDR.  Only 
weeks later, FDR offered Acheson several positions that Acheson insisted on turning down; 
Acheson eventually relented and consented to serving on (and eventually chair) the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure.  This committee was charged with 
examining the due process granted to civilians who had violated some aspect of the new 
federal regulatory laws.  After FDR’s third electoral victory in 1940 and the conclusion of his 
duties on the Attorney General’s Committee, Acheson accepted the position of Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.  With U.S. inclusion in WWII’s hostilities less than 
a year away, Acheson entered the State Department.14 
2.2.1.2.  Acheson’s Experience in the Wartime State Department 
  
The State Department was largely an ineffectual institution during WWII, but there was one 
aspect of the Department’s operations that proved exceedingly important:  postwar planning 
for new economic institutions.  As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
Acheson quickly found himself in the midst of the postwar planning effort, and charged with 
duties of historical importance.   
Even before taking on his new position, Acheson anticipated that world-historical changes 
would result from the new conflict.  In a speech he gave at Yale’s Davenport College in 
November 1939, Acheson anticipated that the U.S. would be forced to assume Britain’s 
position in the world, and that this meant that the U.S. would have to accept the necessity for 
increased military power and realistic foreign policies.  His suggestion was that Britain’s role 
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as the 19th Century hegemon had fundamentally weakened, which meant that the world 
system suffered from the lack of a power which could impose order and provide economic 
resources to improve life standards of people overseas.  In historical hindsight, the 
implications are clear.  Acheson went on to suggest a postwar international trade and 
monetary system largely comparable to what would be established by the Bretton Woods 
accords in 1944.  The essential concepts behind the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and 
NATO are also apparent.  In other words, Acheson already understood the fundamental 
difficulties facing the international community, and had begun to explore remedies for those 
problems.  In another speech, Acheson stated that the U.S. should use its industrial might to 
provide food and arms to America’s friends overseas.15 
 Acheson’s ideas did not remain as only words.  During 1940, Acheson became a public 
defender of FDR’s effort to deliver surplus U.S. military vessels to Britain, and led an 
initiative to establish legal grounds for the President’s idea.  This, of course, was a 
completely different attitude than Acheson had shown as Under Secretary of the Treasury in 
1933.  Acheson’s belief in the need to make decisions according to the facts and needs of a 
situation had triumphed over his attention to the letter of the law.  Furthermore, Acheson’s 
efforts to promote the Lend-Lease Program as well as his public support for the President’s 
unprecedented third term were main factors that brought about Acheson’s appointment to the 
State Department.16 
Acheson’s first important duties in the State Department came while serving as the 
Department’s representative on a State, Treasury, and Justice Department joint policy 
committee known as the Foreign Funds Control Committee.  Throughout 1941, Acheson was 
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closely involved in government deliberations over economic policies towards Japan.  The 
same year, Acheson was involved in negotiating the terms of the Lend-Lease agreement with 
Britain’s representative, John Maynard Keynes (even though the program started before any 
agreements were signed).  Acheson’s experiences with both the Japanese embargo and 
negotiating Lend-Lease prepared him thoroughly for his responsibilities at the Bretton Woods 
negotiations.17 
In 1942-1943, Acheson’s responsibilities revolved around aspects of economic warfare, a 
field of battle that emerged during WWII.  This meant that Acheson paid close attention to 
methods of curbing overland trade between European neutrals and Germany.  Naturally, this 
brought Turkey to Acheson’s attention, but in his memoirs he mentions Turkey in relation to 
this topic only in passing.  In addition to economic warfare, Acheson was the U.S. 
representative to the negotiations that created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA).  The experience with the UNRRA and the need for Congressional 
approval taught Acheson vital lessons about interacting with Congress in general, and with 
Arthur Vandenberg, the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
specifically.  The UNRRA talks also provided Acheson first experiences in dealing with 
Soviet representatives.18   In the future, Acheson’s ability to work with Vandenberg and 
Congress would prove important on countless occasions.        
After the successful launching of the UNRRA in November 1943, Acheson was assigned to 
lead the State Department delegation at the July 1944 Bretton Woods negotiations.  His 
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primary responsibilities were related to the World Bank (known at the time as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and Acheson ended up as chairman 
of the bank’s drafting commission.  Acheson was then given primary responsibility for 
lobbying Congress to pass the Bretton Woods agreements, as well as the legislation 
concerning the United Nations, during late 1944 and the first half of 1945.  These duties came 
after he was given a new title, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and 
International Conferences during the State Department changes that followed the 1944 
Presidential Election.  All of these war time experiences with issues concerning the 
international economic order impressed upon Acheson the connections between economic 
and political problems.19 
After FDR’s death in April 1945, Harry S. Truman’s accession to the Presidency, and the 
successful July 1945 passage of the Bretton Woods agreements by Congress, Acheson 
intended to resign in order to return to civilian life and his more lucrative legal career.  
President Truman had other ideas.20 
 
2.2.1.3.  Acheson’s Post-State Department Career 
 
Because Acheson’s duties and accomplishments during President Truman’s term in office 
will be explored in great detail below, this account of his biography will pass briefly over his 
1945-1953 years in the State Department.  Here, simply mentioning that Acheson stayed in 
the Under Secretary of State position until July 1947, and was the Secretary of  
State from January 1949 to January of 1953 is sufficient.  In the year-and-a-half that he spent 
out of government office in 1947-1948, Acheson remained connected to politics, and gave 
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public speeches in support of the Marshall Plan. 
After his term as Secretary of State expired with the inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower in 
1953, Acheson returned to his law practice.  Because Acheson had acquired a controversial 
reputation, he did not make a grand re-entry into the legal community.  The various 
controversies of his tenure as Secretary, as well as the constant attacks of Joseph McCarthy 
and other conservative Congressional members, had made Acheson someone that many 
Washington D.C. figures did not want to be seen with, and that conservative clients would 
not prefer as legal representation.21 
Consequently, Acheson would not withdraw totally from politics.  By the end of 1953, 
Acheson began to publicly criticize the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration as 
well as to counter attack against Senator Joseph McCarthy.  Acheson also began to author 
books and journal articles on political themes, such as Power and Diplomacy, which was a 
direct criticism of Eisenhower and Dulles’s foreign policies, and “The Illusion of 
Disengagement,” published in Foreign Affairs the same year as Power and Diplomacy, but 
intended as a response to George Kennan’s foreign policy prescriptions.22 
On the other hand, Acheson did not limit his public pronouncements to criticisms of the 
Republican Party or of other foreign policy thinkers with which he had disagreements.  
Acheson wanted to aid his party, the Democrats, as it went through a changing of the guard in 
the mid-to-late 1950s.  To that end, Acheson wrote another book, titled A Democrat Looks at 
His Party, in 1955, and another similarly-themed volume called A Citizen Looks at Congress, 
in 1956.  These books foreshadowed the role that Acheson would assume as the Democratic 
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Party looked for guidance heading into the 1960 Presidential Election, and as John F. 
Kennedy emerged victorious from that contest.23 
In the aftermath of President Eisenhower’s 1956 reelection, the Democratic Party embarked 
on an effort to refashion itself and change some of the ideology that it projected.  To that end, 
it formed a Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) to formulate policy, and which contained a 
foreign policy committee.  Acheson was chosen to lead that committee and utilized the 
position to continue his criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration’s conduction of foreign 
affairs.  John F. Kennedy, who preferred Acheson’s foreign policy views to those of the more 
dovish Adlai Stevenson, joined the DAC in late 1959.  Acheson also gave testimony critical 
of the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy to Congress.24 
During Kennedy’s 1960 campaign and afterwards, Kennedy went to Acheson frequently for 
advice on foreign policy and other questions.  Immediately after the election, Kennedy even 
went to Acheson’s house to ask him about cabinet appointments, including the Secretary of 
State post.  Through these initial approaches, Acheson later became a key advisor during the 
1961 Berlin crisis (which resulted in the Berlin Wall’s construction) and the 1962 Cuban 
Missile crisis, during which Acheson acted as Kennedy’s personal envoy to the French and 
West German leaders.25  
After Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, Lyndon Johnson became President and 
likewise immediately turned to Acheson for advice on foreign policy matters.  The first major 
task that Johnson asked Acheson to work on was the mid-1964 effort to negotiate a solution 
to the Cyprus problem.  Like so many other attempts to solve that quandary, the plan 
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developed by Acheson was destined to eventual failure.  Acheson was also involved in the 
1966 crisis that surrounded French withdrawal from NATO.26 
The most pressing problem that President Johnson faced, of course, was Vietnam.  Vietnam 
had already been an issue while Acheson was Secretary of State, and U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam deepened as the 1950s became the 1960s.  Acheson had originally seen U.S. support 
for the French as the only viable option for U.S. policy, which led to ever-increasing 
American commitments.  In early 1965, Johnson’s Under Secretary of State, George Ball, 
approached Acheson to develop a plan for reaching a settlement of the issue.  That plan was 
unsuccessful, but Acheson remained one of the figures that Johnson turned to for advice 
concerning Vietnam once the situation became more dire in 1967.27 
Johnson eventually decided not to run for reelection in 1968, and in his place Richard Nixon, 
who had been one of Acheson’s primary antagonists during the period that Acheson served as 
Secretary of State, was elected over the candidate that Acheson favored, Hubert Humphrey.  
Even though Nixon was a Republican, he immediately turned to Acheson for advice on 
policy issues, specifically Vietnam.  Until early 1970, Nixon seemed to follow Acheson’s 
advice to steadily decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but Nixon’s decision in April 1970 
to extend the war in Cambodia ended Acheson’s willingness to work with the President on 
the issue.  Acheson did help lobby Congress to pass Nixon’s anti-ballistic missile program.  
In May of 1971 Acheson provided aid on a different issue as he spearheaded an effort to 
defeat a Congressional move towards drastically reducing U.S. troop contributions to NATO.  
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Later that same year in October, Acheson died after suffering a stroke.28  For nearly 40 years 
after his first foray into politics as FDR’s Under Secretary of the Treasury, Acheson had 
remained closely involved in the vital political issues that faced the country.  
   
2.2.1.4.  Acheson’s Personality 
  
Despite the number of biographies and studies that have dwelt on Acheson’s character and 
mentality, providing a concise summary of his personality is not easy, nor is it conducive to 
brevity.  On the other hand, one advantage for scholars is the fact that Acheson wrote 
extensively about his life and opinions after the conclusion of his term in government; these 
tests comprise a rich source of information on Acheson’s ideas and personality for scholars 
examining his life or his career in public office.  As a result, the following paragraphs will 
relate the features of Acheson’s character and mentality that appear, to this author, as more 
relevant to an understanding of Acheson’s role in Turkish-U.S. relations after WWII.  
 
2.2.1.4.1.  Acheson’s character 
 
In terms of character, several aspects of Acheson’s personality are relevant to studying his 
role in Turkish relations with the U.S.  The first is the fact that, despite his elite schooling, 
Acheson was not born into the U.S. East Coast elite.  Acheson, as he describes in the memoir 
Morning and Noon, spent an idyllic childhood in rural Connecticut, comprised of the shared 
romantic activities and experiences that Americans know from authors like Mark Twain and 
Ray Bradbury.  Acheson termed his childhood a “golden age” of “pristine, unorganized, 
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amoral freedom.”29    
That pristine freedom was destined to be shattered by Acheson’s experiences at Groton, 
which the reader understands from Acheson’s explanation as a shocking and “painful” 
encounter with strict order imposed by authority.  Thus, Acheson became highly aware of the 
conflict between the utopian freedom of childhood and the oppressive organization of the 
adult world.  He admitted to his rebellion and understood the consequences of fighting the 
system.  For that reason he had doubts about the adult world.  In order to pursue those doubts, 
or maybe to fight them off, he spent the summer after his graduation from Groton working in 
railroad construction in Central Ontario’s taiga.30  
His experiences both as a child and in the summer after he graduated from Groton taught 
Acheson much about the realities of human life, but also cemented the desire and energy that 
he felt to be a part of that world.  These encounters further meant that he was aware of those 
people in the world who did not have the advantages and privileges that he did.  His 
sympathetic but realistic descriptions of the laborers that he worked with that summer of 
1911, some apparently from Bulgaria and barely proficient in English,31 make abundantly 
clear what he learned about humankind: 
  … the men, simple, illiterate….  were also our friends.  It would be misleading 
 to overstress their simple virtue.  They were hot-tempered and on occasion violent.  
 The knife wounds for which they begged antiseptics and bandages did not appear to 
 be self-inflicted or accidental….  We had, however, devised enough of a common 
 language to learn the main outlines of their lives and hopes….  These men had done 
 more for me than they would ever know and, in doing it, had become a part of me.  
 They had given me new eagerness for experience.  The simple, extroverted pattern of 
 their lives had revived a sense of freedom amidst uncoerced order….  They had 
 restored to me a priceless possession, joy in life.  Never again was I to lose it or doubt 
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 it.32 
That is the description of a person who gave attention to other peoples’ perspectives, who 
could feel the ramifications of the policies that he formulated and carried out as Secretary of 
State, and who understood that his actions had impact on the lives of others.  He had achieved 
reconciliation with the adult world.   
Acheson’s upbringing and later experiences would mold the ideals with which he conducted 
his affairs and interactions with other people.  Even though his father was an Episcopal 
minister, Acheson’s life was not excessively dominated by religion.  This most likely came 
from his father’s example, who was well-read in theological matters, but chose to emphasize 
“ethics and conduct” in his sermons.  From his father he learned basic codes of behavior, to 
bear hardship quietly, to take responsibility, to be useful to others.33  The code of conduct that 
Acheson developed would even cause him political problems later as his emphasis on loyalty, 
and unwillingness to betray those to whom he had given his loyalty, would be used against 
him, just as his adamant refusal to repudiate Alger Hiss was.34  At the same time, that loyalty 
would form the basis for his relationship with Harry S. Truman. 
In sum, Acheson was a person capable of analyzing his own ideas and prejudices, and of 
reflecting on his relationship to other people and situations that he encountered.  Despite the 
apparent inconsistency of some of his attitudes, such as towards the white governments of 
Southern Africa, 35  Acheson was clearly not a person who would simply dismiss the 
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viewpoint, needs, or situation of, for example, Turkish people and their government.  He 
would however, make a realistic, fact-based assessment of Turkish needs according to U.S. 
interests and the nation that he represented.  Acheson’s law-influenced approach to problem-
solving mandated such an attitude.   
 
2.2.1.4.2.  Acheson’s mental approach to law and diplomacy 
 
No doubt exists about Acheson’s intellectual capacities.  Despite his poor showing at both 
Groton and Yale, his youthful rebellion and social pursuits masked a mind searching for the 
right motivation and subject.  In the study and practice of law, he found the object of his 
search. 
During Harvard Law, Acheson was strongly influenced by Felix Frankfurter and, through 
Frankfurter, eventually came to have close interactions with both Louis Brandeis and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, two of the towering figures in U.S. jurisprudence history.  These doyens of 
the legal profession left lasting impressions on Acheson’s beliefs concerning how law and 
society interact.  Acheson, while evaluating the Supreme Court judges that he encountered as 
Brandeis’s clerk, explained the qualities he felt made those men great.  Most fundamentally, 
law was an exercise of reason necessary for the maintenance and progress of society, and he 
described the judges he admired in terms of their approach to law: 
  Their minds, as judges, were not only open but disciplined and controlled, and 
 their exercise of power was limited and restrained, by the law as it existed in the 
 precedents.  Here lay both the value and the limitation of their prior judicial 
 experience in preparing them to exercise the functions of our highest court.36 
Clearly, those men also prepared Acheson, his approach to law, and eventually his approach 
to diplomacy.  The same description, “open but disciplined and controlled” is an excellent 
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summary of Acheson’s term in the State Department.37   
Later in the same text, Acheson describes in detail the ethos with which Louis Brandeis 
approached his cases, and the historian can recognize the essential similarity to the manner in 
which Acheson approached diplomacy.  He explains that Brandeis, 
  …  sought continuously to make the case before him as concrete as possible, to 
 develop fully all the facts involved in the dispute and, beyond them, the great body of 
 factual knowledge which surrounded the particular episode.38 
 The State Department that developed under Acheson’s terms as Under Secretary and 
Secretary of State enabled Acheson to do the same as Brandeis suggested, but in the realm of 
diplomacy.  Immediately following his description of the justices’ admirable attributes, 
Acheson turns to his contemporary Supreme Court, that of the mid-1960s, and criticizes what 
he calls the “activism” of the justices: 
  A present vogue in judicial practice and theory is to turn from the ideal of 
 restraint in the exercise of judicial powers, from restraint imposed by respect for 
 precedent and predictability in the law, as well as from deference to legislative and 
 executive judgments and prerogatives in the constitutional field, to a more “activist” 
 and “result-minded” role….  What seems to me novel is the self-consciousness of the 
 “activism” both in constitutional decisions and in less far-reaching but still important 
 ones applying historic statutes and common law conceptions….  He may 
 conscientiously be seeking to administer justice, but it is personal justice… not that 
 described on the lintel of the Supreme Court Building, “Equal Justice Under Law.”39 
Again, this reflection summarizes in a highly effective manner the approach that Acheson 
took towards diplomacy.  Acheson did not believe that pursuit of an ethical or moral ideal 
was appropriate or even possible for the Secretary of State.  Indeed, he criticized his 
successor, John Foster Dulles, for exactly that behavior.  The Secretary of State had to focus 
on the interests of the country, and those interests, determined through evaluation of each 
                                                            
37
 For Acheson’s own thoughts on the legal profession and the proper approach for judges 
and legal professionals, see:  Acheson, Dean.  Fragments of My Fleece.  New York:  W.W. 
Norton and Co., 1971.  pp. 116-154. 
38
 Acheson, Morning and Noon, pp. 83-84. 
39
 Acheson, Morning and Noon, p. 69. 
171 
 
case according to its own facts, resulted in the policies formulated.  This attitude is why 
Acheson is understood by diplomatic historians as a realist, but Acheson’s perception of 
diplomacy was firmly rooted in his legal training.40  Notably, this attitude would also have 
made Acheson’s approach to Turkey freer from the prejudices or idealistic expectations of his 
time, and based more concretely in U.S. interests. 
Despite his legal training, a profession notorious for producing conservative, cautious 
mindsets, Acheson remained a life-long liberal.  Much of the public perceived him differently 
by the end of his life, but Acheson always described himself as a Democrat and a liberal.  
When appointed Under Secretary of State by Byrnes in summer 1945, Acheson was praised 
by the liberal press, and was focused on positively by liberals evaluating Truman’s 
appointments to the State Department.  The following years of McCarthyite attacks, the 
controversies surrounding his foreign policies, and the changing expectations of U.S. society 
would dramatically affect public perception.  In the 1960s, Acheson would be seen as one of 
the archetypical members of the “Establishment.”41 
Acheson’s own attitudes would contribute to the public’s negative perception of him that 
eventually developed.  Acheson’s realist outlook, and lawyer’s approach to analysis and 
argument, resulted in a lack of tolerance for anything that he interpreted as an attempt to 
escape from the reality of human existence and interaction.  Acheson was famously impatient 
with those who did not see reality as he did, and saw action as preferable to introspection.  
This was a source of his intellectual disagreement with George Kennan.  This also meant, for 
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instance, that he dismissed the importance of the U.N. and thought that the campaign to sell 
the U.N. to the American people created exaggerated expectations.  This did not mean that he 
treated the U.N. dismissively while Secretary of State.  He worked with and through the U.N. 
when he thought it appropriate or useful, and skirted the U.N. when he thought necessary -- 
the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO are illustrations of such circumstances.  
On the other hand, this meant that Acheson saw direct solutions negotiated between two 
countries as more appropriate and useful.42 
As a result, Acheson’s character and legal perspective are vital in order to understand more 
completely how and why he pursued the foreign policy prescriptions that he did as Secretary 
of State.  Even though he was a brilliant, disciplined, and hard-working lawyer, trained by 
several of the greatest jurists in U.S. history, and focused on determining solutions for 
problems through factual analysis, Acheson remained a flexible pragmatist who understood 
that American society was changing, and that change meant gradual development of legal 
precedents.  His comfort with both received wisdom and moral or ideological absolutes 
meant that even near the end of his life, Acheson could state, “I was a strong partisan and I 
still am.  I still believe that the dissenters were right and the majority of the Court were 
wrong,” with total conviction.  Acheson would apply the same realistic logic, as well as 
pragmatism, to diplomacy. 43   
 
2.2.2.   Acheson’s Relationship with President Truman 
 
Before Harry Truman became President, Acheson had had little time to develop definite ideas 
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about how effective a President Truman might be, and whether he could work with the 
President on a personal level.  In order to show his readers the development that his 
relationship with President Truman underwent, Acheson recounted his initial estimate of the 
new President, which he had included in a letter he penned to his son at the end of April 
1945.  Those first reflections are interesting for the conflict in Acheson’s evaluation of the 
President as “straightforward, decisive, simple, entirely honest” but also “limited.”  However, 
he immediately states that it is a “blessing” that Truman was in the position to become 
President and not Henry Wallace, and that he thought Truman would “learn fast and inspire 
confidence.”44  
Acheson formulated those feelings after a meeting that, by chance, occurred only two days 
before FDR’s death.  Acheson explains that this was the first meeting that he could remember 
in which he had a long conversation with Harry Truman.  That encounter had apparently left 
Acheson with a highly positive, but somewhat colorless impression.  In the days and weeks 
after that first real encounter, Acheson’s account portrays a new atmosphere of decisiveness, 
efficiency, and follow-through in the new White House administration, and Acheson’s 
daughter even contributed a quote (though ultimately unused) for Truman’s concluding 
speech at the San Francisco United Nations Conference.45  Overall, the two men seemed to 
get along well, but as yet had no reason to form a closer bond.  Truman would make that 
decision in the month after the Potsdam Conference.  After accepting the Under Secretary 
position, Acheson would be able, by the middle of September 1945, to write that he was 
getting full support from the President and that he liked Truman “a great deal.”46 
Exactly how Truman became aware of Acheson’s abilities, why he initially accepted 
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Acheson’s resignation, and why Truman then recalled Acheson with alacrity all seem to be a 
mystery that no biographer of Acheson has yet solved.  Truman did not explain the situation 
in his memoirs and Acheson did not venture any guesses in his.  Whatever the reason, 
Truman’s abrupt decision to reverse his acceptance of Acheson’s resignation made the 
following seven years of Acheson’s service to U.S. foreign policy possible. 
Historians generally agree that Truman and Acheson, despite their apparent differences, had 
an extraordinarily close and trusting relationship.  That relationship had several foundations, 
the most important of which were reciprocal respect and trust.  Both men saw the essence of 
the other and embraced their compatibility, were attracted to politics but held similar 
behavioral and ethical ideals for those engaged in that pursuit, and held fast to those ideals in 
relation to the other.  While Secretary, Acheson told Truman that they “have always spoken 
the truth to one another and we always will.”  Truman returned the sentiment several years 
later, while writing his memoirs, when he told Acheson “you are one man who can say to me 
what you please anytime, anywhere on any subject.”  Such a relationship has rarely been 
observed amongst political actors in any society in any age.47 
Another cornerstone on which Truman and Acheson’s relationship rested was a clear division 
of responsibilities, which both men respected absolutely and did their utmost to fulfill.  
Unlike FDR, Truman was not in the habit of sending his personal emissaries to foreign 
dignitaries, nor did Truman maintain personal advisors for foreign policy matters.  This 
meant that other figures would not confuse the lines of communication between the Secretary 
and the President, thereby making the source of foreign policy more clear and eliminating 
possible sources of mistrust.  For his part, Acheson was careful to defer important decisions 
to the President and consult consistently and openly with the President on whatever matters 
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were undergoing consideration.  Acheson was also the President’s essential source for foreign 
policy information because, at that point, no other U.S. government institutions had 
developed that capacity to the extent of the State Department.  This also meant that, when 
necessary, the two men defended the other both in private and in public.  Until the end of his 
life, Acheson referred to Truman as “Boss.”48 
The last factor which facilitated Truman and Acheson’s relationship might be termed rapport.  
By all accounts, Acheson and Truman had a similar sense of humor and they struggled in a 
similar manner with an obstreperous Congress and vicious, at times slanderous, political 
opposition.  They understood what the other faced and could sympathize with the other’s 
difficulties.  Acheson appreciated Truman’s decisiveness and no-nonsense approach; Truman 
was grateful for Acheson’s loyalty and brilliant mind.  Because Truman trusted Acheson’s 
decisions and Acheson knew that he had Truman’s support, both were able to carry out their 
tasks and initiatives, in relation to the international problems that faced the U.S., with a 
maximum of mutual agreement and understanding.49 
The most important sign of how well Truman and Acheson worked together, and how much 
respect they had for each other, was the friendship, expressed through their numerous letters 
to each other, which lasted after their term in government to the end of their lives.  The author 
of the Introduction to the collection of Truman and Acheson’s letters states that the only 
precedent for such a lengthy exchange of correspondence between former national leaders is 
the Thomas Jefferson-John Adams letters.50   
This author’s estimation is that, even though a lot is sometimes made of the British, even 
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aristocratic airs that Acheson put on, Acheson and Truman’s relationship was facilitated by 
their roots in rural American culture.  Acheson’s elite education did not seem to change the 
value that he gave to his origins, and this was reflected in the manner that he raised his 
children, taking them to their Maryland farm as often as possible, and educating them in the 
traditions that he knew.  Possibly, this shared rural experience enabled Truman and Acheson 
to understand one another, and construct a camaraderie that had lasting importance not only 
for the U.S., but also, through the foreign policies pursued during Acheson’s service to the 
Truman Administration, for the world.51 
 
2.2.3.  Acheson and the Formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy during Truman’s Tenure 
 
The quality of the professional relationship that existed between Truman and Acheson 
displays clearly that U.S. foreign policy was in Dean Acheson’s hands while he served as 
Secretary of State.  In other words, Dean Acheson’s understanding of U.S. foreign policy 
interests effectively functioned as the U.S. understanding of its foreign policy interests 
between 1949 and 1953.   
Consequently, a discussion of Dean Acheson’s importance to the formulation of U.S. postwar 
policy can begin with a reference to Alan Brinkley’s description of the general conception 
that Americans had of what the war would bring to the world.  To be brief, Americans 
understood that the world that would emerge from the war would be fundamentally different 
than the one which had plunged itself into two global catastrophes in the previous three 
decades.  However, only a few had the opportunity to devise and carry out decisions that 
would directly shape that world.  Acheson was one of those people.  As mentioned above, 
Acheson grasped, long before the U.S. entered WWII, that the international situation that 
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would result from the war would be fundamentally new, and would provide both immense 
opportunities and grave dangers to the U.S.  Coming from the liberal internationalist side of 
the American political spectrum, Acheson knew well that his work in the State Department 
would have particular importance in that world-historical juncture, and he made that 
perception overt through the title of his memoirs.52  He was able to bring this understanding 
to bear on policy problems during the war, and began his stint as Under Secretary of State 
with the same strong convictions.  His realistic awareness of the world situation, of U.S. 
strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities, and of fundamental U.S. interests, would guide his 
decisions from 1945 to 1953.   
Another unusual characteristic of Acheson’s term in the State Department was the fact that 
Acheson had great experience as the State Department’s leader even before he was appointed 
Secretary.  As Under Secretary of State, Acheson’s role was no less pronounced than it would 
be later as Secretary.  Gaddis Smith, writing in 1972, comments on the vital role that 
Acheson played as Under Secretary of State: 
  Never in American history has the second-ranking officer of the Department of 
 State exerted as much influence on foreign policy as did Under Secretary of State 
 Acheson from August 1945 through June 1947.  He was the balance wheel, the 
 coordinator, the provider of continuity and sense of direction during an extraordinarily 
 baffling time.  His ideas and direction contributed substantially and continuously to 
 the sharpening and hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union in an era 
 now recognized as the unequivocal outbreak of the Cold War.53 
Therefore, the vital nature of the role that Acheson played even as Under Secretary cannot be 
ignored.  Moreover, even though the role that Acheson played as Secretary is explicit, one 
should not forget the unusual mutual understanding with which President Truman and 
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Secretary Acheson approached their collaboration.  Acheson, simply, had nearly complete 
control over the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy from January 1949 to 
January 1953.  Especially in light of the changes which the State Department’s prestige, 
operational capacity, and influence on the President have been subjected to in the decades 
since the early 1950s, the unique nature of Secretary Acheson’s term in office must be 
recognized.54 
Under Secretary, and then Secretary, Acheson’s impact on U.S. foreign policy thus came 
from several sources.  Foremost is the fact that Acheson was the Acting Secretary of State for 
a great deal of time in 1945-1947.  Secretary Byrnes, for example, was away from 
Washington for 350 of the 562 days that he spent as Secretary.  When Byrnes was absent, 
Acheson was Acting Secretary.  Of the five months that Acheson served as Under Secretary 
for George Marshall, he spent two of them as Acting Secretary.  As Acting Secretary, 
Acheson fulfilled all of the normal functions of the Secretary of State position:  “meeting 
regularly with the President, attending Cabinet meetings, delivering the important testimony 
before Congress, giving major speeches.”55  As Acting Secretary, Acheson essentially had a 
trial run with the responsibilities of the Secretary, and knew intimately the difficulties faced 
by the Secretary well before he assumed the office.         
Second, while Secretary, Acheson was able to fulfill his duties with the knowledge that 
Truman trusted him implicitly and appreciated his methods.  Acheson had won President 
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Truman’s trust, as described above.  Both agreed on the necessity for negotiation from 
strength and “total diplomacy,” but it was Acheson’s responsibility to carry out this 
understanding.56 
Finally, on the basic level of bureaucracy, Acheson was the main force that helped bring the 
State Department out of the doldrums into which it had fallen during FDR’s Presidency.  One 
of the first innovations that Acheson introduced after becoming Under Secretary was the 
daily 9.30 meeting of the Assistant Secretaries, in which the Department’s work was 
delegated and ongoing concerns tracked.  Later, upon the prescriptions of the Hoover 
Commission, for which Acheson served as vice-chairman, the State Department was 
reorganized to expand the number of Assistant Secretaries and define their responsibilities 
more exactly.  Under Acheson’s terms as Under Secretary and then Secretary of State, the 
morale of, and prestige accorded to, career foreign service officers improved, lines of 
authority and communication within the State Department were better-defined, and 
Department staff were protected by Acheson from political attack.57 
To summarize, Dean Acheson’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the 1945-1953 period is 
derived from several different aspects of his terms as Under Secretary, and then Secretary, of 
State.  First of all, he had a vision of the role that the U.S. needed to play in the postwar 
world, and he had definite ideas about how that vision could be realized.  Additionally, he 
played an important role in policy formation and implementation not only as Secretary but 
even while Under Secretary of State.  As Under Secretary of State he fulfilled the role of 
Secretary for long periods of time, and operated with the full capacities and responsibilities of 
the Secretary.  Third, his power over foreign policy was cemented by his close relationship 
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with, and the trust granted by, President Truman.   
Finally, the resurrection of bureaucratic organization, of lines of responsibility and 
communication, and of policy creation that took place largely at Acheson’s initiative once 
again made the State Department the primary U.S. foreign policy engine of the U.S. 
government.  Acheson, as a result, was the captain of a retooled, modified, strengthened, and 
improved foreign policy vehicle.  As Smith observes, no other 20th Century U.S. Secretary of 
State wielded the power that Acheson did.58  This brings the discussion to the actual issues 
that Acheson faced during his service in one of human history’s most critical intersections.  
 
2.2.3.1.  Major Foreign Policy Issues for Acheson’s Tenure in 1945-1947 and 1949-1953 
 
Naturally, the years in which Acheson served at the top of the State Department hierarchy 
were defined by the multitude of fundamental economic, military, and political dilemmas 
faced by the U.S. government.  Gaddis Smith, in the Preface to his study of Acheson’s State 
Department years, summarized the unprecedented events that pressed upon U.S. foreign 
policy between 1949 and 1953, and to which it fell to Secretary Acheson to formulate the 
U.S. response.  His list includes the North Atlantic treaty’s mediation and Congressional 
authorization, Western Europe’s economic rehabilitation and rearmament, West Germany’s 
emergence and inclusion in European defense arrangements, the Soviet Union’s attainment of 
atomic weapons, thermonuclear weapons, the assumption of control in China by Mao’s 
Communist armies, the failure of efforts to reach a mutual understanding with those Maoist 
forces, the Korean War, the emergence of Indochina as an issue in U.S. foreign policy, 
attempts to find a remedy for the decline of British power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
the extended process of negotiating various issues with the Soviet Union throughout the 
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period.59  However, some details can be added to the overall picture in order to make the 
overwhelming nature of what Acheson confronted more clear.  
Acheson was appointed Under Secretary of State in August 1945, after the Potsdam 
Conference and upon the retirement of Joseph Grew.  As Under Secretary in the following 
tumultuous period, Acheson’s performance brought him attention and, perhaps most 
importantly, won him President Truman’s trust.   
 
2.2.3.1.1.  August 1945-June 1947 
 
As Under Secretary of State between August 1945 and August 1947, Acheson was often 
given specific responsibilities that added enormously to his normal duties.  The first of these 
issues was international control of atomic energy, for which Acheson worked on a U.S. 
proposal that became known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan.  The second major issue was 
China, and Acheson took on the role of personal envoy between General Marshall and 
President Truman in December 1945.  That role lasted throughout 1946.  The last major issue 
was the developing situation in Palestine and of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which 
Secretary Byrnes, according to Acheson, treated as a hot potato that he tried to pass to 
Acheson.60     
Acheson also confronted a number of other problems, lesser in magnitude but important 
nonetheless, during his first year as Under Secretary.  One author adds the general U.S. 
official struggle to comprehend and then formulate a response to Soviet behavior in 1945-
1946, the issue of a loan to Britain in 1946, and the crisis over Iran early that same year; 
Acheson interacted directly with all of those issues.  In August 1946, Acheson was forced to 
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deal directly with major issues related to Turkey as a result of the 7 August note from the 
Soviet Union, which demanded Soviet participation in defense of the Turkish Straits.61  
Issues relating to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan will be related below. 
 
2.2.3.1.2.  July 1947-December 1948 
 
On 30 June 1947, Acheson was replaced as Under Secretary of State by Robert Lovett.  Even 
though Acheson, at that point, had left the State Department, he did not leave politics.  Within 
several months, Acheson began providing speeches and radio appearances for the Citizens’ 
Committee for the Marshall Plan.  Acheson also testified before Congress in order to support 
the Marshall Plan.  At the same time, Acheson served in what was popularly referred to as the 
“Hoover Commission,” the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
United States Government, which did not actually complete its work until mid-1949.62   
 
2.2.3.1.3.  January 1949-January 1953 
 
Immediately upon his reentry to the State Department in January 1949, Acheson was 
confronted with an imposing docket of international issues.  Gaddis Smith long ago provided 
an effective, case-by-case summary of the primary issues that Secretary Acheson labored on 
from 1949 to 1953.  They include (in the order of Gaddis’s treatment) the negotiations 
surrounding the North Atlantic Treaty and the treaty’s passage through Congress; the issues 
surrounding Germany, the emergence of West Germany (i.e. the Federal Republic of 
Germany), and Soviet pressures related to that process; China and its “loss” to Mao’s 
Communists; Russia’s development of an atomic bomb and the resulting U.S. decision to 
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develop a fusion, or hydrogen, bomb.63  All of those situations occurred before June 1950. 
On 25 June 1950, the North Korean army attacked South Korea.  The resulting conflict would 
not be concluded during Acheson’s term in office, but would remain a critical problem, 
especially after the setbacks that the U.S. effort suffered in 1950 and the controversy 
surrounding President Truman’s removal of General Douglas MacArthur from command of 
the U.N. forces in Korea.  West Germany’s rearmament and relationship to NATO, the 
conclusion of the U.S. occupation of Japan and defense of the Western Pacific, the worsening 
situation in Southeast Asia, Palestine and Israel, Iran, and Egypt all constituted further strains 
on Acheson’s energy and abilities.  Other, more minor matters during Acheson’s term were 
Latin America, Yugoslavia’s careful distancing from the Soviet Union and its dispute with 
Italy over Trieste, U.S. economic and military aid for Franco’s Spain, U.S. efforts to convince 
colonial powers to disengage from their possessions (with certain exceptions), India, the 
general issue of U.S. foreign aid, and the U.S. relationship with the U.N.  Added to all of the 
international issues was the domestic U.S. political situation as Acheson was under intense 
attack from Congress, especially Joseph McCarthy, and public opinion for most of his term as 
Secretary. 64 
An essential lesson that a scholar focused on Turkish-American relations should take away 
from a study of the questions that Dean Acheson wrestled with while Secretary of State is 
that Turkey was only one of the multitude of extremely difficult, even intractable, 
international problems that Acheson faced.  Furthermore, Turkey, even though its 
geographical position and staunchly anti-Soviet government put it in the forefront of the State 
Department’s field of vision, was not as important as the problems that the U.S. faced in its 
relations with the USSR, China, and Western Europe.  From time-to-time Turkey did emerge 
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as a pressing issue, such as in August 1946 and February-March 1947, but generally it was 
not the most urgent or difficult concern for the State Department.  Turkey was only one 
aspect of problems that had global scope for the Secretary of State.  On the other hand, from 
August 1945-June 1947 Acheson was arguably more important than any other U.S. official 
for the development of U.S. policy towards Turkey, and because of his position, in 1949-
1953 Acheson was the sole figure responsible for making the final decisions on U.S. policy 
towards Turkey. Acheson developed policies and made decisions concerning Turkey within 
the global scope of his foreign policy vision and the factors affecting that vision.   
Consequently, Dean Acheson’s impact on U.S. foreign policy from 1945-1953 is not in 
dispute.  Not only is Acheson now seen as one of U.S. history’s greatest Secretaries of State, 
but also the historical juncture and the issues which Acheson confronted were 
unprecedented.65  Gaddis Smith summarized his view of Acheson’s overall record as follows: 
  Dean Acheson was the principal author and manager of American foreign 
 policy during the presidency of Harry S. Truman.  As Under Secretary of State…  he 
 provided intellectual balance and coordination during the unstable transition between 
 a time of war against Germany and Japan and Cold War against the Soviet Union.  As 
 Secretary of State…  he, more than any other man, suggested the courses which the 
 President ordered for the nation during the most dangerous phase of the Cold War.66 
The decisions that Acheson made and the policies he pursued continue to shape global 
international relations.  What has not been examined in depth, however, is the impact that 
Acheson had on Turkish-U.S. relations, or the factors that affected Acheson’s decisions 
concerning Turkey.  This study’s next section focuses on that issue. 
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2.3.  DEAN ACHESON AND U.S POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY, 1945-1953 
 
 
  SENATOR SMITH:  Are we adopting a policy where we say the United States 
 of America will be interested all over the world in any country that is seeking 
 democratic freedom?  
  SECRETARY ACHESON:  I think that what the President said was much 
 more limited that what you now suggest to me, and very clear indeed.  He proposed 
 that we should give this aid to Greece and Turkey.  He pointed out that here were two 
 countries which had constitutional systems which were founded on democratic 
 principles which were struggling to maintain those systems.  He said it was to our 
 interest that all peoples who had free governments and democracies, that were moving 
 towards human freedoms, should not be coerced into giving up those institutions, and 
 that whatever help we could extend would be in accordance with our policy.1 
 
This chapter will focus on Dean Acheson’s activities and decisions relating to Turkish-U.S. 
relations in the 1945-1953 period.  In a largely chronological manner, and with reference to 
primary documents from Acheson’s memoirs, the FRUS series, and the Truman Library, 
Dean Acheson’s role in Turkish-U.S. relations during the period in question will be explored 
in detail by focusing on the communications and messages that Acheson generated while 
performing his responsibilities.  Messages sent by other officials to Acheson while he was 
Acting Secretary will not be examined in depth since determining whether Acheson read 
those messages, and what effect those messages may have had on his thinking about Turkey, 
is usually not possible.  Only when Acheson clearly is responding to a certain previous 
communication (or communications) will such messages be focused on in the analysis below. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1
 Jones, Joseph M.  The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947).  New York:  The Viking 
Press, 1955.  p. 191.  These comments were spoken by Acting Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson in testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 13 March 1947.  
Acheson’s testimony concerned President Truman’s proposed aid to Greece and Turkey. 
186 
 
2.3.1.  August 1945-December 1945 
 
Dean Acheson, after being convinced by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes, took the 
oath of office as Under Secretary of State on 27 August 1945 in a recess appointment, and 
would be officially confirmed by the Senate in late September 1945.  Within two weeks of 
taking his oath, Acheson would already be complaining in letters to his daughter about the 
amount of work and the disorganization in the State Department.  Furthermore, for essentially 
all of September 1945, and the first week of October, Acheson was already Acting 
Secretary.2 
In the FRUS documents, the first 1945 incident in which Acheson directly deals with issues 
relating to Turkey occurs in September 1945, when Secretary Byrnes was in England for the 
London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting.  Sent on 20 September to Edwin C. Wilson, 
the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, this message was forwarded before Acheson was officially 
confirmed by the Senate on 24 September.  The message was a response to the U.S. Ankara 
embassy’s worried query concerning President Truman’s course of action on the Straits issue, 
and explained that the U.S., as agreed at Potsdam, would discuss the Straits issue with the 
Turkish government, but did not plan to broach the subject at the ongoing London Council 
meeting.  The same message mentions that the U.S. government’s suggestions to the Turkish 
government on the Straits issue would be forthcoming in the near future.3 
The next message from Acheson on an issue regarding Turkey appears in December 1945, 
when Acheson was again Acting Secretary while Byrnes was in Moscow for the next Council 
                                                            
2
 Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation:  My Years in the State Department.  New York:  
W. W. Norton & Co., 1969.  pp. 122-128.  Byrnes states that he left for England on 5 
September 1945; see:  Byrnes, James F.  Speaking Frankly.  New York:  Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1947.  p. 92. 
3
 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 126-127; FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, p. 1247.  “The Acting 
Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson),” signed “Acheson.”  President 
Truman’s suggestions for the Straits issue were sent to Ankara in late October. 
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of Foreign Ministers meeting.  The interesting aspect of this message is that, in contrast to the 
September message, it shows a slightly deeper involvement in the issue at hand, i.e. Turkey, 
and the events occurring there.  This conclusion proceeds from the fact that Acheson’s 
message was the response to a telegram, sent to Washington by Edwin Wilson, explaining 
that the Istanbul Soviet Consulate had begun to recruit local Armenians to become Soviet 
citizens and emigrate to the USSR.  Wilson also requested that his information be forwarded 
to U.S. embassies in other countries with sizeable Armenian populations, and requested that 
he be kept informed about the situation in those other countries.4  
The situation was a direct continuation of the Soviet Union’s efforts to apply pressure on 
Turkey concerning the Kars and Ardahan regions in Northeast Anatolia, in this case to create 
a population problem in Soviet Armenia by registering external Armenians as Soviet 
nationals and then urging them to emigrate to Soviet Armenia; that situation could then be 
utilized to push for territorial concessions from Turkey.  In turn, those efforts stemmed from 
the diplomatic notes Moscow had forwarded to Turkey earlier in 1945 denouncing the 
Soviet-Turkish Friendship and Neutrality Treaty, and demanding renegotiation of the 1921 
Turkish-Soviet and 1936 Montreux Treaties.  When Acheson had assumed the Under 
Secretary position in August, Soviet pressure on Turkey had been continuing for several 
months.  Acheson’s response also shows that he almost certainly had read Wilson’s telegram 
and was sensitive to the general situation.  Acheson succinctly summarizes the problem and 
requests that the embassies report to Washington on Soviet activities concerning Armenians 
in their countries.5 
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 FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1284-1285, telegram dated 19 December 1945 “The Ambassador in 
Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State,” signed “Wilson.” 
5
 FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, p. 1285, circular telegram dated 21 December 1945, “The Secretary of 
State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in Europe and the Middle East,” signed 
“Acheson.”  For the FRUS records on the previous Soviet notes, see:  FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 
1219-1293 passim. 
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In the week following Acheson’s note, Wilson sent several more telegrams providing updates 
on that specific issue and some other occurrences in Turkish-Soviet relations.  Meanwhile, 
Byrnes returned from the Moscow Conference on 29 December 1945.  That same day, Acting 
Secretary Acheson saw the Turkish Ambassador to Turkey, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, in a 
scheduled meeting at the State Department, despite the fact that it was a Saturday.  One other 
State Department official, from the Near East and African Affairs desk, was also present.6 
Ambassador Baydur requested the meeting in order to learn from the State Department 
exactly what issues affecting Turkey had been discussed by the Foreign Ministers in 
Moscow, and he began the meeting by expressing that wish.  Acheson responded by 
explaining that Secretary Byrnes had arrived in the U.S. only that morning and, since he had 
not yet had the opportunity to discuss the Moscow Conference with Secretary Byrnes, the 
only information he had was the same information from the press that Ambassador Baydur 
had.  Ambassador Baydur then asked about Acheson’s opinion on the recent Soviet demands 
concerning the Trabzon-Ardahan area in Northeast Anatolia.  Acheson’s response is 
interesting because it was entirely aimed, both directly and indirectly, at urging Turkish 
officials to not engage in any rash behavior.  First, Acheson said that the personnel in the 
State Department charged with observing Turkish affairs were watching the USSR’s actions 
closely, but then warned that, in order for the United Nations organization to be effective, 
smaller nations needed to avoid “unilateral action.”  This also meant that Turkish officials 
needed to ensure that no domestic “incident or manifestation” of the tension felt by the 
Turkish side should be allowed to happen, and reminded Ambassador Baydur that the strain 
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 FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1287-1289, “Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief 
of the Division of Near East Affairs (Jones).”  Jones is assumed to be Joseph M. Jones, author 
of The Fifteen Weeks. 
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on Turkish-Soviet relations involved issues of concern to the entire international community.7 
Ambassador Baydur responded to Acheson’s polite reminders by thanking him for the 
concern that Acheson expressed, but then asserted that it was “very difficult for the Turkish 
people to contain themselves” while under fierce and unjustified pressure from the Soviet 
Union.  He continued to argue that the “defense of the Turkish position in the Turkish press 
and in the Turkish parliament” was only that, and no belligerent intent could be construed 
from it.  Acheson expressed agreement with Ambassador Baydur’s last statement, and the 
meeting concluded with the Turkish Ambassador’s request for follow-up information from 
the State Department concerning what was discussed at the Moscow conference.8 
Consequently, at the end of 1945, both Secretary Byrnes and Under Secretary Acheson had 
dealt directly with Turkish-U.S. relations since the beginning of their terms.  Secretary 
Byrnes’s communications on the subject are generally curt when directed towards U.S. 
foreign service officers, but become much more verbose when directed to President Truman.  
Acheson’s communications are also short, but more detailed, and they evince attention to and 
knowledge of the issue in question.  By contrast, in his memoirs Acheson does not 
specifically mention Turkey in relation to his term as Under Secretary until well into the 
material concerning 1946.  Acheson apparently thought that the various, and more ominous, 
international problems that he worked on in his first months as Under Secretary deserved 
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 Ibid.  pp. 1287-1288.  Quotes from p. 1288.  A footnote on the bottom of p. 1288 explains 
that, on 2 January 1946, the head of the State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs, Loy Henderson, sent a memorandum to Acheson explaining that the three 
powers did not collectively discuss Turkey at the conference, and then mentions an 
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8
 Ibid.  pp. 1288-1289.  Quotes from p. 1288.  The interesting aspect of Ambassador Baydur’s 
comments is that Acheson, according to the memorandum, had not specifically mentioned 
any incidents or comments from the Turkish press or parliament.  If the information in the 
memorandum is correct, this means that Ambassador Baydur assumed that Acheson had 
implicitly referred to such incidents.  The telegrams received from Ambassador Wilson over 
the previous week, at least those included in the FRUS documents, also do not refer to any 
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greater attention.  The other important features of U.S. officials’ continuing conversation 
about Turkey in 1945 are that Turkey’s strategic importance is already manifest and assumed, 
and that the idea of a security guarantee for Turkey had already emerged, even if the political 
atmosphere rendered the idea moot.  As is clear from the FRUS records, Congress was the 
issue that immediately loomed over the conversation once the idea of aid or a security 
guarantee for Turkey was suggested.9 
 
2.3.2.  January 1946-July 1946 
 
January 1946 saw a continuation of the trends in Turkish-U.S. relations -- and Under 
Secretary Acheson’s role in regard to that subject -- that had concluded 1945.  The FRUS 
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 Byrnes did at least devote several pages in one of his memoirs to the Turkish-Soviet issue; 
see:  Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 300-303.  In a later memoir, Byrnes would claim, while 
relating the New York Council of Foreign Ministers meetings of November-December 1946, 
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Publishers, 1958.  p. 384.  By far the longest 1945 statements that Secretary Byrnes drafted 
concerning Turkish issues were the memorandums Byrnes sent to President Truman 
concerning the Montreux problem.  The first letter was attached to a policy recommendation 
on the Montreux Treaty sent in early September 1945, two days before Byrnes went to 
London.  In that note Byrnes famously stated that the U.S. should not support demilitarization 
of the Straits without providing Turkey with a military guarantee that, first, the U.S. must be 
willing to fulfill, and second, must be approved by Congress.  The second memorandum, sent 
two weeks after Byrnes returned from London, also ended with the warning that the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee would have to be consulted if a more stringent approach was to 
be taken towards the Straits issue.  For Byrnes’s letters to Truman see:  1945 FRUS, Vol. 8, 
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Pach, Chester J. Jr.  Arming the Free World:  The Origins of the United States Military 
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97, 236 n. 34. 
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records concerning Turkey in 1946 are divided into two main subjects, U.S. communications 
and efforts concerning Turkish-Soviet issues, and Truman Administration initiatives to 
identify means through which aid could be provided to Turkey.  Both subjects feature 
messages from Under Secretary Acheson since he spent much of 1946 as Acting Secretary 
while Secretary Byrnes attended the January United Nations General Assembly in London 
and the various conferences surrounding the peace negotiations in April-December.  As 
Acheson suggests in his memoirs, even the first few weeks of 1946 indicated that his role was 
becoming more difficult and involved.10 
During the London Conference, and after receiving more messages from the U.S. 
Ambassador in Ankara on the ongoing tensions between Turkey and the USSR, Acheson sent 
a brief message, dated 10 January 1946, to assuage Turkish fears that the U.S. may have 
brought new proposals concerning the Turkish Straits issue to the London conference.  
Acheson reiterated that an international conference on the Montreux Treaty was advisable 
and that the U.S. would attend such a conference.11  
Before the end of January, Acheson would initiate possibly the most important event in 
Turkish-U.S. relations prior to March 1947.  At some point in the previous several weeks, 
Turkish Ambassador Baydur had forwarded a request to the State Department for the return 
of Münir Ertegün’s body.  Ertegün was Baydur’s predecessor and, at the time of his death in 
1944, had been a senior Washington diplomat.  His remains had been interred temporarily in 
Arlington Cemetery.  Exactly to whom Ambassador Baydur expressed that wish is not 
apparent, but on 25 January Acting Secretary Acheson drafted a memorandum for President 
Truman requesting that Ertegün’s remains, in accordance with diplomatic tradition, be 
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 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 149; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, pp. 347-348, 357-
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returned to Turkey aboard a cruiser.  President Truman approved and returned the request the 
same day.  The memorandum makes no mention of the current political situation and refers 
only to diplomatic tradition as the reason for the action.  Even though the return of 
Ambassador Ertegün’s remains was apparently not conceived as a political gesture, Turkish 
people came to understand the event as symbolic of U.S. support for Turkey against Soviet 
pressure because the USS Missouri eventually carried Ambassador Ertegün’s remains to 
Istanbul. Thus, an event that came to hold a prominent place in the development of post-
WWII Turkish-American relations seems to have been initiated, on the U.S. side, by 
Acheson.  Certainly, he was the official who asked the President directly to approve the 
action, once the Navy indicated that ships were available.  This event was later given great 
importance by various contemporary observers and historians, but in his memoirs, Acheson 
mentions the event only in passing while relating the events of August 1946, and does not 
mention Münir Ertegün’s name.  This implies that the person primarily responsible for the 
event did not consider it of lasting importance.  The attention the USS Missouri’s visit 
garnered was likely caused by the tenor of the message that President İnönü sent to President 
Truman, which Truman subsequently released to the press.  The fervent pitch of the domestic 
Turkish press coverage, and the manner in which Turkish officials utilized the event in a 
tense international atmosphere during and following the crisis over Iran, provided additional 
incitement.12   
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The next point at which Acheson was forced to return to Turkish affairs occurred several 
months later, in June 1946.  Acheson’s expertise on international financial issues had been 
formed during his experiences as a lawyer, as Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and then in 
the State Department during WWII while engaged with economic warfare issues.  In June 
1946, financial aspects of the effort to provide Exim (Export-Import) Bank loans to Turkey 
came to Acheson’s attention while Secretary Byrnes was abroad for conferences.  The 
Turkish government had, since the previous fall, been requesting aid in the form of both loans 
and equipment or vehicles.  To those ends, a settlement of the outstanding Turkish Lend-
Lease debts was achieved in early 1946, but negotiations over the amount that the Exim Bank 
would offer to Turkey continued into summer 1946.13 
On 21 June 1946, Acting Secretary Acheson sent a lengthy, detailed reply to a Turkish 
government request, forwarded by Ambassador Wilson, for a larger Exim Bank sum.  Over 
the previous several months, the Turkish government had worked strenuously to obtain more 
than the $25 million offered to them.  The essence of Acheson’s message is that, despite the 
impression that Turkish officials had, the Exim Bank did not have hundreds of millions of 
dollars to disburse as development aid, and that development projects such as Turkish 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
identified by David Alvarez, but his analysis was concerned with a different aspect of 
Turkish-U.S. relations, so he did not dwell on the implications of the memorandum other than 
to note that the memorandum is the only evidence (available at the time) that Truman was 
involved in sending the remains of Ertegün back to Turkey on a naval ship.  In April 1946, 
after the USS Missouri arrived in Istanbul, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Wilson sent a 
message to Washington elaborating the effects that he felt the occasion had engendered; see:  
FRUS 1946, Vol. 7, pp. 822-823, “The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of 
State,” signed “Wilson” and dated 12 April 1946. 
13
 For information concerning the Turkish Lend-Lease settlement see FRUS 1946, Vol. 7:  p. 
901, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson),” signed “Byrnes” and 
dated 28 January 1946; p. 903,  “The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union 
(Kennan),” signed “Byrnes” and dated 15 March 1946; pp. 904-905, “The Ambassador in 
Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State,” signed “Wilson” and dated 2 May 1946; p. 905, 
“The American Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Saka),” signed “Edwin C. Wilson” and dated 2 May 1946; p. 906, “The Ambassador in 
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officials proposed should be funded through the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.  In the same vein, he stresses that a loan of more than $25 million was 
impossible and that Turkish officials had been informed of this repeatedly.  Finally, Acheson 
mentioned that a credit for an airport project would be separate from any Exim Bank loan, 
that the Maritime Commission might soon have surplus ships useful to Turkish needs and 
available for a credit amounting to 25 percent of the price, and that other countries which 
suffered large-scale destruction during the war would receive lending priority.14 
In the following two weeks, Acheson would again send messages to the Ankara Embassy 
concerning the same topic.  On 27 June 1946, Ambassador Wilson told the State Department 
that the Turkish government had been informed of the limitations on the Exim Bank loan.15  
Several days later, Acheson was able to send confirmation to Ankara that the Exim Bank loan 
had been approved for the $25 million previously suggested.16  The same communication 
mentioned that press reports of a $100 million loan were an “irresponsible misinterpretation” 
of information that the Associated Press had obtained from the State Department.  Thus, not 
only was Acting Secretary Acheson working to satisfy both sides of the Exim Bank loan (i.e. 
the Turkish government and the lending agency), he was also fighting off malicious press 
reports apparently intended to exacerbate confusion surrounding the problem.  One week 
later Acheson had to repeat the same information in a telegram to the U.S. Ankara embassy 
because the telegram sent on 3 July was apparently garbled during transmission, and the 
details of exactly what the various sides of the agreement would be responsible for still were 
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not fully clarified for Turkish officials.17  After the August 1946 crisis in the Turkish-U.S.-
USSR triangle, the financial aspect of U.S. aid to Turkey would slowly merge into the 
military and political aspects.  That process of change would manifest itself first in the 
Truman Doctrine and its aid to Greece and Turkey, and then would make Turkey a 
beneficiary of the Marshall Plan. 
 
2.3.3.  August 1946 
 
At 17.30 on 7 August 1946, Soviet Chargé Fedor Orekhov handed to Acting Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson a diplomatic note which repeated the content of a note also transmitted 
to the Turkish government earlier that day.  The note explained that the Soviets wished to 
convene a conference amongst the three powers and Turkey to revise the Montreux Treaty.  
The key Soviet demand was that Turkey and the Soviet Union would establish “joint means 
of defense” for the Turkish Straits.18  This development caused an immediate outburst of 
frenetic activity in the State Department as U.S. officials raced to formulate their response; at 
the center of this activity was the initial recipient of the Soviet note, Acting Secretary 
Acheson.19  Because the August 1946 Soviet diplomatic note to Turkey has been discussed in 
many other scholarly works, this discussion will focus on Acheson. 
As far back as February-March of 1946, the State Department had been engaged in internal 
discussion concerning policy towards Turkey. For months Edwin Wilson had argued, under 
the influence of Feridun Cemal Erkin, that Soviet inquiries concerning the Straits were 
merely a stepping stone to Moscow’s true aim, political domination of Turkey.  How 
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influential Wilson’s efforts were is unclear, but the actions taken by U.S. officials in August 
1946 seem to reflect Wilson’s opinion.20   
Acheson, in his memoirs, begins his narrative of the State Department reaction to the Soviet 
note with the famous 15 August 1946 White House meeting of top Truman Administration 
officials.  Acheson explains that the President had instructed him to prepare, in coordination 
with the Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments, as well as with the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), recommendations on how to respond to the Soviet note.  This information is 
echoed in a 13 August 1946 telegram to Ambassador Wilson in Ankara asking for his ideas 
concerning two previous Department telegrams related to the issue.  In the same message, 
Acheson also mentioned that the Department was giving “close study” to the Soviet note and 
that the “magnitude” of the issue pushed the Department to get input from the Navy and War 
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Departments.21   
Acheson’s position as Acting Secretary made him a primary actor in the 15 August 1946 
White House meeting, but Acheson’s increasing involvement in U.S. interactions with 
Turkey had prepared him to fulfill that role.  In that fateful meeting, Acting Secretary 
Acheson was accompanied by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Under Secretary of 
War Kenneth Royall, and the JCS.  Their recommendations were to be open with the Soviets, 
but to insist “at all costs” that defense of the Turkish Straits should be an exclusively Turkish 
project; the interpretation was that the ultimate Soviet goal was political domination of the 
Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.  In order to impress upon all, and specifically Soviet, 
Turkish, British, and French officials, the “deadly earnest” nature of U.S. determination, a 
naval force should be sent to join the USS Missouri in the Mediterranean.  President Truman 
made clear that he understood the potential results of these steps, and efforts to inform the 
U.S. public of the Administration’s decisions on the Straits matter were agreed upon.22  U.S. 
geostrategy now placed Turkey in the focus of U.S. concerns. 
Immediately after the White House meeting ended with President Truman’s assent to the 
recommendations offered, Acheson sent a telegram containing the text of the policy 
memorandum agreed upon in the White House meeting to Secretary Byrnes in Paris.  The 
telegram informs Secretary Byrnes that the Department was now at work preparing a draft 
reply for the Turkish government on the U.S. attitude towards the Soviet note, and that the 
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President asked specifically for his comments on the agreed-upon policy memorandum.  The 
most striking aspect of the memorandum is the emphasis given to Turkey’s central position in 
U.S. interests, and Turkey’s need for U.S. support: 
  We, therefore, feel that it is in the vital interests of the United States that the 
 Soviet Union should not by force or through threat of force succeed in its unilateral 
 plans with regard to the Dardanelles and Turkey.  If Turkey under pressure should 
 agree to the Soviet proposals, any case which we might later present in opposition to 
 the Soviet plan before the United Nations or to the world public would be materially 
 weakened; but the Turkish government insists that it has faith in the United Nations 
 system and that it will resist by force Soviet efforts to secure bases in Turkish territory 
 even if Turkey has to fight alone.  While this may be the present Turkish position, we 
 are frankly doubtful whether Turkey will continue to adhere to this determination 
 without assurance of support from the United States.23 
Following that statement, the memorandum asserts that the U.S. must make clear to the 
USSR its determination to resort, if necessary, to arms in order to defend its interests, and to 
“resist with all means at our disposal” if the Soviets were to launch hostilities against 
Turkey.24  Consequently, the U.S. position vis-à-vis Turkey was finally clear, but exactly 
what kinds of aid, and how that aid would be provided, would be determined in the following 
months and years.  The various aspects of the U.S. effort to aid Turkey would begin to 
converge and, throughout the entire process, Under Secretary Acheson would remain at the 
forefront of U.S. policy-formation and decision-making towards Turkey.  
The day following the White House meeting, 16 August 1946, Acheson sent a memorandum 
to President Truman concerning the Turkish-Soviet issue.  This memorandum explains that, 
as per President Truman’s instructions, Secretary Byrnes had been informed of the previous 
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day’s meeting’s results and asked for his comments.  The Secretary’s remarks had arrived as 
well as his suggestions for the official State Department proposal that would be sent to the 
Turkish government.  The memorandum then asks for the President’s approval of the 
Department’s communication to the Turkish government concerning the Soviet note, and for 
sending a note to the Soviet government concerning the same issue.  Finally, Acheson asks 
whether publishing the U.S. note to the Soviet Union, but not the U.S. note to the Turkish 
government also meets with the President’s approval.  All of Acheson’s suggestions were 
approved by President Truman.25 
The communication that Acheson proposed to send to the Turkish government is also 
included in the FRUS documents.  Apparently, Acheson and the President were working with 
haste because the telegram to Ambassador Wilson is marked as being sent at 1.00 pm, which 
means that Acheson’s memorandum, explained in the previous paragraph, had been sent and 
approval from the President obtained in the morning.  The official communication to the 
Turkish government enclosed with the telegram states that the U.S. government remained 
committed to its opinion, expressed to the Turkish government in November 1945, that the 
Turkish Straits were not a matter that concerned only the Black Sea littoral powers, that 
defenses on the Turkish Straits should not be an issue of Turkish-Soviet cooperation, and that 
the U.S. would gladly participate in a conference aimed at renegotiating the Montreux Treaty.  
The text of Acheson’s telegram explains in detail what Ambassador Wilson should say to 
Turkish officials, including that the message to the Turkish government had been composed 
at the highest levels of the U.S. government, that the Turkish government should adopt a 
“reasonable, but firm” stance towards the Soviets, and that any agreement to a conference on 
the Montreux Treaty implied only agreement to examine possible changes to the Montreux 
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regime.26  
The next day, Acting Secretary Acheson sent another message to Secretary Byrnes in Paris.  
This telegram informed the Secretary of the Department’s course of action in reference to the 
Straits issue, and that the Department had obtained the President’s approval for the text of the 
note to the Soviets and for provision of the note to the press at an appropriate hour.  
Consequently, the Secretary’s views were also requested because of the matter’s magnitude.  
Secretary Byrnes relayed his comments the same day, and one day later Ambassador Wilson 
sent a telegram summarizing a conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hasan Saka, 
in which Saka stated that the Turkish government would follow the U.S. government’s 
suggestions concerning the Soviet note and a possible Montreux Treaty conference.27  
The result of this flurry of telegrams was the diplomatic note that Acheson forwarded to the 
Soviet Chargé on 19 August 1946.  This note, as is well-known, stated the U.S. government’s 
rejection of the Soviet views that the Turkish Straits were a matter that concerned only the 
Black Sea littoral powers and that defense of the Straits should be a joint Turkish-Soviet 
project.  The same note also emphasized the United Nations’ relevance to such matters of 
international importance and agreed to the proposal for an international conference charged 
with revising some of the Montreux Treaty’s specifications. 28   For two weeks, Acting 
Secretary Acheson had been deeply and directly involved in formulating U.S. policy and 
response towards the Straits issue.  In his memoirs, Acheson also summarized the events that 
occurred after the 15 August White House meeting, and mentions specifically what he told 
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the press.29  After this point, Turkish-U.S relations would be a topic that imposed increasing 
strains on his duties as Under Secretary of State, and the most intensive months were still in 
the future. 
The final document from August 1946 that illustrates Acheson’s personal involvement in 
Turkish-U.S. affairs is a memorandum of conversation dated several days after the official 
U.S. response to the Soviet Straits note was forwarded to the Soviet Chargé in Washington.  
On 20 August 1946 the British Ambassador to the U.S., Lord Inverchapel, requested a 
meeting with the Acting Secretary, and the resulting conversation served to underline the 
gravity of the entire process that U.S. officials at the highest governmental levels had 
engaged in since the 7 August Soviet note.  Inverchapel began by noting that Loy Henderson 
and H. Freeman Mathews both had recent conversations with British officials in which they 
indicated that the U.S. took an extremely grave attitude towards the Straits issue and “was 
prepared to see this matter through to the end”30; these words had apparently inspired talk of 
war in London.  Acheson explained that the U.S. position on the Straits matter resulted from 
agreement amongst the State, Navy, and War Departments, and was approved by President 
Truman.  The essence of the situation was that the Administration had decided to treat the 
issue with the utmost seriousness in order to impress upon other actors the need to approach 
the matter with the same calm and reasoned attitude, so that rash or unexamined actions 
would not be taken.  However, because Congress and public opinion were the fundamental 
long-term factors that would determine the course of U.S. policy, the Department had also 
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communicated those sentiments to the press in hopes that the press would approach the issue 
with the same “solemnity and restraint.”31  In all, this exchange expresses well the influence 
that Acheson held over those vital two weeks in August 1946.  Acheson’s approach to law 
was the same calm, rational, serious, and studied attitude.  Furthermore, in attaching such 
great stakes to the Turkish Straits and Turkish sovereignty, the U.S. declared its interest in 
Turkish affairs.  Acheson’s lawyerly attitude towards decision-making guided the process 
that resulted in that declaration. 
In September 1946’s final days, Acting Secretary Acheson continued to receive telegrams 
and memorandums concerning Turkish issues from Ambassador Wilson and other sources.  
On 27 August, for example, Acheson informed Ambassador Wilson that the $25 million 
Eximbank credits for Turkey had received approval, what the probable interest rate on the 
loan would be, and through which ministries the Turkish government told the bank it 
intended to utilize the funds.32   
The most important communication of late August 1946, however, came from the Secretary 
of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy.  This message included a memorandum from 
the JCS evaluating the strategic military significance of the Turkish Straits.  After explaining 
the military implications of hypothetical Soviet bases on the Straits (that Soviet bases in the 
Straits would eventually reduce Turkey to the status of Soviet satellite), the memorandum’s 
authors wrote what would become its most repeated sentence:  “Strategically Turkey is the 
most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.”  
Afterwards, the memorandum moves on to the dire potential results of Turkey’s reduction to 
Moscow’s puppet, and then concludes by recommending that the U.S. encourage Turkish 
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purchase of non-military U.S. supplies useful for reinforcing the Turkish economy and 
military, give permission for Turkish purchase of U.S. weapons as well as military aircraft 
and equipment, and send technicians and officers.33  Again, noting Acheson’s work habits, he 
almost certainly read that memorandum and would have added its content to the facts with 
which he evaluated the steps that the Truman Administration would take towards its relations 
with Turkey over the following months.    
 
2.3.4.  September 1946-January 1947 
 
Between September 1946 and February 1947, when the crisis that resulted in the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan erupted, Acheson would remain involved in the ongoing 
development of Turkey-U.S. affairs.  In late September 1946, the USSR once again sent a 
diplomatic note concerning the Turkish Straits to the Turkish government, in essence a 
continuation of the dialogue Moscow initiated in August.  On 30 September, Acting 
Secretary Acheson conveyed to Secretary Byrnes’s Press Assistant the Department’s public 
stance towards the new Soviet note, that it would be handled by the Navy, State, and War 
Departments in the same manner as the August Soviet note had been.34 
From 4-8 October 1946, Acting Secretary Acheson authored another group of telegrams, 
apparently after the State Department’s official response to the Soviet note had been 
formulated.  The first note, on 4 October, informed Secretary Byrnes that the State and Navy 
Departments agreed on the desirability of the U.S. warship Randolph visiting two Turkish 
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ports, Izmir and Marmaris.  Interestingly, Acheson suggests that the Randolph’s calling at 
these ports and others in the Eastern Mediterranean would help establish such visits as a 
“routine matter rather than as diplomatic or political gestures” since the U.S. was in the 
process of establishing a long-term naval presence in the Mediterranean.  The implication, 
that Acheson did not see the USS Missouri’s visit to İstanbul as a diplomatic gesture, is clear.  
Acheson also thought that the recent Soviet note did not warrant a change in the Randolph’s 
schedule in light of Izmir’s being a “considerable distance” from the Dardanelles.35      
The following day, Acheson forwarded to the U.S. Ankara embassy the State Department’s 
draft reply to the new Soviet note.  The draft was succinct, stating that the U.S. position, as 
expressed in August, was unchanged, that the discussions in Potsdam had foreseen mutual 
discussion of the Turkish Straits issue by the powers, not by one of the powers with Turkey 
directly, that Turkey should be solely responsible for the Straits’ defense, and that any 
aggressive threat against the Straits would be referred to the U.N. Security Council.  Acheson 
added that the Department would not be sending any advice or comments to the Turkish 
government until they had the Turkish government’s draft reply and comments from 
Secretary Byrnes.36 
After receiving Secretary Byrnes’ assent, Acheson sent the note to President Truman on 8 
October for approval, noting that Secretary Byrnes and the Secretaries of the Navy and War 
had also approved the message.  He explained to the President that the note, once approved 
and forwarded to Moscow, would be sent to Ankara, all the Montreux Treaty signatory states, 
and released to the press.  These steps were necessary because the note’s content was directed 
more towards the Soviet government, the Department desired to avoid giving the impression 
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that the U.S. was using the Turkish government as a tool to prod the Soviets, and the press 
would “undoubtedly” speculate inaccurately on the message if it was not made public.  The 
President’s approval was obtained, apparently in the morning, and the note was forwarded to 
Moscow at noon the same day; the U.S. embassy in Ankara was informed later in the 
evening.  The only notable aspect of the note sent to the Soviets was that Acheson used first 
person possessive several times in stating “my Govt.”  Acheson’s message to Ankara 
explained to the U.S. Chargé that the Turkish government should be informed of the steps the 
U.S. government had taken, asked for the Turkish reply’s final version so that it could be 
given to the U.S. press, and approved of the “non-provocative and temperate tone” of the 
draft Turkish reply.37 
After the intense work that the State Department devoted to the August and September 1946 
Soviet diplomatic notes to the Turkish government, and in the wake of the JCS’s late August 
1946 strategic evaluation of Turkey and the Near East and Africa desk’s October 1946 
political policy evaluation of Turkey, the State Department’s efforts on different economic, 
military, and political issues related to Turkey began to converge.  During 1946’s remaining 
months, the other FRUS documents that Acheson authored were placed under an economic 
heading, but in reality those communications began to embrace aspects of diplomatic, 
military, and political strategy as well as economic aid.38 
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The merging of various U.S. strategic interests related to Turkey is reflected in the first FRUS 
document sent by Acheson after the late September-early October 1946 response to the 
Soviet note.  On 8 November, the Under Secretary composed a lengthy and detailed telegram 
to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey; notable for the knowledge of and sensitivity towards 
Turkey that Acheson displays, the message takes in hand the problem of providing military 
aid to Turkey.  Acheson opens the message by explaining that “a number” of meetings had 
been held to discuss the “delicate question of the providing of arms and military supplies to 
Turkey” since Secretary Byrnes’ return in late October.  He then goes on to describe the 
quandary in which the State Department found itself, that the U.S. needed to reassure Turkey 
that its sovereignty was a matter of more than superficial importance to the U.S., but that 
providing such assurances had to be done in a tactful manner which would not give fuel to 
rumors in the U.S. and abroad that the U.S. was trying to provoke the USSR through Turkey, 
or to instigate Turkish-Russian hostilities.  Consequently, the State Department had decided 
to defer this problem to the British, and to direct the supply of weapons and other military 
supplies to Turkey through British channels.  He requested that the personnel at the U.S. 
embassy be informed of this situation so that uniform answers could be supplied to Turkish 
officials if they approached those personnel with requests for military aid.  In case some 
Turkish requests for certain types of military aid could not be fulfilled by the British, the U.S. 
would consider indirectly or directly providing that aid, but that would not be the preferred 
option.  Acheson then provided a summary of the State Department’s policy towards Turkey 
at that juncture, a policy which would be dramatically changed four months later: 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Bank loans and the settlement of Lend-Lease claims.  Supplies or vehicles with potential 
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  We feel sure that in the various discussions which may arise in this connection 
 with appropriate Turkish officials, you will be able to make it clear that our reluctance 
 to furnish arms and military equipment direct is not due to any unwillingness on our 
 part openly to support Turkey in its efforts to retain its independence and territorial 
 integrity but rather to our feeling that in the world situation the wiser course would be 
 for the Turks to look to the British.    
In sum, the U.S. had decided that Turkey should receive U.S. military aid, but the current 
political situation made such an act extremely problematic.  Acheson closed the message with 
reference to the Turkish request that the Turkish warship Yavus be refurbished for modern 
warfare, and mentioned that the British would be asked to carry out this task.39  
In the weeks following Acheson’s 8 November message, he would author several more 
communications concerning U.S. efforts to provide aid to the Turkish government as 
concerns about the Turkish economy became graver.  On 13 November, Acheson, as Acting 
Secretary, sent a telegram to Wilson indicating that approval had been obtained for a credit 
which would fund the sale of six ships to Turkey.  On 15 November, Acheson sent another 
telegram to Ambassador Wilson; this message gently scolds the embassy’s Economic Affairs 
Counselor Edward Lawson for not providing prompt details on his discussions with British 
representatives in Ankara concerning the Turkish economy (apparently information had 
arrived in Washington from British channels and not from Lawson).  The message also 
includes topic suggestions, including details on the current state of the Turkish economy, 
what kinds of and how much assistance are needed for the Turkish economy, and which 
Turkish governmental projects, whether ongoing or planned, will need foreign assistance or 
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purchases.  Acheson closes the telegram by mentioning that information on all of these points 
will be helpful for the State Department’s plans regarding a program of Turkish economic 
aid, which was already under development. Before the end of 1946, Acheson’s only other 
telegram included in the FRUS documents on Turkish issues was to relay a message 
concerning economic aid for Turkey from Loy Henderson to Ambassador Wilson.40   
In January 1947, Acheson did not author any new messages concerning Turkish affairs.  
George C. Marshall became Secretary of State on 21 January, and Acheson agreed to stay on 
for six more months in order to ease the transition for Secretary Marshall.  Acheson, in his 
memoirs, refers to the choice of Marshall for Secretary of State as “an act of God” at an 
extremely ominous historical juncture.  Acheson also describes his 21 January meeting with 
Marshall after the new Secretary had taken the oath of office.  In that conversation, Marshall 
told Acheson that he would be the Secretary’s “chief of staff” and all Department business 
“…  would come to the Secretary through the Under Secretary with his recommendation 
unless the Under Secretary chose to decide the matter himself.”  Years later, Acheson would 
state that, “…  for the first time in the history of the State Department, there was a line of 
command.”  Acheson’s importance to policy formation in the State Department thus 
increased another order of magnitude.41 
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2.3.5.  February 1947 
 
Under Secretary Acheson’s first 1947 message on Turkish issues was dated 24 February, 
after Britain informed the U.S. government that responsibility for aid to Greece and Turkey 
was henceforth on American shoulders.  The British notes triggered a vigorous and months-
long bureaucratic process resulting in striking and historical U.S. foreign policy events.  Most 
obvious are the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, but both initiatives also meant 
fundamental changes in the U.S. relationship with the Turkish Republic.  Throughout all of 
these developments, Dean Acheson led the State Department’s response.   
The span of time from late February 1947 to early June 1947 was most famously described in 
Joseph M. Jones’s The Fifteen Weeks.42  This study’s analysis of that period will thus follow 
Jones’s analysis and add information from the FRUS documents when necessary, since Jones 
composed his book long before the FRUS documents were available.  Jones’s text also makes 
clear how vital Acheson was to the unfolding process that created a new place for the Turkish 
Republic in U.S. foreign policy.  Acheson, in his memoirs, refers to the February 1947 
Greece-Turkey situation as “my crisis.”43   
The British notes were forwarded to the State Department on 21 January, the previous Friday, 
but Secretary Marshall had left Washington early that day.  As a result the State Department, 
under Acheson’s direction, had the weekend to prepare memorandums on the various matters 
that the British notes affected directly.  Clark Clifford mentions that Acheson called the 
President once the contents of the British notes was known, and the first concern identified 
was that support would have to come from Congress in order to obtain the funds necessary to 
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aid Greece and Turkey.  As for Acheson’s 24 February note to Secretary Marshall, the 
language which he uses is notable for its lack of ambiguity:  independent Greece and Turkey 
“will not survive” without aid, which means that the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean “will 
fall under Russian control.”  Finally, the memorandum asserts that the Navy, State, Treasury, 
and War Departments need to examine the problem posthaste, make recommendations, and 
then discuss the matter with Congressional leaders; all of this process should be completed 
within one week.44 
Joseph Jones states that during the single week from 21-28 February 1947, the realization that 
responsibility for leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean specifically, and in the world more 
generally, had been passed to the United States, infused the State Department with a 
singleness of purpose.  During that week, a series of meetings at the highest administration 
levels set U.S. foreign policy on a new course.  Two aspects of Jones’s narrative are most 
important for this study.  The first is the fact, emphasized repeatedly by Jones, that Acheson 
was at the helm of this week-long process.  Acheson’s role culminated in his celebrated 
exposition at a meeting with Congressional leaders on Thursday, 27 February 1947.  In this 
meeting, Secretary Marshall’s presentation was not forceful or clear enough to persuade 
Congressional members focused on their parochial tariff and budget interests.  Acheson took 
the stage and, using the rhetorical skills he had developed in the courts, gave a powerful 
presentation of the historical moment that the United States faced.  His performance ensured 
Congressional support for what became the Truman Doctrine.  The other vital action that 
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Acheson took was to inform the press unofficially of what was occurring; in essence, 
Acheson kick-started the public relations campaign that the Administration would have to 
implement in order to win public support for the new foreign policy reality dawning on U.S. 
citizens in the following weeks and months.45 
During that same week, only one other document authored by Acheson is included in the 
FRUS records even though Acheson’s comments are included in several others.  This 
memorandum was authored on 27 February for Loy Henderson after the morning meeting 
with Congressional leaders.  In the memorandum, Acheson explains that the aid to Greece 
and Turkey has been approved by the President, the Secretaries of Navy, State, and War, and 
Congressional leaders, and then lists what steps need to be taken by the Office of Near East 
and African Affairs, which will coordinate the actions described in the memorandum’s text.  
Other than coordinating communications with the British, the appropriate U.S. ambassadors, 
and the relevant departments, the most important tasks listed are preparing Congressional 
legislation for the aid program, preparing Presidential speeches to Congress and the U.S. 
public, and initiating a public information campaign to support the legislation and new 
foreign policy course.46 
 
2.3.6.  March-June 1947 
 
Over the three-plus months that followed 21-28 February 1947, Under Secretary Acheson’s 
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 FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 63-64, “Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) 
to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson),” signed “Dean 
Acheson.”  For all of the FRUS documents related to the events of 21-28 February 1947, see:  
FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 32-71 passim. 
212 
 
efforts to construct the novel U.S. geopolitical role in the wake of Great Britain’s retreat 
focused on two separate tasks (in addition to the normal day-to-day tasks that Acheson, as 
Acting Secretary for most of March and April 1947, had to fulfill).  The first of these tasks 
was to direct and advise the State Department’s work in developing speeches and policy 
papers.  The most important of these was the Truman Doctrine speech itself, which was 
written in the State Department, and the main arguments of which were composed by 
Acheson from the contributions of State Department staff.  Jones summarizes the drafting of 
the Truman Doctrine speech thus: 
  The State Department drafted the message.  The White House pointed it up 
 and stylized it for presidential delivery.  Acheson, using the contributions of many, 
 selected the major lines of argument, phrased a number of parts, and edited the whole 
 closely. 
That is, the decisions which determined the eventual content and form of the Truman 
Doctrine address were made almost exclusively by Acheson.  Even though the speech’s 
drafting went on for nearly two weeks, from 28 February to 10 Marsh 1948, and a number of 
individuals also contributed to writing the content, Acheson controlled the speech’s 
essence.47  
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While the effort to finalize the Truman Doctrine speech continued, Acheson also launched 
the bureaucratic processes that would result in the Marshall Plan.  On 5 March 1947, 
Acheson asked the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to study the question 
of whether other countries in the world were also in need of aid similar to that offered 
through the Greece-Turkey aid program.  The essential problem was to identify other 
situations, resulting from the decline in Great Britain’s strength and the changed world 
conditions, in which nations might need aid, and to provide that aid before a crisis point was 
reached.  According to Jones, this was the period in which State Department thinking and 
planning became truly global.  Furthermore, most of the countries identified as potential aid 
candidates by the SWNCC studies were in Europe.  In another early March Cabinet meeting, 
Acheson apparently foresaw the need for committees of U.S. experts to travel to countries 
that the U.S. proposed to aid in order to understand their needs more comprehensively.48   
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The SWNCC studies that Acheson initiated would serve as the basic material for two 
important speeches.  The first was Acheson’s speech to the Delta Council on 8 May 1947, 
and the second would be Secretary Marshall’s Harvard commencement address on 5 June.  
President Truman asked Acheson to give the Delta Council speech on 7 April, so Acheson 
convened a meeting with Francis Russell and Joseph Jones to discuss what he should say.  
Jones had been working on one of the SWNCC committees carrying out economic studies 
related to Acheson’s original 5 March directive.  Drawing on those studies, Jones explained 
to Acheson, in more concrete terms, a situation with which Acheson was generally familiar:  
the abilities of several important European countries, especially Great Britain and France, to 
buy U.S. goods would be exhausted soon, U.S. public concern over the situation in Europe 
was swelling rapidly, the Soviets were dead set against allowing Germany to function in a 
manner that would contribute to European recovery, and reaction to the ideological content of 
the Truman Doctrine was gaining energy and proponents.  Consequently, Acheson’s speech 
would focus on the economic dimension of foreign countries’ need for U.S. aid, and the 
determination of the Truman Administration to use the vast resources of the U.S. economy to 
provide that aid.  In effect, Acheson’s speech became a preliminary statement of the Marshall 
Plan.49   
The Marshall Plan speech drew on several sources, but Secretary Marshall had told Acheson 
that he wanted to speak on a topic similar to that of Acheson’s Delta Council speech.  Joseph 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and a common military orientation” needed to be established in order to preserve military 
collaboration during a potential war with the USSR, but that this would not include a large 
increase in military aid because Congress probably would not approve the financial aid 
necessary for many of the nations to buy the military aid from the U.S.  The financial aspect 
of the problem is exactly what the Marshall Plan was intended to address.  This period of 
change was also the point at which State Department officials became more aggressive than 
the service branches in promoting foreign military aid.  McLauchlan, on pp. 14-17, 
summarizes some of the trends that contributed to this metamorphosis in the State 
Department’s mentality.  
49
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Jones was again charged with writing a first draft of Marshall’s speech in mid-May 1947.  As 
Jones explains, the primary problem that faced the State Department in May 1947, and to 
which the Marshall Plan speech would provide an answer, was how to provide aid to 
European countries that would not ask for that aid.  In the two months that had passed since 
the Truman Doctrine speech, U.S. public opinion had come to support the provision of aid to 
Europe, so this was no longer the main difficulty.  Thus, the other main concern was to 
provide that aid without specifying an ideological motivation and without dividing Europe by 
not including the USSR amongst the countries to which aid was offered.  Even though 
Acheson was actually against using the Harvard commencement speech to announce the U.S. 
offer of European aid, Marshall persisted.  Acheson then made sure that British press 
representatives paid close attention to Marshall’s speech.  Even though Acheson’s 
contribution to Marshall’s address was not as fundamental as that for the Truman Doctrine 
speech, the ideas, data, and policy analysis that went into the speech had been largely 
generated during the bureaucratic process initiated by Acheson two months previously.50 
The second area which Acheson was most involved in was the effort to convince Congress 
not only to pass legislation granting the necessary authority and financial resources to the 
Administration, but also to act with alacrity and purpose.  For this objective Acheson would, 
in addition to normal Capitol Hill lobbying efforts, spend much time testifying before 
Congressional committees in March 1947.  Acheson’s first appearance in support of the 
Greece-Turkey aid program came the day after President Truman’s speech, before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.  In that appearance Acheson explained that aid to Greece and 
Turkey were interlocking issues in which the succumbing of one to Soviet influence would 
inevitably result in the same fate for the other.  Acheson also described Turkey’s economic 
and military situation to the committee.  Eventually, Acheson would provide extensive 
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testimony to committees from both Houses of Congress, and the legislation, after being 
passed through Congress, was signed into law by President Truman on 22 May.51 
An essential aspect of convincing Congress was the public relations effort to inform the 
American people of exactly what kind of crisis faced the country and why that crisis 
necessitated aiding countries on the opposite side of the world.  During the early stages of the 
Truman Doctrine’s composition, Acheson had spoken off-the-record with press 
representatives, and slightly later President Truman delegated responsibility to a small group 
of officials, including Acheson, for communicating the Administration’s new foreign policy 
design to the press and public opinion leaders.  In the month or so before Marshall’s address, 
Acheson, Marshall, and other political figures foreshadowed some aspects of the Marshall 
Plan in their public comments, and in the weeks leading up to 5 June, Acheson and other 
officials began to give more specific information to the press concerning what foreign policy 
developments were on the horizon.52  
In regard to Turkey, Jones explains that the Administration faced a specific problem in 
explaining Turkey’s inclusion in the new aid initiative to the public.  He states that Turkey 
needed both economic and military aid but, because Turkey’s situation was not as dire as 
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Greece’s, military aid would help the country resist Soviet pressure until economic aid from 
international institutions could be obtained.  After the decision to aid Turkey primarily with 
military aid was made, officials then chose to downplay the Turkish aspect in Truman’s 12 
March speech.  Two reasons are provided for this.  First was the fact that U.S. citizens may 
have been excessively alarmed by the peacetime provision of military aid to a country that 
was not at war.  Second was the need to avoid provoking the Soviet government.  
Consequently, even though the Turkish aspect of the aid “was not concealed,” it also was not 
accorded excessive prominence.53 
After the President’s 12 March Congressional speech, one difficulty that Jones mentions, and 
asserts that the State Department “fully anticipated,” was the fact that Turkey was not a 
democracy in the sense that Americans understood.  The result was that Turkey’s apparent 
lack of democracy became an issue that the opposition used to attack the Greece-Turkey aid 
program.  Most importantly, Jones states that only the “best-informed experts” knew accurate 
information about the changes occurring in Turkey and understood their implications.  
Naturally, such people were, at that time, few in number.  Even though Jones’s evaluation of 
the Turkish government in 1947 is somewhat optimistic, he summarizes the situation 
realistically, saying that for a person to support aiding Turkey on democratic terms “required 
full information and a certain amount of faith.”54 
In anticipation of retirement from the State Department, Acheson began to withdraw from 
policy-formation activities around the beginning of June 1947.  This step was yet another 
reflection of the strong ethical stance that Acheson displayed towards his work.  Clifford later 
would characterized the months of February-June 1947 as the period when Acheson was “the 
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most important” of the U.S. officials guiding U.S. foreign policy into uncharted territory, and 
near the pinnacle of his prestige.  Concurrently, Acheson was the primary steering factor as 
Turkish-American relations gained new, more complex, and ultimately more challenging 
dimensions.55 
 
2.3.7.  July 1947-December 1948 
 
After returning to civilian life at the beginning of July 1947, Acheson did not disassociate 
himself from the ongoing efforts to inform the public about the Marshall Plan. Instead, during 
the year-and-a-half that Acheson spent away from the State Department in 1947-1948, he 
remained highly active in promoting important foreign policy initiatives, especially those 
related to the Marshall Plan, known officially as the European Recovery Program (ERP).  
Even before the summer of 1947 ended, Acheson had taken on an “operational 
responsibility” in the Citizens’ Committee for the Marshall Plan, a group of outstanding 
figures who lent their voices to the effort to pass the ERP.56 
Acheson’s papers at the Truman Library provide some insight into how he remained 
connected to issues affecting Turkish-American relations even while he was out of the State 
Department.  From these documents the researcher can observe both Acheson’s efforts in 
support of the Marshall Plan and the information to which he had access as a part of that 
endeavor.  This discussion will use a handful of examples in order to illustrate both what 
Acheson did and to what extent the information that Acheson either generated or had access 
to was relevant to U.S. policy towards Turkey. 
In Fall 1947, Acheson became a featured speaker and radio guest in the ongoing public 
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debate concerning the Marshall Plan.  On 14 October 1947, Acheson appeared on ABC (the 
American Broadcasting Company) Radio’s “Town Meeting” program in order to debate 
Henry J. Taylor on the merits of the Marshall Plan.  Max Lerner, a prominent liberal 
Democrat of the time, also appeared.  Henry J.Taylor gave an opposing presentation speech 
which referred specifically to Greece because he had travelled in Greece, but not Turkey.  
Acheson’s presentation against Taylor and for the ERP did not mention Turkey, nor do the 
materials prepared for him for the debate; the question-and-answer session also did not 
include Turkey.  In the same period, Acheson also traveled across the U.S. to provide local 
support for the Marshall Plan.57   
Acheson’s papers at the Truman Library contain many documents that illustrate what 
information Acheson utilized or had access to in regard to his role in the Committee for the 
Marshall Plan.  One inclusion is the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)58 publication 
“Toward Total Peace:  A Liberal Foreign Policy for the United States,” which describes the 
political controversy over the Truman Doctrine as one in which two sides promoted a view 
that served their ends.  The “pro” side needed a political crisis to push through unpopular 
foreign aid; the “con” side needed an issue to energize political opposition to the Truman 
Administration.  The tract continues to explain that the aid package for Greece and Turkey 
was not an innovation in American foreign policy, and states specifically that it continued 
FDR’s ideals.  The tract, to illustrate its perspective, provides FDR’s famous “Quarantine 
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Speech,”59 and asserts that the ideas expounded by FDR in that address applied equally to 
Greece and Turkey in 1947.  Following that, the tract refers to George Kennan’s equally 
famous “Long Telegram” of February 1946 as additional support.60   
Another pamphlet in the same file, called “The Marshall Plan or Else…” does discuss Turkey 
in relation to the Marshall Plan.  The tract’s author, Livingston Hartley, uses precisely the 
approach developed in the State Department in 1946-1947 to argue, on pp. 3-4, that lack of 
support for Turkey (and other regional states) would ensure that Soviet influence increased in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and that U.S. access to Arabian oil might be endangered.  Both 
this tract, and the ADA pamphlet mentioned in the previous paragraph, reflect ideas about the 
Marshall Plan of which the Truman Administration would already have approved, so they 
were probably not so much for Acheson’s reading as to provide examples of the pro-Marshall 
Plan information being provided to the public in late 1947.61 
Another indication of how closely Acheson remained connected to Truman Administration 
efforts to promote the Marshall Plan and its passage through Congress is the letter sent by 
W.W. (Walt Whitman) Rostow to Acheson on 20 February 1948.  At that time, Rostow was 
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in Geneva, Switzerland, acting as an aide to the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe’s 
(UNECE) Executive Secretary; the commission was charged with developing the Marshall 
Plan.  Rostow begins the letter by stating that, because Acheson was “responsible for giving 
this baby a chance to come to life,” Rostow thought that the current circumstances warranted 
Acheson’s using his influence to ensure that the Marshall Plan stayed on course.  Rostow 
foresees two results at that conjuncture, that the Marshall Plan would either be conjoined 
with, and made complementary to, the UNECE’s operations, or the Marshall Plan would be 
used to “break” the UNECE.  For this reason, Rostow opines that a “quiet indication from the 
United States” that the European structure handling the Marshall Plan should not make the 
UNECE or a larger European agreement unworkable would have an important positive effect 
before the upcoming Paris negotiations.  The unstated implication of the letter is that 
Acheson was known to have the connections necessary for such an indication to be secured.                 
Interestingly, the report included with Rostow’s letter mentions Greece only once and Turkey 
not at all.62  
In the spring of 1948, Acheson continued his activities in support of the Marshall Plan.  On 5 
March, the Committee for the Marshall Plan held a Conference for the European Recovery 
Program in order to lobby for the Plan’s passage.  The Conference’s morning session featured 
Acheson chairing a bipartisan meeting of Congressional leaders.  Acheson was obviously 
chosen for this task since he knew most Congress members on a first-name basis and had 
long experience lobbying Congress for various State Department causes.  Acheson was also a 
speaker in the Conference’s Executive Session, which was held in the afternoon after a 
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luncheon speech by Secretary of State Marshall.  However, the Conference’s program gives 
no indication that Turkey was a subject of discussion.63 
Eventually, the conclusion that Turkey was not an important subject of the debate around the 
Marshall Plan in late 1947-early 1948 becomes difficult to escape.  Probably this indicates 
general public acceptance of the need to aid Turkey.  From Acheson’s correspondence with 
various officials, and his own speeches, it also seems clear that the aid to Greece and Turkey, 
while important, was not the most pressing issue of the day.  On 10 March 1948, for example, 
Acheson gave a speech in Philadelphia concerning U.S. foreign policy; in a letter five days 
later, he mentioned to George McGhee that time limitations on the speech had kept him from 
touching on the “Greek-Turkish question,” the result of which was that he “… could only re-
emphasize the basic need and urgency of the European Recovery Plan itself.”  Obviously, if 
the issue of Greek-Turkish aid were more pressing, Acheson would have made time for the 
topic in his speech.64 
The atmosphere in the Committee for the Marshall Plan, of which Acheson was an Executive 
Committee member, also suggested that the issue of aid to Greece and Turkey had receded in 
importance.  The minutes of a Committee for the Marshall Plan Executive Committee 
meeting, held a week after Acheson’s Philadelphia speech, include the comment that 
packaging aid to China, Turkey and Greece in the ERP plan would no longer pose legislative 
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difficulties, and continues to state that Senator Vandenberg was “trying to report a Greek-
Turkish aid bill out next week.”65  This suggests that opposition to the Greece-Turkish aid in 
the Senate had been overcome.  The impression is strengthened by the minutes of a 
subsequent meeting of the same Executive Committee.  One simple sentence near the end 
states that the House had endorsed the Senate’s “China-Greece-Turkey aid bill.”66  The topic 
had become a footnote to the meeting’s discussions.  The ERP program was passed by 
Congress and signed into law by President Truman on 3 April 1948.   
Acheson explains that, near November 1948’s conclusion, President Truman requested a visit 
from Acheson.  Acheson thought nothing of the matter since he had remained in contact with 
the President on other responsibilities that Acheson maintained.  As a result, he was “utterly 
speechless” when Truman asked him to replace George Marshall as Secretary of State.67 
 
2.3.8.  January 1949-January 1953:  Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
 
2.3.8.1.  1949 
 
Upon assuming the position of Secretary of State on 21 January 1949, Acheson’s 
involvement in relations with, and policy towards, Turkey resumed almost as if he had not 
been away for the previous eighteen months.  Because the final agreement for the North 
Atlantic defense arrangement was only two months away, Turkish-American relations were 
of course focused on that topic.   
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In February, Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. Feridun Cemal Erkin called on Acheson’s 
office in the first official conversation between the two after Acheson’s becoming Secretary 
of State.68  At the conversation’s beginning, Erkin stated that the Turkish government had 
decided that, even though a Turkish role in the Atlantic Pact was not possible, it was 
“interested in the possibility of a Mediterranean pact in which Turkey could and should play 
a leading role.”  Erkin continued to explain that Turkey did not want a declaration from the 
North Atlantic Pact participants because it would not add anything to the Anglo-Turkish 
alliance or the Truman Doctrine, and instead possibly weaken Turkey’s position since the 
Pact included countries such as “Luxembourg and Holland.”  Instead, if any declaration were 
included with the Pact announcement, Erkin wanted it to come solely from the U.S. since the 
Turkish government’s real desire was to strengthen its relationship with the U.S.  Turkish 
President İsmet İnönü had apparently raised the issue of high-level military discussions with 
Admiral Richard L. Conolly,69 but they agreed that a political agreement needed to precede 
such talks.  Acheson then remarked that his reading of the NATO Pact negotiations minutes 
made it clear that the countries involved intended no decrease in attention to the security of 
states, such as Turkey, that were not included in the Pact, that the Pact countries intended 
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 The Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 65: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; 
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some sort of declaration to that effect, and that Erkin’s comments clarified his ideas on the 
matter.  Acheson continued to state that the essential hurdle to considering a new regional 
grouping, such as the one broached by Erkin, was Congress; the alternative to NATO had 
been a global security organization, but such a project would elicit great opposition from 
people who would see it as a rival to the U.N.  Acheson explained that even consideration of 
a Mediterranean security group “would complicate things to an impossible extent, especially 
with relation to Congress.”  The result, Acheson went on to say, is that he had to be able, 
while presenting the NATO Pact, to tell Congress that there were no other regional security 
arrangements in development.  Acheson hastily added that none of what he had explained 
precluded further regional security projects, but the issue needed to wait for a more propitious 
moment.  Later, in response to more probing from Ambassador Erkin, Acheson averred that 
at the current juncture, he “…  was simply not able…  to say that we would consider or 
would not consider the creation of a Mediterranean pact,” and asserted that a Turkey-U.S. 
agreement was unnecessary for the USSR to understand that the U.S. would “inevitably 
become involved” in the event of Soviet aggression against any state in Turkey’s region.  
Acheson’s memoirs reflect a slightly different understanding of his Spring 1949 meetings 
with Turkish representatives than the memorandum related in the previous paragraph would 
suggest.  Acheson described Turkish officials as displaying “considerable agitation” over 
their exclusion from the Pact, and that their “painful sense of abandonment” continued until 
Turkey was finally admitted to NATO in 1952.  The statements attributed to Ambassador 
Erkin in the previous memorandum do not seem to indicate agitation since he actually rejects 
Turkish inclusion in the Pact.  On the other hand, Erkin is clearly eager to see a declaration of 
U.S. support for Turkish sovereignty.70 
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Acheson’s worries about Congressional support for the North Atlantic defense organization 
proposal were not exaggerated.  In his memoirs, he notes in detail the efforts he carried out in 
early 1949 to coax votes from reluctant Senators and Representatives, writing that, in 
February alone, he met four times with top-ranking Senators.  Ten days after Acheson’s 
meeting with Ambassador Erkin, on 28 February 1949, Acheson conversed with several 
Senators concerning the North Atlantic mutual defense treaty then nearing completion.  Tom 
Connally, the current Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Arthur 
Vandenberg, the previous Chairman of the same committee, were part of the conversation, 
along with Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.  According to the 
Senators, even the inclusion of Italy in the Pact would create problems in the Senate.  They 
also pointed out that the Pact would cause unspecified difficulties in regard to Greece and 
Turkey.71      
Other issues related to Turkey and the North Atlantic pact occupied Acheson’s time.  An 
important problem was how to reassure the Turkish government and public that, even though 
Turkey was not going to be taken into the new defense organization, the U.S. still remained 
committed to Turkey’s sovereignty and defense.  Ambassador Erkin expressed concern about 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
point that several sentences reported by both sides are nearly identical.  Importantly, what 
both sides reported that Erkin said to the press after the meeting corroborates.  Some other 
details do differ, however.  Erkin generally stresses the close, serious attention that Secretary 
Acheson gave to the Ambassador’s views, including his emotional responses, whereas 
Acheson’s report is marked by normal diplomatic detachment.  Erkin begins his comments by 
explaining the Turkish government’s response to Turkey’s inclusion in the Pact being “not 
possible” (imkânsız), while Acheson’s minutes record Ambassador Erkin as saying that the 
Turkish government had decided it “…  could not appropriately participate in the North 
Atlantic arrangement.”  Erkin’s account also makes clear that Congress, especially the 
Senate, was Acheson’s primary concern; see:  Erkin pp. 49-51.  It should be noted that 
Erkin’s memoirs were composed well after the FRUS documents were made available, but he 
does not seem to have used the FRUS documents while writing or without disclosing the 
reference.  Most likely he was able to utilize the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s archives.  
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that issue in his 17 February conversation with Acheson, and a statement or speech from U.S. 
sources had been proposed as a possible solution.  On 9 March British Ambassador to the 
U.S., Sir Oliver Franks, called on Secretary Acheson.  During the conversation Franks asked 
about a possible special statement concerning British and American interest in Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran; Acheson explained that he would probably give a speech, on or near the 
same date a draft of the NATO charter would be made public, which would emphasize the 
U.S.’ commitment to those countries’ sovereignty.  Secretary Acheson had also discussed this 
speech’s content, as well as whether such a statement should be made at all, with 
Ambassador Erkin in their 17 February conversation, but in terms of a hypothetical statement 
that would reiterate the Pact’s interest in Turkey’s sovereignty.  Ambassador Franks, 
however, brought up the possibility of a signed declaration concerning Greece, Turkey, and 
Iran, which Acheson dismissed with alacrity, saying that “constitutional problems,” i.e. 
Congressional difficulties, would be incited by any such signed statement.72    
That conversation was followed-up on 15 March when Franks brought to Acheson a 
proposed statement on Greece and Turkey from British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin.  
Franks noted that Iran would not be included in Bevin’s speech concerning the NATO Pact 
draft, and that Turkey “in particular” was known to desire a pact, “ratified by the U.S. Senate 
binding the U.S., and Great Britain, to go to war if Turkey should be attacked.”  At the end of 
the conversation, Acheson noted that he had already given Turkish officials assurance that a 
special mention of U.S. concern for Turkish sovereignty would be made upon the release of 
the NATO Charter draft, and that he knew the Turkish side would be “gravely disappointed” 
if such an announcement were not made.  Franks said that he understood that Bevin had 
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provided similar reassurances to Turkish officials.73 
The consummation of the North Atlantic Treaty at the beginning of April 1949 inspired other 
reflections on the important place that Turkey had come to occupy in U.S. foreign policy.  
Three days after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, Secretary Acheson 
and President Truman met with the British and French Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in 
a farewell chat.  During the meeting, the topic of the 1947 decision to aid Greece and Turkey 
came up, which Acheson described as “the turning point.”  Acheson explains that Truman’s 
stance on Turkey, after the Soviets had “threatened” Turkey, signaled “the administration to 
go ahead.”74      
Five days following that conversation, on 12 April 1949, the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Necmeddin (Necmettin) Sadak, as well as Ambassador Erkin, called on Secretary Acheson.  
Erkin states in his memoirs that he specifically counseled Sadak to postpone his trip to the 
U.S. until the situation surrounding the formation of the North Atlantic Pact had settled and 
better consultations with U.S. officials could be obtained.  This advice was ignored and 
Sadak’s journey occurred within a month of the treaty’s signing, for the ostensible purpose of 
Sadak’s joining United Nations General Assembly meetings.  Erkin also indicates that State 
Department officials were not pleased by the timing of Sadak’s visit.  Sadak was 
accompanied by a wordy thank you note from Turkish President İsmet İnönü.75 
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In contrast to the summary that Erkin provided for his initial meeting with Acheson, the 
Turkish Ambassador’s version of Sadak’s one-and-a-half hour conference with the Secretary 
of State is far briefer than the minutes kept by Acheson, which runs to seven pages and 
contains great detail.  The first interesting aspect of the conversation is Sadak’s reference to 
Fall 1948 negotiations in Ankara with the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors, during which Turkish 
officials asked about Turkey’s potential inclusion in the proposed North Atlantic defense 
organization.  Sadak explained that, in response, Turkish officials were told Italy would not 
be included, and that the Turkish government duly informed both the Turkish parliament and 
the Turkish public of the purely geographical nature of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty.  
The understanding was that another organization would be arranged for the Mediterranean.  
Sadak continued to explain that, when it turned out that not only Italy but also the French 
possessions in North Africa would be included amongst the treaty nations, the Turkish 
government’s plans were completely overturned, and the Turkish public felt great confusion 
about whether the Western states were actually concerned with Turkey’s security.  Sadak 
then enumerated some of the “heavy sacrifices” that the Turkish state and people had endured 
since 1945, and closed his opening remarks by asking what he should tell the Turkish 
parliament and people about the U.S. government’s attitudes towards Turkish security 
concerns.   
Secretary Acheson responded by stating that the U.S. government took the issue of Turkish 
security so seriously that he, as Under Secretary of State, had devoted nearly an entire week 
in 1946 to that issue after Moscow’s note proposing Soviet bases in the Straits.  According to 
the Secretary, President Truman had directed Acheson to hold meetings with the Secretaries 
of War and Navy, and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs of Staff.  Those 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
President of Turkey (İnönü) to President Truman,” signed “İsmet İnönü” and dated 31 March 
1949. 
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consultations resulted in agreement that the USSR intended to establish hegemony over 
Turkey, “…  and that this would be contrary to the vital interests of the U.S.”  Furthermore, 
the decision to support Turkey was made knowing that the Soviets may be provoked by the 
action, but the President considered “…  this the most important decision he had made 
subsequent to the bombing of Hiroshima.”76 
Secretary Acheson continued with more brief summaries of recent developments that affected 
Turkish-U.S. ties, mentioning specifically the statement that President Truman released in 
October 1948 in commemoration of the Turkish Independence Day, and the Secretary’s own 
comments concerning the recently signed North Atlantic Pact.  He concluded this explanation 
by saying that he had discussed with President Truman the importance of Turkey to U.S 
interests “a dozen to twenty times,” and that Turkey’s exclusion from the pact in no way 
diminished that reality.  Towards the end of these statements, Acheson’s tone betrays some 
exasperation.  
Despite Acheson’s comments, Sadak continued to press, asking that if Turkey were as 
important to U.S. interests as the Secretary had asserted, then why had Turkey been excluded 
from the Pact?  Would it be possible for the Turkish Foreign Minister to obtain reassurance 
from the Secretary that hypothetical aggression against Turkey would be countered by U.S. 
force?  Acheson replied that the statements provided over the previous several years by both 
the President and the Secretary, past and present military assistance provided by the U.S. to 
Turkey, and the U.S.-funded economic assistance to the entire Eastern Mediterranean should 
be sufficient to convince the Turkish public of U.S. intentions.  Finally, the U.S. would not 
stop examining the international situation in Turkey’s region, but rather continue to pay close 
attention to developments there.   
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To this answer, Sadak again pressed for more specific information:  could the Foreign 
Minister assume that the U.S. would stand with Turkey if Turkey suffered aggression, and 
was it possible that Turkey could be brought into a “…  contractual security arrangement 
with the U.S. in the near future”?  To these inquiries the Secretary replied, first, that the 
Foreign Minister had assessed the situation accurately, but that the Secretary could not make 
commitments for the U.S. government.  Moreover, further security pacts would depend on 
developments in the region, and on Soviet behavior. 
Sadak then made one further query.  The Foreign Minister asked whether steps towards 
bringing Turkey into a security pact with the U.S. might be taken in a short period of time, 
specifically one year.  Secretary Acheson replied that this was extremely unlikely because 
such arrangements needed time for development, and that he did not want to give an 
excessively positive impression to the Minister.  Foreign Minister Sadak, in saying farewell, 
demurred that he “…  ‘might’ be able to render a ‘fairly optimistic’ report” when he returned 
to Ankara.77   
This conversation between Secretary Acheson and Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak is 
important for several reasons.  First is the close attention which Secretary Acheson is clearly 
giving to issues involving Turkey.  Acheson is able to speak in detail, and with full 
comprehension and command of the subject.  Secretary Acheson probably had prepared for 
the meeting by reviewing developments in Turkish-U.S. affairs over the past four years, but 
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his statements reveal a depth of interest and knowledge that cannot have come from a simple 
document review.  Furthermore, even though Acheson does not betray subjective ideas on the 
subject, that U.S. relations with Turkey are of more than just passing importance is clear from 
his statements.  Comparing the importance of the decision to aid Turkey with the importance 
of the decision to use the atomic bomb is not a statement that can be taken lightly.  Acheson 
was obviously serious.  This point is reinforced in the FRUS records, where a footnote 
reveals that Acheson, in a subsequent meeting with other U.S. officials, expressed concern 
about Sadak’s fears and said that he seemed to have been able to assuage some of the Turkish 
minister’s anxieties.  That meeting had ended with a decision that “…  very careful attention 
would have to be paid to the problem of Turkey in all our discussions.”  The implications of 
this statement are not totally clear, but the genuine concern that U.S. officials, and Secretary 
Acheson specifically, felt towards the U.S. relationship with Turkey is apparent.78        
Secretary Acheson would have numerous opportunities to provide that “careful attention” to 
U.S. relations with Turkey over the following four years.  Three days after his encounter with 
Foreign Minister Sadak, Secretary Acheson submitted a report to the National Security 
Council (NSC) in which he recommended against asking the Turkish government for 
permission to build airfields or stockpile aviation fuel in Turkey.  The report explains that, 
even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined that such actions accorded with U.S. 
strategic interests, the potential to provoke more aggressive Soviet behaviors towards Turkey, 
and the lack of U.S. ability to counter those potential behaviors, made U.S. airfields and fuel 
stockpiles in Turkey “unwise” until circumstances changed.79 
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Subsequently, on 19 April 1949, Acheson discussed with President Truman the possible dire 
repercussions (not specified) of cuts in aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran.  The reader receives 
the impression that Acheson was trying to convince the President to not cut those programs.80  
The same day, Secretary Acheson was also called upon by the Colombian Foreign Minister, 
Minister of Defense, and Ambassador to the United States.  The discussion focused on 
Colombia’s various needs for aid, specifically weapons and loans.  When the subject of 
obtaining that aid arose, however, Secretary Acheson explained that previous attempts by the 
Truman Administration to gain approval from Congress for weapons transfers had met with 
failure.  Furthermore, because the U.S. was currently running a deficit, Congress was likely 
to provide aid for only “…  the areas where the pressure is the greatest, that is the Middle 
East (Turkey, Iran, Greece).”  Not only does Acheson state that the Middle East was a focal 
point in the administration’s concerns, he even puts Turkey, Greece, and Iran ahead of 
Western Europe as an area of worry.81 
From the previous three documents, the route that Acheson had to follow in regard to Turkey 
was clearly delineated.  On the one hand, Acheson wanted to preserve, as much as possible, 
the aid that the U.S. already provided to Turkey; on the other hand, he also knew that the U.S. 
ability to support Turkey was in reality severely limited because of the difficulty of obtaining 
funds from Congress.  For this reason, steps that might inspire hostile actions toward Turkey 
by the Soviets had to be avoided. 
Ten days later a communication from Acheson to the U.S. Ankara embassy displayed some 
of the other difficulties that the Department encountered while trying to provide aid to 
Turkey.  This telegram mentions that Ambassador Erkin had requested additional aid under 
the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), but that Organization for European Economic Co-
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operation (OEEC) countries would be unhappy about providing aid to Turkey since it would 
reduce their own share.  Secretary Acheson replied that OEEC would actually be open to the 
Turkish requests, but that Turkish officials needed to formulate acceptable proposals.  More 
specifically, the Turkish side needed to have staff that could “assemble and present [a] 
thoroughly documented case,” and “present sufficient facts in proper form.”82   In other 
words, the issue in this case was not the aid itself but that Turkish proposals were not 
composed correctly and were not supported by the necessary information.  Simply, Turkish 
officials needed to be able to write a convincing proposal.    
A few days later, the trends in State Department policy towards Turkey that had been 
developing for months, if not years, were distilled into a policy statement on Turkey that, 
even if Acheson did not compose, must have been accepted by the Secretary.  The opening 
paragraphs of the text state that the two main policies that the U.S. would follow towards 
Turkey were, first, a “peacetime policy of military and economic assistance” meant to shore 
up Turkish sovereignty and enhance Turkish military power, and second, to further the 
Turkish government’s “determined and successful efforts to achieve a fuller democracy and a 
more productive economy,” which would naturally have the extra salutary effect of 
countering Soviet influence in the region.  The main text of the statement ranges over the 
history and current status of U.S. political and economic policies towards Turkey, Turkey’s 
relations with other states, and then an analysis at the statement’s end.   The concluding 
analysis is interesting for a variety of reasons; it begins by stating that U.S. “moral and 
material” support has buttressed Turkey’s will to resist, and warns that the U.S. “…  should 
therefore be especially vigilant not to allow any situation to arise which might weaken 
Turkeys intention to resist.”  The explanation then, in essence, repeats the concerns that both 
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Ambassador Erkin and Foreign Minister Sadak had expressed to Secretary Acheson in the 
previous months, that the exclusion of Turkey from the North Atlantic defense organization 
gave the impression that the U.S. was no longer interested in Turkish security issues.  The 
report’s conclusion then offers six recommendations to broaden U.S. support for Turkey:  1) 
continued effort to counter Soviet actions against Turkey; 2) further military aid to Turkey; 3) 
consideration for Turkish admission to NATO or another regional security arrangement; 4) 
effort to gain further economic aid for Turkey; 5) use of the Point Four program to provide 
more aid to Turkey; and 6) information efforts to educate the U.S. public about U.S. interests 
and initiatives in Turkey.  As should be clear, the most important article on that list is the 
third.  In that item, the State Department indicates its official support for a security guarantee 
for Turkey, even if advanced at a moment when conditions were not ripe for such a 
proposition to be put to Congress.83   
After the flurry of activity concerning U.S. relations with Turkey in the first half of 1949, the 
State Department was forced to turn its attention to other issues.  Turkey did, at times, cause 
Acheson further concern, and that attention illustrates the care that Secretary Acheson gave to 
the topic.  In late June 1949, for example, Acheson sent an inquiry to the U.S. Ankara 
embassy asking for further information about an Associated Press report, apparently 
excessive, that implied some sort of revolutionary situation in Turkey.  Another telegram sent 
by the Secretary the following day touches on various issues related to the economic aid 
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being offered to Turkey.84 
The other major issue, also related to Turkey, that occupied Acheson in the second half of 
1949 was the Mutual Defense Assistance Act85 legislation.  Acheson devotes several pages to 
this program in his memoirs, and is careful to note the various political and bureaucratic 
trends which gave rise to the initiative.  In essence, the Program was intended to coordinate 
U.S. military aid and give the Executive more flexibility in distributing that aid.  Turkey was 
included in the second category of states that would receive aid under the program, but which 
countries would receive aid was not an object of contention.  Most of Acheson’s narrative 
concerns the great and extended wrestling match between the Administration and Congress 
over the legislation.86 
 
2.3.8.2.  1950 
 
Secretary Acheson began 1950 with a series of press conferences and foreign policy speeches 
starting in February and continuing throughout the spring.  Those speeches were meant to 
explain the Truman Administration’s foreign policies, in the wake of the (then secret) 
National Security Council Report 68 and the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb, against 
the various domestic criticisms that were being raised in opposition.  In his memoirs, 
Acheson states that one of the themes he reiterated during those speeches was the fact that 
some “purists” were demanding that the U.S. deal only with states that they had determined 
to be “true-blue” democracies; naturally, U.S. support for Turkey was the target of such 
critics’ displeasure, and Acheson mentions Turkey specifically in that context.  Acheson 
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points out that such critics were often “curiously hopeful about the Russian future” and, in yet 
another reflection of his lawyerly approach to analysis, labeled such mentalities as 
“escapism” intended to avoid dealing with the facts existing in the world.  Overall, he states 
that the strategic goal of the U.S. was to “diminish further the possibility of war” by 
supporting the non-Soviet bloc economically, militarily, and politically.87 
Possibly because Secretary Acheson had more intensive speaking responsibilities in the first 
half of 1950 in addition to the other pressing political matters, the FRUS series documents for 
that period feature his messages on issues related to Turkey less often than was the case in 
early 1949.  After the outbreak of the Korean War in June, messages relating to Turkish-U.S. 
issues would once again become frequent.  Secretary Acheson’s first 1950 message on 
Turkish issues in the FRUS documents is dated 1 March.  This telegram indicates that some 
discord or misunderstanding had begun to creep into the utilization of the aid provided to 
Turkey under the Mutual Defense Aid Program.  Whether that aid was being implemented by 
Turkish officials seemed to be unclear and an object of disagreement.88 
Concerns and issues related to the deepening relationship between the U.S. and Turkey would 
continue to arise throughout 1950.  On 31 March, Secretary Acheson sent another note to 
Ankara, but this telegram was on an entirely new problem:  heroin.  This message mentions 
that most of the heroin fueling an increase in urban U.S. use is coming from Turkey, and that 
the U.S. administration would like to send an agent from the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics to 
work with Istanbul police on identifying traffickers.89  As is well known, heroin would be a 
thorn in the side of Turkish-American relations until the 1970s, but the problem appeared 
during Acheson’s tenure in the State Department.  Additionally, heroin was a topic that could 
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be added to the general trend then beginning to manifest itself in relations between the two 
countries.  As the connection between the two countries strengthened and interaction became 
more profound, the issues that both sides faced in relation to the other became more 
complicated, detailed, and subject to technical dispute.  Secretary Acheson’s messages also 
reflect that development. 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, a flurry of action would once again envelope 
Turkey-U.S. affairs.  Acheson noted in his memoirs that, after the first week of the crisis had 
passed, and the major decisions that first week entailed, his attention became divided between 
the ongoing conflict and the other concerns that conflict elicited.  In that context he 
specifically refers to the “…  fear of our European allies that our absorption in the desperate 
battle going on in Korea might dilute our attention to their security.”90   
The first major Korea-related event affecting Turkish-U.S. matters would be Turkey’s 
provision of soldiers to support the U.N. effort to counter the North Korean attack.  On 13 
July 1950, less than three weeks after the North Korean offensive began, Secretary Acheson 
discussed the issue of Turkish soldiers with Defense Secretary Louis Johnson in a telephone 
conversation.  Secretary Acheson mentions that the idea of requesting soldiers from several 
governments, including Turkey, had been put to the JCS, and that the JCS were considering 
the matter.  Secretary Acheson, on 19 August, would inform Ambassador Erkin that the U.S. 
had accepted a Turkish offer to send soldiers to fight in Korea.91 
Two weeks after his conversation with Secretary Johnson, Acheson would forward to Ankara 
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one of the most extensive and technically complicated telegrams that he had yet composed on 
issues related to Turkey.  This message also reflected the heightened energy and anxiety of 
the first months after armed conflict began in Korea.  The telegram’s opening lines confirmed 
the concerns forwarded to U.S. authorities by Turkish officials, stating that Turkish national 
defense had to be accorded the highest priority and that the Turkish armed forces needed to 
be reorganized.  The rest of the message focused on various aspects of the main difficulty, 
which was efficient and economical use of the aid being provided to Turkey.  One issue was 
the expansion of the Turkish officer corps and military technicians; another was how Turkish 
officials intended to meet the financial costs of carrying out the reforms; a third was whether 
more economic aid might be provided to Turkey by the ECA.  The telegram ends by 
explaining that, even though the State Department recognized the dual nature (development 
and military) of Turkish needs, the situation that had recently developed (i.e. Korea) would 
mandate greater military expenditures and less development investment.92 
The issue of U.S. military aid to foreign governments became even more pressing after the 
Korean War’s eruption, and Congress, frightened by the conflict’s implications, began to 
respond far more positively to Truman Administration requests to fund U.S. economic and 
military foreign aid.  On 10 August, a group of Congressional members looking for an 
opportunity to harangue Secretary Acheson concerning various aspects of U.S. foreign policy 
attended a meeting with Administration officials in Acheson’s State Department office.  The 
Memorandum on the meeting runs to fourteen pages, but Acheson did not see the meeting as 
important enough to mention in his memoirs.  In the days before that meeting, however, the 
Secretary penned a letter to “Jim” -- apparently Under Secretary James Webb -- which 
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suggested the lines of counterattack that the Department could adopt against assaults on the 
Administration’s foreign policy.  The letter may have been an exercise in developing strategy 
for the 10 August meeting with Congressional members, but he also mentions November, so 
it is possible that it was intended to suggest campaign strategy for the midterm elections later 
that year.  Some of Acheson’s responses to the Senators in the 10 August meeting echo 
concepts he described in the letter; the electoral strategy possibility is supported by his 
statement on the letter’s third page that he would simply write down his ideas and leave their 
“adaptation to the political arena to others.”  The important aspect of the letter is that 
Acheson defends the Administration’s foreign policy record passionately, and mentions 
Turkey several times while defending the policy’s effectiveness.  Acheson’s focus on Turkey 
in order to defend Administration policy illustrates the extent to which Turkey was at the 
forefront of deliberation during his term.93 
A few days after Secretary Acheson returned from his vacation to upstate New York, Turkish 
Ambassador Erkin came to Acheson’s office to renew their conversations on Turkish-
American issues.  The Memorandum of Conversation begins with the note that this was 
Erkin’s first interaction with the State Department since he returned from Ankara.94  Erkin, in 
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his memoirs, explains that he had gone to Ankara at the end of June because of the new 
administration in Turkey; the elections were held on 14 May 1950. The possibility that his 
position as Ambassador to the U.S. would be terminated was clear.95  However, the new 
Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, and the new President, Celal Bayar, wanted Erkin to 
remain as Ambassador to the U.S.  While in Turkey, most of Erkin’s interactions with the 
new administration revolved around the sudden war in Korea and the issue of sending 
Turkish forces there.96   
Acheson’s Memorandum mentions that the meeting took place upon Erkin’s request, and that 
Erkin began by stating two important matters upon which Turkey desired more urgent action, 
the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and Turkey’s need for additional economic aid.  According 
to Acheson’s Memorandum, much of the conversation was taken up by Erkin’s reiteration of 
recent efforts on the part of the Turkish state to gain inclusion to the NAT and greater funds 
from the ECA.  Acheson’s responses seemed formal and cool, and he reminded Ambassador 
Erkin of past U.S. efforts to aid Turkey, adding that the U.S. would be conferring with the 
British and the French governments in September on the issue of Turkey’s admission to the 
NAT.  Overall, Acheson and the other Department representatives that attended the meeting 
politely parried all of Erkin’s inquiries.97 
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Erkin’s memoirs, on this occasion, devote more attention to the meeting, recounting the 
conversation in detail over nearly three pages and differing from Acheson’s Memorandum in 
a variety of ways.  However, Erkin again omits the fact that he requested the meeting, instead 
commenting that the attendance of McGhee and Rountree indicated the importance that the 
meeting carried with the Americans.  Another interesting aspect of Erkin’s account is that the 
issues he says he emphasized to Acheson often depend on what he claims he experienced in 
Turkey only days before.  In the immediately preceding section of his memoir, though, he 
makes literally no mention of the phenomenon -- being bombarded by questions concerning 
whether the U.S. would consummate a security pact with Turkey -- that he relates to 
Acheson.  Moreover, he makes little mention of the economic aspect of his visit.98  
One week after Erkin’s visit, Acheson sent another telegram to the U.S. Ankara embassy 
concerning yet another minor issue that had cropped up over the previous months.  Acheson’s 
message conveys the caution with which the Administration had begun to approach 
communications with the Turkish government in order to prevent misunderstandings.  The 
problem was whether or not the Turkish straits should be mined.  Turkey had asked for 
advice on the matter and Acheson’s response shows extreme concern lest the Turkish side 
misunderstands or over interprets the answer provided by the State Department.  Acheson 
wants also to avoid any U.S. responsibility for the decision.  The conclusion is that Acheson 
wants Turkish officials to make their own decision on, and be responsible for any 
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repercussions of, mining the Straits.99 
On 19 September, Acheson again conversed with Ambassador Erkin, on this occasion in New 
York.  In this case, Acheson had invited Erkin to meet with him, and the purpose was to 
inform Erkin of the North Atlantic Council’s decision concerning whether Turkey should be 
granted member status.  This meeting came ten days after the JCS recommended associate 
status and eventual consideration of full member status for Turkey and Greece.100   The 
Council decided that, at the current juncture, it could only offer Turkey association with 
defense planning for the Mediterranean, and Ambassador Erkin was predictably upset by this 
result.  After Secretary Acheson related the Council’s suggestion, the remaining conversation 
was mostly devoted to Erkin stating how and in what ways the Council’s decision would be 
unfavorably received in Ankara and by the Turkish citizenry, while Acheson tried to assuage 
his feelings, asked him to look on the bright side, and attempted to convince him that the 
USSR would not be encouraged to more aggressive action towards Turkey.  Towards the end 
of the discussion, Acheson urged that “…  the Turks not get nervous like the French and talk 
about commitments,” and reminded Erkin that the proposal was, in actuality, a positive offer 
that the Turkish government should accept.101       
Erkin’s account of the conversation differs significantly from Acheson’s.  Erkin skips over 
Acheson’s prefatory remarks to the heart of the matter, the note verbale that contained the 
Council’s offer.  After reading the note, Erkin told Acheson that, in essence, Turkey was 
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being asked to participate in the Western Mediterranean’s defense, but when a potential 
conflict spread to the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey would be abandoned to its fate 
(kaderine bırakılacak).  For this reason, it was not possible for him to recommend to his 
government acceptance of the offer.  Erkin then describes how Acheson, in a softened voice 
and urging him with his name (Haydi Erkin), asserted that this was a strong start, and that he 
knew that Erkin would not desert him halfway to their journey’s destination.  Following this, 
Acheson took him by the arm (apparently in the Turkish style) and walked him to the door of 
his office.  Convinced, Erkin recommended to the Turkish government that the Council’s 
offer be accepted, and it eventually was.  Several pages later, Erkin relates that he learned, 
from unnamed sources, that in the North Atlantic Council meeting in which the decision to 
grant Turkey only associate status was made, only two Ministers, Acheson and Italy’s Count 
Sforza, defended Turkey’s inclusion.  Erkin is unclear on exactly what Acheson may have 
defended, though.102 
Later in 1950, sensitivity to public statements again caused a wrinkle in Turkish-U.S. 
relations when Omar Bradley published an article in Reader’s Digest aimed at explaining 
U.S. foreign policy to the average American citizen.  Instead, Bradley managed to create a 
stir amongst Turkish military and civilian officials, who wondered whether Bradley’s 
reference to Turkey as a potential local conflict area indicated that Turkey no longer figured 
in U.S. global defense strategy.  Subsequently, alarmed Turkish officers met Bradley for 
clarifications on 14 November, after which Acheson sent a telegram to the U.S. embassy in 
Ankara explaining that the Turkish officers’ fears had been mollified and the various subjects 
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discussed in order to achieve that end.103  Before the end of the year, Secretary Acheson 
would write two more telegrams to the U.S. Ankara embassy on completely different 
subjects, one concerning the influx of Bulgarian Turkish refugees to Turkey and their 
ramifications for Turkey’s economic aid requirements, and another concerning the details of 
the pact that Turkey signed with Britain and France in October 1939.104  In sum, 1950 was a 
year in which Turkish-American relations acquired novel topics and complexities that 
demanded more detailed knowledge and attention from Secretary Acheson, despite the 
several years of attention he had already given to the subject.   
 
2.3.8.3.  1951 
 
1951 would see the culmination of the long process, starting as far back as 1941, which saw 
the Turkish Republic emerge as a strategically important state in U.S. foreign policy’s new 
geopolitical scope, develop through different stages, and result in the accession of Turkey to 
NATO, making Turkey an official military ally of the United States.  Similar to the manner in 
which the British notes of 21 February 1947 provided the crisis that enabled the Truman 
Administration to justify sending large amounts of aid to Greece and Turkey, and then to 
many other countries in Europe, the Korean War would force Congress and the smaller 
NATO nations to confront the steps mandated by the world situation more realistically.  
Acheson would not author as much material on Turkish issues in 1951, but his role again 
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would be key as the main figure who argued with, cajoled, and finally prodded reluctant 
NATO and Congressional members to accede to Turkey’s NATO membership. 
Acheson states in his memoirs that the first half of 1951 was an especially trying period, but 
that naturally referred to the extreme controversies that erupted over the Truman 
Administration’s prosecution of the war in Korea and the dismissal of General MacArthur.  
He also describes a policy review that he initiated in January 1951, eventually resulting in 
agreement from General Marshall (the Secretary of Defense), the JCS, and President Truman, 
that Greek and Turkish defense of the Eastern Mediterranean should be organized through 
NATO.  Ambassador Erkin’s memoirs provide the first example of Acheson’s attention to 
Turkish issues in 1951.  According to Erkin, on 16 February 1951, Acheson told a Senate 
committee that Turkish soldiers had distinguished themselves in Korea, and that the 
Administration had realized the importance of deepening North Atlantic planning cooperation 
and relations with Turkey and Greece.105 
On 27 April 1951 Ambassador Erkin once again traveled to the State Department for talks 
with Secretary Acheson.  Acheson’s Memorandum of Conversation is much longer than 
Erkin’s account, and differences in the two narratives begin with the reason given for the 
meeting. 106   Erkin states that he was called to the State Department by Acheson, but 
Acheson’s notes give the impression that Erkin requested the meeting.  In Acheson’s 
memorandum, Erkin begins by saying that he had come to talk with Acheson because he had 
been called back to Ankara for consultation, and that there were two essential issues that he 
would be asked to clarify.  The first issue brought up was Turkey’s request for a security 
pact.  According to Erkin, “the Turkish people” were feeling increased anxiety concerning 
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the lack of a definite answer, whether positive or negative, to the Turkish request for a mutual 
security agreement. 
Acheson’s response was lengthy and detailed.  The Secretary stressed that the U.S. was well 
aware of Turkey’s security needs, and that both the U.S.’s awareness of the Soviet threat, and 
the service rendered by Turkish forces in Korea, had greatly aided the Turkish case in regard 
to domestic U.S. political opinion.  Acheson went on to elaborate other issues affecting the 
feasibility of a security pact with Turkey (and Greece as a matter of course).  Those factors 
included the stances of the U.S.’s European allies, the attitudes of Egypt and Iran, the tense 
domestic political situation created by President Truman’s dismissal of General Douglas 
MacArthur, and when the atmosphere might be auspicious for “a new policy decision.” 
Erkin then asked Acheson about those diplomatic concerns, specifically the Conference of 
Foreign Ministers and the North Atlantic Council.  The Secretary’s reply made it clear that 
the Conference of Foreign Ministers did not have a strong bearing on the U.S. attitude 
towards the issue of a security arrangement between the U.S. and Turkey; as for the North 
Atlantic Council, Secretary Acheson asserted that he had not personally talked with other 
Council ministers about that issue, and that he did not know the current opinion of the other 
Council governments either. Acheson concluded his response by mentioning that               
“…  conditions had changed significantly since September 1950, when the question of 
Turkey’s inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty was last discussed.”  The Secretary then 
reiterated that many issues need to be analyzed in regard to such a mutual pact, but that the 
situation was not negative. 
The second issue that Erkin inquired about was the problem of financial aid, expressing a 
need for prompt action because of Turkey’s difficult situation.  Secretary Acheson explained 
that the 1952 foreign aid figures would soon be under discussion, but that it was too early to 
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know how much aid would be provided to Turkey.  In general, Acheson’s tone seems 
stressed, as if he is explaining something that has already been explained several times.  
Erkin’s version of the meeting could not be more different and, unlike previous 
conversations, in which Acheson and Erkin’s disagreement on who invited whom for the 
discussion is the most serious distinction, the essence of this particular conversation was 
different in both versions, and presents a serious problem for the researcher.  Erkin asserts 
that Acheson revealed to him at this meeting that the Administration had decided to support 
Greece and Turkey’s full membership in the North Atlantic defense organization.  Moreover, 
according to Erkin, Acheson explained that a pro-Turkey feeling had developed in Congress 
which made the new stance possible, that the Administration had taken the step unilaterally 
and without consulting the other North Atlantic Treaty ministers, and that the news was top 
secret, but would be publicized in two weeks.  Thus, Erkin had permission to tell only the 
Turkish President.  Erkin also presents Acheson’s emotional state as being totally different 
than what Acheson’s Memorandum suggests; in Erkin’s account, Acheson’s behavior is that 
of the happy conspirator, relaying joyful news to a comrade.  In contrast to Acheson’s 
version, Erkin reports that he did not say anything about his trip to Ankara until the end of the 
meeting.107 
The researcher wonders whether Cemal Erkin, writing 30 years after the events he describes, 
may have confused this meeting with a later conversation.  However, the events happening at 
that moment in the Administration leave doubt, because three days after the 27 April meeting, 
Acheson asked President Truman about the issue of a mutual security arrangement for 
Turkey and Greece.  President Truman referred to a paper, presumably the NSC policy 
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proposal that would be circulated ten days later,108 and said that he approved discussion of the 
Greek and Turkish security problem outlined in that paper, asserting his agreement “…  that 
the North Atlantic Treaty organization was the best arrangement into which to bring Greece 
and Turkey.”  The Memorandum comprises what the Secretary told his assistant, Lucius 
Battle, had transpired during the conversation; Battle was apparently not present for the 
conversation.109  
Furthermore, a week after the 30 April Memorandum, Secretary Acheson and President 
Truman discussed Greek and Turkish admission to NATO again.  Acheson noted that if a 
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting did not result from the Paris discussions going on at 
that time, then the U.S. should “…  begin confidential talks with the British and French 
looking toward a proposal to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO,” and urged haste.  In 
response, President Truman referred to their conversation the previous week, stated that he 
had been ruminating on the subject, and told Acheson to continue with the actions he had 
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suggested.110  Consequently, the highest levels of the U.S. government had agreed, by the end 
of April 1951, to bring Turkey into NATO, and it was Acheson who brought this issue to 
President Truman for approval.  Now the challenge would be to convince America’s allies in 
NATO to take the same step.111 
Some allies proved more amenable to, even enthusiastic about, the idea of Turkish and Greek 
admission to NATO than others.  The Italians, for instance, expressed open acceptance in 
their conversations with Secretary Acheson.112  The British, on the other hand, proved more 
difficult, and Acheson, in his memoirs, repeatedly expressed his frustration with Foreign 
Minister Herbert Morrison on a variety of issues.  On 31 July, Secretary Acheson had a 
telephone conversation with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, in which they 
discussed the topic of British intransigence concerning the September 1951 NATO Council 
meeting.  The British were insisting that the Middle East Command (MEC) issue be settled 
before Greece and Turkey’s admission to NATO; Secretary Acheson retorted that “the real 
central point is Greece and Turkey,” because without Turkey an MEC was impossible, and 
Turkey refused to discuss participation in an MEC until being made a full NATO member.  
Consequently, Acheson continued, the only issue the British should be focused on at the 
moment was what kind of offer will be made to Turkey on admission to NATO.  Acheson 
and Lovett concluded the conversation with an agreement to express to the other NATO 
                                                            
110
 Located in the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 69: “Secretary of State File, 1945-
1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “May 1951” folder and dated 7 
May 1951. 
111
 In order to be clear, the discussion that follows of the effort to convince the other NATO 
members to accept Turkey should not be construed as simply Secretary Acheson’s work.  A 
number of other U.S. officials were heavily involved in that effort, but Acheson, as the 
Secretary of State, was the leader of the effort and made the primary decisions on strategy for 
bringing about the desired end. 
112
 See the Memorandums of Conversation between Italian Ambassador Tarchiani and 
Secretary Acheson located in the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 69: “Secretary of 
State File, 1945-1972; Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “May 1951” 
folder and dated 18 May 1951, and in the “June 1951” folder and dated 22 June 1951.  Erkin 
claims that Ambassador Tarchiani told him similar information; see:  Erkin pp. 234-235. 
251 
 
members “firm intentions” towards a decision to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO.113  
Three days later, Secretary Acheson told the ECA’s William Foster that the U.S. delegation’s 
focus at the Ottawa NATO meeting would be to “keep the discussion to Greece and Turkey 
and economic progress” and no other subject would be dwelled upon except in an 
“exploratory” manner.114  By the beginning of September, the British had been convinced to 
soften their position on Greek-Turkish admission to NATO and the formation of an MEC, but 
Danish and Norwegian opposition remained strong.115 
The 1951 Ottawa North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting continued for six days, from 15-20 
September.  In his memoirs, Acheson describes the meeting as possibly the most exhausting 
of the NAC conventions, and explains in a general manner that “after much private 
exhortation” the NAC voted at the conference’s conclusion to invite Greece and Turkey to 
join NATO.116  Examples of that “exhortation” are in the minutes that the delegation took of 
their meetings with their NATO partners.  On 17 September, for example, Secretary Acheson 
spent a great deal of energy trying to soothe small NATO states’ concerns about how Turkish 
forces would be utilized.  In one of the conference’s meetings, Acheson explained that 
Turkish forces would not be scattered, that all Turkish territory would be included in NATO, 
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and that an MEC would also be established that would allow non-NATO regional countries to 
associate themselves with NATO in a flexible manner.  Secretary Acheson then enumerated 
four points concerning Greek-Turkish accession to NATO:  the defense of Greece and 
Turkey would be completely under the control of NATO; NATO would not be involved in 
the defense of other regional countries; other regional countries would not be involved in 
NATO defense arrangements; an MEC would be established for the forces defending Turkey 
and the Middle East area.117  
The next day Secretary Acheson resumed his efforts.  In the continuation of the previous 
day’s discussions, Acheson stated that all the NATO states agreed on the need to “associate” 
Greece and Turkey with the defense of the West.  The problem was how to get a reciprocal 
guarantee from Greece and Turkey.  Acheson explained that simply creating a Mediterranean 
Pact for Greece and Turkey was unwieldy, and taking Greece and Turkey into NATO was a 
much more simple arrangement.118 
Once the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO was secured, the next step was to fit 
Turkey into the command structure.  This required more arm-twisting of various allies.  The 
British, for example, were concerned with protecting their command positions.  Acheson was 
forced, at one point during the Ottawa conference, to soothe British fears about the command 
under which Turkey would be integrated.  British Foreign Secretary Morrison complained to 
Acheson that Turkish officials would only accept the MEC if they were fully integrated in 
SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe), and that the British Cabinet had only assented 
to Turkish NATO accession because of the understanding that Turkey would be in MEC.  
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Acheson tried to allay his concern by saying that the Turkish focus on the MEC was also a 
U.S. priority.  Various controversies over command arrangements in NATO and the proposed 
MEC would go on for many months.119  
Secretary Acheson’s September 1951 efforts affected Turkish-American relations in other 
fundamental ways.  Today, if there is one U.S. Ambassador to Turkey since WWII who is 
remembered as a great friend of the Turkish people, and for working tirelessly to solidify 
Turkish-U.S. relations, that person would be George McGhee.  George McGhee, after 
important posts in the State Department’s Near East and African Affairs Division that made 
him a prime architect of the developing post-WWII Turkey-U.S. alliance, served as U.S. 
Ambassador to Turkey from January 1952 to June 1953.120  On 27 September 1951, a week 
after the NAT Council voted to offer admission to Greece and Turkey, Secretary Acheson 
recommended McGhee to President Truman as outgoing Ambassador George Wadsworth’s 
replacement.  According to Acheson’s Memorandum of Conversation, Truman consented to 
the McGhee appointment if both Acheson and McGhee desired it.121 
On the domestic front, even though the NAT Council had approved Turkish accession to the 
North Atlantic defense organization, Secretary Acheson still had to convince Congress to 
approve the step, since new members of NATO were considered new U.S. military allies.  
Congress adjourned in mid-October 1951, and a few days before adjournment, Secretary 
Acheson inquired with Senate Secretary Leslie Biffle about when Congress looked to adjourn 
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and whether bringing Greece and Turkey’s NATO membership confirmation to the Senate 
before adjournment would be advisable.  During his conversation with Biffle, Acheson stated 
that, under the current conditions, bringing the matter to the Senate would be “unwise,” and 
Biffle concurred, opining that it would be “disturbing.”122  Thus, confirmation of Greece and 
Turkey as NATO allies had to wait until January 1952 and a new Congressional session.  
Interestingly, a week after Acheson decided to not broach the Greece-Turkey confirmation 
issue with the Senate, Ambassador Erkin came to Acheson’s office in order to express 
gratitude from the Turkish government for the U.S. government’s efforts in ensuring Turkish 
accession to NATO.  In that conversation, Secretary Acheson told Ambassador Erkin that, 
due to delays in the legislative processes in other NATO members, Congress had adjourned 
before the State Department was able to send Turkey’s confirmation for approval.  However, 
no difficulties were expected when Congress resumed deliberations in January.  Erkin also 
mentions this meeting in his memoirs and his account is different only in the details.  Erkin 
refers specifically to France and Denmark as the states which had experienced some 
legislative delays, and devotes an entire paragraph to what he and Acheson discussed in 
relation to the situation in the Arab countries, whereas Acheson covered that subject with 
only an adverb clause.123 
Other Turkish officials also expressed their good wishes to Acheson in the months after the 
successful Ottawa NATO meetings.  In November 1951, at the sixth U.N. General Assembly 
meetings in Paris, Secretary Acheson conversed with Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü.  
Köprülü expressed thanks for the U.S.’s “sincere cooperation” in all Turkey-related issues.  
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Acheson replied that cooperation with Turkey was not only important to mutual defense but 
also to the prevention of war, and that Turkey served as a defensive “umbrella” for the entire 
Near East.  The Secretary added that Turkish strength was vital in light of the weakness of the 
region’s other states.124 
Following the Paris U.N. assembly was the Rome NATO Council meeting, and there again 
Acheson discussed mutual issues with Turkish officials.  Because Turkey had been granted 
admission to NATO, but was not yet an official member, a Turkish observer was allowed to 
participate in the proceedings.  The representative that the Turkish government chose to send 
was a former Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, who was at that time 
Ambassador to Italy.  Presumably, Acheson and Baydur were well acquainted from Baydur’s 
term in Washington.   
During the Rome meetings, Ambassador Baydur mentioned to Secretary Acheson that his 
government had received information indicating that the U.K. supported putting Turkish 
forces under the MEC and a British commander, and the U.S. supported splitting Turkish 
forces under a Western command under Eisenhower and an Eastern command connected to 
the MEC and British officer.  Baydur stated that having a political association with NATO 
and having its military forces attached to MEC, with which Turkey had no contractual 
agreement, would be impossible for Turkey because it would create both domestic political 
discord and inspire new diplomatic difficulties with the USSR.  Secretary Acheson attempted 
to reassure Ambassador Baydur by stating that the U.S. was highly attuned to Turkish desires 
to be included in the NATO command structure, and that both the State and Defense 
Departments had “carefully considered” the Turkish aide-memoir on the issue raised by the 
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Ambassador.  Acheson also stressed that the eventual decision on the issue would certainly 
be similar to what the Turkish government desired, and that nothing would be finalized 
without “a complete exchange of views with Turkey.”  Finally, he mentioned that he had not 
understood that U.S. military planners wanted to put Turkish forces under two separate 
commands.  Baydur concluded the conversation by explaining that Turkey was not against 
the MEC concept, but that the correct time to deal with that body would only be after 
Turkey’s political and military responsibilities in NATO were clear.125 
Consequently, as 1951, a turning point in the history of Turkey-U.S relations, came to a 
close, the spectrum of issues that the two states confronted in their mutual relations continued 
to widen and develop unanticipated dimensions.  Other messages from Acheson reflected this 
reality.  In May 1951, Secretary Acheson sent a telegram to the U.S. embassy in Ankara 
featuring minute details of ongoing negotiations and planning concerning Turkish economic 
and military aid programs.  The messsage was not composed by Acheson but it was sent 
under his name, which means that he had read and agreed on its content.  That telegram is the 
most complex and involved message that Acheson had sent concerning Turkish issues.  Later 
in the year, that telegram was followed by other messages concerning continuing negotiations 
on economic aid matters, and again featuring minute details of the issues involved.126  From 
this point on, the U.S. government’s dialogue with the Turkish state would no longer be 
dominated by relatively simple issues such as whether the Turkish Central Bank had enough 
exchange to pay for U.S. imports.  Henceforth, relations between the two states would be 
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close, dominated by intense negotiations and the sensitivities of both sides, and prone to 
misunderstandings and periods of tension stemming from those sensitivities.  Secretary 
Acheson, the single most important U.S. author of, and participant in, the development of 
post-WWII Turkish-American relations, would be involved for one more year as the new 
alliance solidified. 
 
2.3.8.4.  1952 
 
For Secretary Acheson and Turkish-U.S. affairs, 1952 opened as 1951 had closed, 
overshadowed by the continuing discord over the proposed Middle East Command.  At the 
beginning of January Winston Churchill, once again the British Prime Minister, arrived in 
Washington D.C. for negotiations, and the MEC issue was a topic that occupied attention 
since it was connected to the decline of British military power.  During a conversation with 
President Truman and other U.S. officials, including Secretary Acheson, Churchill explained 
that loss of British control in India meant fewer resources for the British military while the 
Suez Canal zone was a burden resting solely on the British.  The U.S. four-power (U.S., 
U.K., France, Turkey) MEC proposal was clearly the best solution so far for the Canal issue, 
he continued, but Turkey would contribute “more wholeheartedly” under Eisenhower than 
under the MEC.  Furthermore, British command of the MEC should not be understood as a 
quid pro quo for concessions on other NATO-related issues.  Secretary Acheson replied that 
the U.S. saw the MEC structure as imperative, and even though Greece and Turkey would 
have to be integrated into NATO before much work on MEC could be finished, he wanted to 
underline the importance the project held for the U.S.  Acheson also mentioned that the U.S. 
no longer thought that the “two hat” approach would work for coordinating MEC-NATO 
command and communication, so the two commands would need to be distinct.  Several 
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other officials then added their observations on the matter.  In sum, the discussions on the 
MEC issue comprised a delicate interplay between the sensitivities of the British and Turkish 
sides against an American view of what the military and strategic necessities were.127 
Soon after Prime Minister Churchill’s visit to Washington, the Lisbon NATO meetings, at 
which Turkey and Greece would formally be admitted to NATO, took place.  The most 
notable aspect of Acheson’s account of the February 1952 Lisbon NAT Council meeting is 
that he makes no mention of Greece and Turkey’s accession to the organization.  This 
omission is interesting because he was one of the main factors, if not the factor, that enabled 
the event to transpire.  On the other hand, the MEC issue and other subjects related to Turkey 
would continue to occupy Secretary Acheson’s time throughout 1952.  One of those, aviation 
fuel stockpiling in Turkey, was an issue that had been put on hold in 1949.  Now that Turkey 
was a NATO member, fuel stockpiling in Turkey was no longer seen as a potentially 
sensitive issue, and Secretary Acheson gave his assent to the move.  Acheson also responded 
favorably to official Turkish inquiries about whether the State Department could help the 
Turkish government contract with U.S. companies in order to develop potential Turkish 
petroleum resources.128 
By mid-year the quagmire surrounding the MEC issue had not lessened.  In June, Secretary 
Acheson went to London both for discussions and to accept an honorary degree from Oxford.  
The day after a Doctorate in Civil Law was conferred upon the Secretary, he once again 
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delved into talks on the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). 129   In discussions 
between U.S. and British officials on proposed changes for MEDO, Secretary Acheson went 
into detail on why the U.S. vision of the NATO-MEDO command structure was preferable.  
Acheson then explained that the U.S. also foresaw a Military Representatives Committee, 
composed of all MEDO participants, to which would be attached a Planning Group (doing 
the organization’s real work) under the command of a U.K. officer who, once the military 
capabilities of the organization were developed, would be the same person as the Supreme 
Allied Commander Middle East.  Acheson continued to state that Turkey would have to be 
included in any such group since Turkey was essential for MEDO’s legitimacy and ability to 
provide six divisions of soldiers, and that MEDO should be established even if no Arab state 
decided to participate.130  
The difficulties with MEDO even followed Secretary Acheson to Hawaii for an August 1952 
ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty Organization) Council meeting.  
Secretary Acheson, in response to questions from Australian and New Zealand officials about 
the viability and aims of MEDO, explained that “great reliance” was being placed on Turkey 
and the U.K. for Eastern Mediterranean defense.131  Despite the great efforts that Acheson 
and many other U.S., U.K., French, and Turkish officials gave to the MEDO project, it was 
doomed to failure when the Democrats were defeated in the 1952 U.S. Presidential election 
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and the Eisenhower Administration chose not to pursue MEDO further. 
As Secretary Acheson’s term in office drew to a close, he continued to give close attention to 
the details of Turkish-U.S. issues.  In late September 1952 Ambassador Erkin once again 
called on Acheson at the State Department, this time to examine the new complexities of an 
old theme, Turkey’s exchange difficulties.  In this discussion, Erkin gave a long exposition of 
Turkey’s current economic situation, the reasons for the current difficulties in meeting their 
European Payments Union (EPU) responsibilities, and the steps the Turkish government had 
taken in attempting to remedy the situation.  Despite everything, and also because of some 
apparent disagreements between the Mutual Security Aid (MSA) administration and the EPU, 
Turkey would need funds in order to meet their September 1952 EPU payments.  Erkin went 
to Secretary Acheson even though he did not have any authority over the MSA; instead, 
Erkin hoped that Acheson’s influence could provoke action from the MSA.132     
Erkin once again included the same conversation in his memoirs, and his account generally 
agrees with Acheson’s Memorandum of Conversation.  There are at least two important 
differences, however.  First, Acheson does not mention the Aide-Mémoire that Erkin brought 
with him, and which is attached to the Memorandum in the archival copy.  Erkin, referring to 
it as a muhtıra, mentions that he gave Acheson the Aide-Mémoire.  Secondly, Erkin explains 
that Acheson was obviously well-prepared for their meeting, and made pointed criticisms of 
how Turkey had utilized some of the previous economic aid provided by the U.S.  In fact, 
Erkin reveals more of Acheson’s criticisms than does Acheson’s Memorandum of 
Conversation, and Erkin especially notes Acheson’s indication that the manner in which the 
Turkish government had used some of Marshall Plan aid could cause problems for the 
Administration in Congress.  As a result, Erkin writes that he did not feel optimistic after the 
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conversation with Acheson.133 
That Acheson took Erkin’s request seriously is evident from the message sent by Henry A. 
Byroade to Secretary Acheson two weeks later.  In that note, Byroade explains the actions 
taken in response to Erkin’s requests, and that the MSA had granted additional aid to Turkey 
in order to cover Turkey’s EPU problem for September 1952.  He also mentions that MSA 
officials, the U.S. Ankara embassy, and Turkish government representatives were working 
together on Turkey’s financial needs for the 1953 fiscal year.134 
 
2.3.9.  Conclusion 
 
In January 1953, Acheson stepped down as Secretary of State and John Foster Dulles took his 
place; thus ended Dean Acheson’s ability to directly shape U.S. policy towards Turkey.  Even 
though Acheson would not remain distant from politics, would advise President Kennedy 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis (partially sparked by the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey), 
and even take on responsibilities concerning the Cyprus situation in the 1960s, he would 
never again have decisive responsibility for the course of Turkish-U.S. relations. 
One other detail deserves comment at the end of this extensive exposition of Acheson’s 
involvement with U.S. policy towards Turkey.  Despite the great attention that Acheson was 
forced to give to U.S. relations with Turkey over a span of six years, in some ways it is 
                                                            
133
 Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl 2. Kısım, pp. 384-386.  On p. 385 Erkin explains Acheson’s 
comments:  “…  Amerikan yardımının ödemeler açığını kapatmakta kullanılması…  
Hükümetin Kongreye izah etmekte aciz kalacağını söyledi” (“…  he said that using the 
American aid to make the payments would be difficult for the Administration to explain to 
Congress” -- author’s translation). 
134
 Truman Library Acheson Papers, Box 71: “Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; 
Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953” in the “September 1952” folder and dated 8 
October 1952.  Though this document was dated 8 October 1952, it was found in the 
“September 1952” folder directly underneath, but not stapled to, the Memorandum of 
Conversation that detailed Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Erkin’s 22 September 1952 
consultation. 
262 
 
difficult to know exactly how well Acheson was informed concerning Turkey.  Amongst all 
of the documents related in the preceding pages, Acheson does not once express a subjective 
opinion concerning Turkey or Turkish issues.  Acheson met many times with Turkish 
officials and engaged in lengthy conversations and negotiations with them.  The Acheson 
Papers in the Truman Library contain lengthy reports on multiple aspects -- economy, 
history, military, politics, society -- related to Turkey, U.S. aid to Turkey, the Greece-Turkey 
aid program, and the Marshall Plan.  These reports, despite being a fountain of information 
on the contemporary Turkish situation, show little sign of being read since no notes or 
markings were written on the original copies.135  On the other hand, because these documents 
were compiled by government officials, it can be assumed that this information represents 
general data about Turkey that the U.S. government possessed and utilized.  Acheson, 
moreover, was known for his work habits, and his approach to any problem was to gain the 
information necessary to make decisions concerning that problem.  In his capacity as 
Secretary of State, Acheson at the least had access to extensive State Department information 
concerning Turkey and could draw upon it when necessary. 
In The Pattern of Responsbility,136 McGeorge Bundy devoted several pages to explaining 
Acheson’s attitude towards the Marshall Plan and Turkey.  Bundy’s book was published in 
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1952 as an attempt to defend Acheson against some of the political rhetoric that was aimed at 
both Acheson’s record as Secretary of State and his character.137  In the other parts of the 
text, Turkey is rarely mentioned, but the six pages that the editor devoted to the Marshall Plan 
provide informative interpretation of Acheson’s ideas concerning Turkey.   
The only conclusion that can be drawn from Bundy’s analysis is that Greece took primary 
importance in both Acheson’s thinking and Bundy’s explanation.  Turkey is always 
mentioned secondary to Greece, and the attention which Acheson and Bundy give to the 
separate nations does not seem derived from simple alphabetical order.  Bundy also gives 
more space to Acheson’s commentary towards Greece.138  Since Bundy relied on Acheson’s 
public statements concerning Turkey, it is also not surprising that Acheson provided no 
subjective statements, and instead explained Turkey only in relation to defending U.S. 
interests. 
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3.0.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 
 We, as a people, have always accepted and encouraged the undeniable right of a 
 people to determine its own political destiny.  It is our own faith and the foundation of 
 our own political freedom.  If this is valid for us, it must be equally valid for other 
 people.  There could be no ‘ifs’ attached to this right, unless we were to backslide 
 on our political creed.  But the real problem, as I saw it in its application to immediate 
 events, was not one of principle.  We accepted the principle of political freedom as 
 our own and believed that it should apply elsewhere as well.  The real problem was 
 that of procedure and method.1 
 
Harry Truman’s words above are an appropriate preface to the final portion of this study for 
several reasons.  Foremost is the fact that the alliance forged between the Turkish Republic 
and the United States after WWII is an example of the ideology that Truman elaborates.  
Even though Machiavelli’s realism, explained in the quote that opens this dissertation, 
continues to be the actuality under which international politics operates, America’s idealism 
concerning certain values has molded decisions its politicians have made.  Whereas the 
Turkish-U.S. alliance certainly was an alliance based on interests, a fundamental feature of 
the era is the fact that U.S. politicians in general, and Dean Acheson in particular, identified 
Turkey as a nation determined to create its own political destiny, and to resist any power 
intending to impose a destiny upon it.2   
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Furthermore, Truman speaks of “procedure and method.”  This study’s Introduction, in 
Section 1.5., offered a quote from Melvyn Leffler’s Preponderance of Power as an example 
of the geopolitical strategy that U.S. planners developed in the years following WWII, and as 
the Administration began to comprehend the Soviet Union as a competitor rather than as a 
cohort. That strategic perspective had many authors, but the Truman Administration was 
responsible for creating the “procedure and method,” i.e. policy, from that geopolitical 
strategy.  Responsibility for conducting the Truman Administration’s Turkish policy, and for 
ensuring that U.S. policy towards Turkey corroborated with the U.S.’ Grand Strategic 
interests, burdened one man, Dean Acheson, more than any other.  As Under Secretary of 
State, and then as Secretary of State, Acheson pursued policies towards the Turkish Republic 
that he saw as being in the fundamental interests of the U.S.  His decisions shaped the process 
that resulted in Turkish accession to NATO and the creation of a formal alliance between the 
two states.  
Acheson’s role in formulating and conducting postwar U.S. policy towards Turkey is also a 
main component of the answers to a set of questions this scholar has been interested in since 
first traveling to the Turkish Republic nearly twenty years ago.  The first of that set is how the 
Turkish-U.S. relationship occurred after WWII.  Obviously, this study does not dwell on the 
Turkish side of the equation, so it is not appropriate to dwell on that aspect here.  For the 
United States, however, it is clear that more went into the calculation than simply defending 
the Northern Tier.  After understanding the answer to the first, largely chronological question, 
curiosity led this researcher to an obvious subsequent problem:  if Turkey was so clearly vital 
to U.S. strategic interests after WWII, then why did so much time, nearly two years, elapse 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
mentions on p. 140 that Congress was focused simply on expenditure, and apparently not 
interested in the justification:  “…  in all of Acheson’s appearances before Congressional 
committees, he was never questioned about the wisdom or even the magnitude of the Greek-
Turkish aid program”; see:  Bundy pp. 139-145. 
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before the U.S. began sending aid to Turkey?  This was the key question for this researcher, 
and the answer has many facets. 
To begin with, the Truman Administration believed it would be able to work with the Soviet 
Union until late 1945.  Until that point, Secretary Byrnes and President Truman thought that 
aiding Turkey would aggravate Stalin and make cooperation more difficult.  In late 1945 the 
Truman Administration began to understand the international situation differently, and even 
tried to get aid to Turkey passed by Congress in January 1946.  At that time the 
Administration did not have the narrative that it needed to convince Congress that aid to 
Turkey was necessary.  Furthermore, the Truman Administration did actually begin to 
provide small amounts of aid through Eximbank loans in early 1946, but Congressional 
resistance -- some of which was based on isolationism, some on financial concerns, some on 
hatred of the Democratic Party, FDR, and the New Deal -- to providing economic and 
military aid abroad remained adamant until 1947. 
Complicating matters for the Truman Administration was the fact that in 1945-1947 U.S. 
public opinion concerning Turkey was either negligible, due to a lack of information about 
the country, or negative.  This made sure that Congress would not feel urgency in providing 
aid to Turkey.  During 1946, however, world events and decisions within the Truman 
Administration began to mold a narrative that the Administration could eventually use in 
order to sell the concept of aiding Turkey to Congress and to the U.S. public.  The British 
withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean in early 1947 provided the crisis, opportunity, 
talking point, and the inflection point (in today’s jargon) that enabled the Administration to 
sell the Greece and Turkey aid package to Congress.  The Administration’s case was strongly 
aided by U.S. military planners, who had slowly built up a body of plans and studies which 
indicated Turkey’s strategic importance to the U.S.  During the entire period from 1945-1947, 
and beyond, military recommendations concerning Turkey would remain useful in 
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convincing bureaucrats and Congress that Turkey deserved attention.  Finally, Dean Acheson 
was at the confluence of most of these factors, and was a key figure bringing the narrative’s 
different strands together into the account that the Administration would utilize to convince 
Congress to pass the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the 1951 Mutual Security Aid 
package, and Turkey’s accession to NATO. 
The points enumerated in the previous two paragraphs also explain the path that brought this 
dissertation’s focus to Dean Acheson.  Despite the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, 
the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey still was not cemented since aid was an 
inherently unstable and short-term remedy for the step that could create a stable, long-term 
partnership, that is, a military alliance.  Only one person, other than President Truman, 
remained in a position that affected directly the development of Turkish-U.S. relations 
throughout the 1945-1953 period.  Even though global security conditions demanded that the 
U.S. form a partnership with Turkey, it is unclear how smoothly that process would have 
unfolded without Dean Acheson. 
 
3.1.  A New Framework for Post-WWII Turkish-U.S. Relations 
 
This dissertation’s first contribution to the literature on Turkish-U.S. relations is a novel 
framework for understanding the different phases that U.S. officials passed through in 1945-
1952 while trying to formulate a response to the emerging Cold War atmosphere and 
Turkey’s role within that situation.  Phase I of this framework continued from March 1945, 
when the USSR informed the Turkish government that they wanted to renegotiate the 
Turkish-Soviet Friendship Agreement, until at least the end of 1945 and further into 1946, but 
no later than August 1946.  This period I will term “Discovery/Identification” and marks the 
period of time in which U.S. officials, both civilian and military, went through a process of 
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realization that Turkey was fundamentally important to U.S. international security objectives.  
This period can possibly be extended back to 1939 and the Turkish-American Mutual Trade 
Agreement signed only months before the outbreak of WWII, but FDR’s declaration in 
November 1941 that Turkey was vital to U.S. interests and then, only days before Japan’s 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Turkey’s inclusion in the Lend-Lease Program, may comprise a more 
definite starting point.  
Phase II of the scheme begins in August 1946 with the Soviet diplomatic note to Turkey, 
Acheson’s initiation and direction of the State Department response, and the famous White 
House meeting in which President Truman gave a lecture on the strategic significance of the 
Eastern Mediterranean.  The main result of this meeting for Turkish-U.S. relations was that 
Turkey finally was declared a strategic interest of the U.S. that needed assistance, despite the 
absence of a violent conflict that would provide a clear rationalization for that aid, by the 
highest levels of the U.S. government.  The JCS memorandum stating Turkey’s importance to 
U.S. security later the same month illustrated that the U.S. military had reached the same 
conclusion.  The following months were spent determining exactly what aid Turkey needed 
and finding a way to provide that aid.  The British note of February 1947 was the trigger that 
enabled the envisioned action to be taken.  Because of the heightened awareness of Turkey’s 
needs, coupled with the overall perception of a growing Soviet threat to U.S. interests, I have 
titled this period “Alarm.” 
Phase III begins with the February-March 1947 process which resulted first in the Truman 
Doctrine and then in General Marshall’s June 1947 announcement of U.S. willingness to 
provide massive economic aid for Europe’s recovery process.  The result of both initiatives 
was unprecedented amounts of U.S. economic, military, and technical aid for Turkey, and the 
subsequent direct contact and interchange between large numbers of Turkish and American 
citizens.  This phase continued throughout the following several years as the European 
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Recovery Plan was joined by the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act, and then both were 
subsumed into the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (submitted to Congress in May 1951).  I have 
termed this period “Action-Aid” because the U.S. government finally found the means to take 
action in order to provide several different kinds of aid to Turkey, but this aid was provided 
outside of the support that Turkish officials desired more than any other, a military alliance 
with a security guarantee.  
Phase IV overlaps with the end of Phase III since the U.S. effort to bring Turkey into the 
North Atlantic Treaty began in mid-1950, but was not realized until the Ottawa NATO 
meeting of September 1951, with formal accession occurring in February 1952.  I refer to this 
final period with the title “Action-Alliance,” as is easily evident to the reader, because the 
U.S. government finally assented to a more fundamental and rooted relationship with Turkey 
through a military alliance.  This phase has, in reality, continued to the present despite the 
tensions and misunderstandings that occurred over the past 60 years. 
In sum, the scheme looks thus: 
Phase I, Discovery/Identification:  (1941) March 1945-August 1946 
Phase II, Alarm:  August 1946-21 February 1947 
Phase III, Action-Aid:  21 February 1947-August 1950/January-April 1951 
Phase IV, Action-Alliance:  Mid-1950/Early 1951-February 1952 
 
3.2.  Dean Acheson and U.S. Policy towards Turkey, 1945-1953 
 
This author’s primary argument is that, in the changes that precipitated each of the initial 
phases in Turkish-U.S. relations, Dean Acheson was not only a figure who played a leading 
role in the second, third, and fourth of the periods outlined in Section 3.1, but he also made 
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the decisions or directed the official processes that inaugurated each of those three phases.  
Others in the military or civilian hierarchy may have developed the basic ideas (although 
those also came from Acheson just as often) that promoted the development of Turkish-U.S. 
relations, but it was clearly Acheson in 1946, 1947, and 1950-1951, who played the key role 
in pushing the development of new dimensions in U.S. policy towards the Turkish Republic.  
As Acting Secretary, and then as Secretary of State, he took public responsibility for those 
decisions and developments.  
Furthermore, Acheson, as a top-level political appointee, was responsible for making 
decisions and taking responsibility for those decisions in a manner that lower-level officials 
in the State Department never were.  The outstanding texts on Turkish-U.S. relations, written 
by authors such as Ekavi Athanassopoulou, George Harris, Bruce Kuniholm, and George C. 
McGhee, have tended to focus on the role that lower-level officials in the State Department 
played.  This is eminently understandable as there was a motivation to understand who 
exactly “discovered” the fact that Turkey would be essential to U.S. security after WWII, and 
who exactly was the key person who pushed for the decisions that resulted in the provision of 
massive amounts of economic, military, and technical aid to Turkey, and eventually the 
formation of a military alliance between the U.S. and Turkey.  Those are interesting and 
enlightening historical issues worthy of examination. 
As an illustration, in McGhee’s text the author lists the figures that he feels were the most 
important actors in the events and decisions that led to the Truman Doctrine.  He asserts that 
President Truman and Secretary Marshall were the most important movers, followed by a 
group that included Acheson as well as Will Clayton and Loy Henderson.  My argument is 
that Acheson, because of the style of leadership that Truman and Marshall utilized, and 
because Acheson’s actions overshadowed those of Clayton and Henderson, was the most 
important.  I also suspect, from the manner in which McGhee wrote his book, that he may 
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have tried to downplay Acheson’s role; while discussing the Truman Doctrine, McGhee 
emphasizes Clayton’s contributions.  My opinion agrees with that of Walter Isaacson, who 
stated that Acheson was the key figure involved in both the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan.  McGhee quotes Isaacson’s book, so he must have been aware of Isaacson’s 
claim, and may in fact be responding to it.  McGhee may also be responding to Joseph Jones:  
Jones, in the chapter on the officials he deems the primary Marshall Plan actors, listed 
Truman, Marshall, and Acheson (in that order) as the main actors while not mentioning 
Henderson at all, and only briefly mentioned a number of other officials like Forrestal, 
Patterson, Harriman, Clayton, and Vandenberg.  Jones does discuss Henderson’s role at other 
points in the book.3 
Even though one or two officials, such as Loy Henderson or George McGhee, may be 
prominent in certain key junctures, they were not the people who made the final decisions.4  
While those individuals’ initiatives were important, and at points may have even been 
sufficient factors, their actions or opinions were usually only one factor amongst the many 
factors that were considered when higher-level officials made the final decisions.  I am 
interested in the reasoning and the personalities of the people who did make those final 
                                                            
3
 Jones, Joseph M.  The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947).  New York:  The Viking 
Press, 1955.  pp. 100-125; McGhee, George. The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East 
Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets.  
London:  The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990.  pp. 26-29.  Kuniholm also stresses the role that 
Henderson played in the development of U.S. policy towards Turkey although, by the early 
1990s, he was forced to give increasing attention to Acheson; see:  Kuniholm, Bruce R.  “Loy 
Henderson, Dean Acheson, and the Origins of the Truman  Doctrine” in Dean Acheson and 
the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy.  Douglas Brinkley, ed London:  The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1993.  pp. 73-108.  
4
 This is all the more important in light of the fact that FDR had already, in late 1941, 
declared Turkey vital to the U.S.’s security and worthy of aid in the form of Lend-Lease.  
Another vital aspect of this issue is that figures such as Loy Henderson attempted, in late 
1945 and early 1946, to assert more career foreign officer influence over State Department 
policy-making.  Acheson describes the struggle over the issue in largely neutral terms, and 
mentions Henderson as one of the main actors; see:  Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 
157-163.  On pp. 162-163, Acheson states that control over foreign policy resided solely in 
the President and the Secretary of State. 
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decisions because those judgments, made in the broader perspective of Grand Strategy and 
interaction with the U.S. domestic political sphere, provided the foundation for the 
relationship between the Turkish Republic and the United States that exists today.  
Understanding their reasoning in 1945-1952 can help us understand the relationship today 
more clearly.  In parallel, understanding Dean Acheson’s reasoning concerning Turkish-U.S. 
issues can enlighten the fundamental issues upon which the relationship was founded. 
The importance of Acheson to the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy towards Turkey in 
the 1945-1953 era makes not only his decisions, but also his personality, important.  That is, 
understanding how Acheson approached foreign policy issues and made decisions can 
enlighten the processes that resulted in Turkey’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in 1952.  At least two of Acheson’s characteristics must be noted.  The first is 
his lawyer’s approach to problem-solving.  Even though previous sections in this study 
explain Acheson’s legal training and the effect this had on his mentality and approach to life, 
Acheson also explicitly stated that this was the case.  Shortly after Acheson assumed the 
Secretary of State position, in an interview with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard N. 
Lange, Acheson explained:  
   Being a lawyer, I have resorted to the techniques with which lawyers are 
 familiar, of having argument before me, of getting various people to present various 
 views very strongly, so far as the limits of my mind. I can't think of things unless 
 somebody argues. I think we have considered all the matters that you brought before 
 us carefully and sympathetically. I came to some conclusions myself and I have talked 
 those over fully with the President, so that what I say I know reflects his views.5 
Consequently, no need to speculate on how deeply Acheson was influenced by his legal 
training actually exists.  Not only did he accept the importance of his legal training to his 
approach to diplomacy, he openly spoke of it in official interviews with foreign dignitaries.  
                                                            
5
 PDF of this Memorandum of Conversation, dated 11 February 1949, downloaded from 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/achesonmemos/index.php on 28 
September 2013. 
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Thus, the influence of Felix Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, and Oliver Wendell Holmes lived 
on in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy under Dean Acheson. 
The second vital personal characteristic that Acheson brought to foreign policy formulation 
was his realist’s approach to diplomacy and power.  Even though Acheson was a life-long 
liberal and devoted to the Democratic Party, Acheson took a different approach to foreign 
policy.  In terms of foreign policy, Acheson was a classic realist, and saw relations between 
states in terms of power dynamics.  As an American, Acheson wanted to promote U.S. ideals 
abroad, but in the end, the response that would protect and further U.S. interests and security 
was the path that Acheson preferred.  This is the mentality that convinced him of Turkey’s 
strategic importance to the U.S.  Acheson, as is exemplified by quotes included above, knew 
that demanding the same idealistic conditions from every government with which the U.S. 
founded relations or supported, was impossible and would not protect U.S. interests.  
Consequently, Acheson chose to support Greece and Turkey with increased aid, but not the 
Chinese nationalists.  Acheson also, fatefully, chose to support the French in Vietnam, even 
though the French presence in Southeast Asia was a colonial remnant distasteful to 
essentially all of the U.S. political classes.    
The essential concept that Acheson focused on was creating what was referred to as 
“situations of strength.”6  The approach is wholly strategic in nature.  Once the Soviet Union 
was identified as expansionist and inherently hostile to the U.S. economic, political, and 
social systems, then the problem became how to prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its 
influence over other societies, with the long term aim of pulling those countries closer to the 
Soviet Union’s example, and eventually to combine the economic and military capacity of 
                                                            
6
 For an extended discussion of Acheson and the concept of “situations of strength,” see:  
Leffler, Melvyn P.  “Negotiating from Strength:  Acheson, the Russians, and American 
Power” in Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy.  Douglas Brinkley, ed 
London:  The  Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993.  pp. 176-210. 
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those societies with the Soviet Union’s.  Here, it must be stressed that this was a multifaceted 
issue that contained not only economic or political questions, but also cultural and social 
aspects; this is why Mao did not remain Moscow’s ally for an extended period of time.   
As U.S. officials evaluated countries on the Soviet Union’s perimeter, they identified that 
some of them were strongly anti-Soviet both in terms of politics and in terms of military 
strength.  Turkey was the prime example of such a country outside of Western Europe.  Other 
countries could be evaluated as pro-Soviet, again both in terms of politics and military 
strength.  Eastern Europe, as the years passed after WWII, fell more and more into that 
identification. 
Eastern Europe, in fact, was the example to U.S. officials of what might happen to a state if 
the Soviet Union was allowed to increase its cultural, economic, military, or political 
influence.  For this reason, they saw the need to build up “situations of strength,” i.e. states 
which were strongly anti-Soviet both in terms of politics and military strength.  Inexorably, 
this logic meant that Turkey must be supported through a variety of aid types, especially 
economic and military aid, in order to cement Turkey’s status as a situation of strength for the 
U.S.  Thus Turkey, along with Greece, was the first state to receive large amounts of U.S. 
military aid after WWII, and would eventually be admitted to NATO despite the various 
protests brought up by several member states.  Those protests were not based on fundamental 
issues, and were eventually overcome through Acheson’s persuasion and the overwhelming 
strategic logic of Turkey’s inclusion in the alliance.7  
 
3.3.  Congress and U.S. Policy towards Turkey, 1945-1952 
 
A logical implication of the previous two sections is the third essential contribution of this 
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 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 419-420, 424-426, 502-506. 
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study:  the main hurdle to founding closer ties between Turkey and the United States after 
WWII was the U.S. Congress and the prevailing political atmosphere in the United States.  
This study explicitly rejects assertions that various other bureaucratic issues or personal 
ambitions, whether of civilian or military officials, were fundamental reasons for the tardy 
nature of the Turkish-U.S. alliance.  In fact by the end of 1945 the highest levels of the U.S. 
government, whether the President, the State Department, or the military, had understood the 
essential desirability of providing economic and military aid to Turkey.  The problem was not 
ignorance, or bureaucratic sluggishness, or lack of official will.  The problem was that the 
ability, in the form of Congressional approval for the financial resources that would make a 
broader economic or military aid program possible, did not exist.  Both Congressional 
personnel and public opinion rendered this a moot point until new world events created a 
more favorable American political atmosphere. 
The official records at several key junctures make explicit the importance that policy-makers 
were forced to concede to Congress.  The often-cited August-September 1945 State 
Department memorandum on the Turkish Straits reveals this problem at an early stage.  
Secretary Byrnes, in that message, supplies a chain of logic:  demilitarization of the Straits is 
possible if we provide a security guarantee to Turkey; a security guarantee to Turkey is only 
possible if we are prepared to back that guarantee with the means to fulfill it; the means to 
fulfill such a guarantee will have to come from Congress.8  By the time Byrnes authored that 
memorandum, the Congressional mood had begun to turn against President Truman and, 
thereafter, only in moments of crisis would President Truman be able to easily push foreign 
aid packages through Congress.  The February 1947 British notes and the Korean War, 
among other foreign dilemmas, provided the situations that made Congress more compliant 
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 FRUS 1945, Vol. 8, pp. 1242-1243, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President 
Truman,” dated 3 September 1945 and signed “J[ames] F. B[yrnes].” 
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towards providing aid to Turkey.     
From time-to-time figures on both the civilian and military sides of the U.S. government did 
try to make fundamental arguments against the provision of aid to Turkey or a military 
alliance with Turkey, but such assertions were uncommon.  Those figures asserted that 
Turkey was not fundamentally important to U.S. strategy or security, or that Turkey was not 
the sort of state to which U.S. aid should be supplied.  By far the most widely cited reason for 
opposition to the development of the U.S. relationship with Turkey, however, was a lack of 
resources stemming from Congressional intransigence or the public’s mood.  This brings up 
the next important dimension of the Truman Administration’s relationship with Congress.  
 Second, stemming directly from the Congressional reality was the importance of the Truman 
Administration’s relations with Congress.  The Administration had to maintain strong 
relations with Congress, and influence public opinion as positively as possible, in order to 
ensure the passage of its desired legislation and budget requests.  The person who most often 
appeared before Congress to defend the Administration’s foreign policy was, naturally, the 
person most directly responsible for formulating that policy, the Secretary of State.  
Consequently, Dean Acheson’s fundamental importance to Turkish-U.S. relations hinged not 
only on his awareness of Turkish importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategy, and the 
decisions that he made in order to implement the course that he, with President Truman’s 
consent, had chosen.  Acheson also was the person who went in front of Congress, and into 
the public eye, in order to explain what the Truman Administration’s foreign policy was, and 
the rationale for its actions in regard to foreign countries.  That is, Acheson was responsible 
to the public and to Congress for U.S. foreign policy, and specifically for U.S. policy towards 
Turkey, in a manner that no other official was, especially during Acheson’s term as Secretary 
of State.  This was true even in 1945-1947 when Acheson spent much of that period as 
Acting Secretary.  
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Acheson, in his memoirs, emphasized the interaction between the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the U.S. government, and devoted great attention to explaining his relations with 
Congress, and the importance of Congress to the success of his policies.  Throughout Present 
at the Creation, Acheson frequently returns to the topics of his relations with Congress in 
general, with specific members of Congress, and the impact of local politics on 
Congressional voting behavior.  At one point, Acheson devotes several pages solely to 
explaining Congress’s role in policy-making, and his own relations with the institution.  His 
conclusions can be succinctly summarized in two points.  First, Acheson emphasizes that, for 
Congress, politics is a domestic endeavor.  Because the Secretary of State is inherently 
concerned with foreign policy, most Congressional members see the State Department as 
dealing with superfluous issues.  When a foreign policy issue does impinge on local U.S. 
politics, usually it is understood in a negative light.  The implications of the first point 
provide the second point, that the interests and perspectives of the U.S. federal government’s 
Executive and Legislative branches are in fundamental conflict in regard to foreign policy 
issues.  Acheson emphasizes that this is a natural, planned aspect of the U.S. political system, 
but it also means that the Executive branch, while devising and carrying out foreign policy, 
can encounter hurdles and attitudes of the most implacable sort, based on mentalities sourced 
in local politics and sectional interests.  Thus, U.S. foreign policy truly becomes, as Bismarck 
suggested, “the art of the possible.”9 
Other authors express an evaluation of Congress’s relationship to foreign policy that closely 
follows Acheson’s sentiments.  Dougles Southall Freeman, writing in the Introduction to 
McGeorge Bundy’s analysis of Acheson’s record as Secretary of State, asserted: 
  Co-operation with Congress may be…  more difficult for the Secretary of 
 State than for the head of any other Department….  In the Senate, not more than two 
 or three members usually profess any specialized knowledge of such a matter as oil 
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 production, flood control, or the like, but nearly always there are at least twenty who 
 consider themselves experts on foreign affairs.  Senator William E. Borah, ambitious 
 to run the State Department from the floor of Congress, has had many successors in 
 spirit.10 
Of course, one could argue that nothing else would be expected from a book authored by a 
State Department veteran, but historians provide similar perspectives.  One of the eminent 
authorities on the early Cold War era, historian Melvyn Leffler, also points to the importance 
of the Truman Administration’s relations with Congress.  Throughout A Preponderance of 
Power, Leffler refers to the difficulties that the Truman Administration experienced with 
Congress.  In the text’s conclusion, while summarizing the difficulties that the Truman 
Administration faced in formulating policy, Leffler mentions specifically the parochial 
concerns of Congress members and their unwillingness to approve foreign aid.11 
At least one doctoral thesis has also been authored on the subject of Congress and the early 
Cold War era.  That study not only expresses clearly how powerful Congress was during 
1946-1948, but takes the interpretation further to suggest that Congress, at certain points, 
even led U.S. foreign policy.  The author also emphasizes the power and influence Arthur 
Vandenberg had over foreign policy issues, and mentions that foreign leaders eventually 
understood and tried to work with the influence that Congress had over U.S. foreign policy.12 
Turkey was one of those foreign states that had to learn how to interact with Congress and its 
control over the U.S. government’s financial resources.  Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. 
Feridun Cemal Erkin understood the importance Congress held for U.S. policy towards 
Turkey, and he devotes much space in his memoirs to explaining his lobbying efforts with 
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Congress.  Numerous times during the two volumes, Erkin reflects on which Congressional 
members he was able to establish positive relations with, those who did not view Turkey as 
favorably, and the results of the interplay between the pro- and anti-Turkish politicians.13 
However, equally clear is the fact that most analyses of Turkish-U.S. relations do not devote 
a great deal of attention to the issue of Congressional influence on U.S. policy towards 
Turkey.  Even in the most important texts written on the subject, such as Athanassopoulou’s 
Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, Kuniholm’s The Origins of the Cold War in the 
Near East, and McGhee’s The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, little attention, if 
any, is given to the role that Congress and U.S. public opinion played in controlling what the 
U.S. government’s Executive could and could not do in terms of policy in the years following 
WWII.   
Furthermore, the main works written on the topic of Turkish accession to NATO 
(Athanassopoulou, Harris, McGhee) stress the difference between the U.S. aid given to 
Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and then under the Marshall Plan, and the act of giving 
Turkey a security guarantee in the form of a formal military alliance.  Those authors argue 
that the U.S. favored the aid but did not favor the alliance until 1951.    However, James 
Byrnes referred to a security guarantee for Turkey in September 1945.  In a State Department 
policy recommendation dated 5 May 1949, hidden at the end of the report and in a very short 
sentence, is the recommendation that Turkish accession to NATO be considered.14  When 
McGhee does refer to Congress in his book, the Congressional mood’s importance to policy 
is clear:  the last interesting episode in McGhee’s book is his accounts of the meetings with 
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high-level Turkish officials held in the months after he became U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.  
In the narrative of his discussion with Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, Turkish Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes, and Foreign Ministry General Secretary Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, 
McGhee says that he explained the “tremendous pressure” on Congress to decrease 
expenditures.  He also emphasized that, under the circumstances, Turkish aid amounts had 
been comparatively large.15   
Thus, at the risk of excessive repetition, that the Truman Administration early saw the need to 
provide aid to Turkey, and even pursue a military alliance with Turkey, but knew that the 
atmosphere in Congress made this unrealistic, is essential to understanding how U.S. 
relations with Turkey developed after WWII.  Only following the outbreak of the Korean 
War and increased Congressional acquiescence to the Administration’s foreign policy ideas 
and plans did the alliance with Turkey become something that could be realistically 
suggested to Congress.  In the end, Secretary Acheson still waited until early-1951 to take 
strong steps towards making Turkish admission to NATO State Department policy.  
For many years there has been a strong Turkish caucus in Congress, and attention to issues 
affecting Turkey in Congress has grown since the 1980s.  However, in analyses of the 
Turkish-U.S. alliance after WWII, Congress is neglected, to the detriment of our 
understanding of what actors and interests went into the foundation of that relationship.  
President Truman did not have the luxury of making the same mistake.  His main worry was 
Congress itself, and in maintaining relations with Congress that would enable him to achieve 
as much of his domestic agenda as possible.  Logic dictated that, even though foreign policy 
was supposedly carried out in a spirit of bipartisanship with Congress, President Truman had 
to tread lightly when needed and pick his fights carefully.   
                                                            
15
 McGhee pp. 105-107. 
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Generally, the other texts on Turkish-U.S. relations provide explanations that focus on the 
actions of individuals.  This study, by focusing on Dean Acheson, presents a similar focus, 
but one that attempts to place Acheson within the wider political and social trends of the 
time.  That also explains this study’s emphasis on Congress, since Congress reflects the larger 
political and social trends in the U.S.  The individual views of U.S. officials, whether pro- or 
anti-Turkey, were unlikely to have determining influence over U.S. policy towards Turkey 
unless the individual was a key decision-maker. Moreover, that lower-level officials did not 
see the same overall picture as higher-level officials is suggested by McGhee’s account of the 
November 1949 Middle East Chiefs of Mission Conference, which published a conclusion 
contradicting the spirit of the May 1949 State Department policy statement concerning 
Turkey:  “We see no present need for U.S. association with any regional military or mutual 
defense pacts to assure greater protection against aggression.”  This statement turns attention 
to the intentions and opinions of higher-level State Department officials such as Secretary 
Acheson, since the May policy statement had his approval, whereas the report from the 
November Middle East Chiefs Conference did not need higher approval.16  After explaining 
his role in the February 1951 Middle East Chiefs of Staff Conference, in securing U.S. 
military representation at that conference, and in arguing for the extension of a security 
guarantee to Turkey, McGhee notes that it was Secretary Acheson who took the conference’s 
recommendations to Defense Secretary Marshall, and then to President Truman.17 
In late 1950, the JCS also stated that Turkish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty should be 
considered at the appropriate time; this is not, in substance, different than what Acheson had 
been telling Erkin since early 1949.  Both Acheson and McGhee stressed the fact that NATO 
did not have the military wherewithal to protect even those countries that were already in the 
                                                            
16
 McGhee p. 60-62, 66-67.  Quote from p. 67. 
17
 McGhee pp. 78-85.  
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organization, and that the question of Turkish admission needed to wait until that ability 
existed.  Naturally, the primary reason that such abilities did not exist, on the American side, 
was the reluctance of Congress to increase foreign aid and defense spending; only the 
outbreak of the Korean War changed Congressional attitudes.18  
Even after the Korean War’s start, the Administration did not feel sure of potential 
Congressional responses to proposals on Greek-Turkish issues.  In 1951 the issue of Greece 
and Turkey’s admission to NATO was raised, and the Truman Administration once again felt 
compelled to defend the concept.  Secretary of State Acheson and the State Department 
provided off-the-record conferences to important U.S figures in order to inform and convince 
those figures that U.S. foreign policy was heading in the right direction.  A January 1951 
memorandum details the topics of one such meeting, including recommendations on topics 
for Acheson’s speech (taken from a similar speech given a month before); another 
memorandum contains a newspaper clipping from a columnist for the Detroit News who had 
discussed the Greece and Turkey problem in terms amenable to the administration’s views, 
i.e. supporting the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, and details the arrangements for 
the Secretary’s luncheon with representatives from the Detroit-area press.19  Finally, Turkey’s 
admission to NATO, granted at the September 1951 Ottawa NATO conference, was not even 
sufficient to ensure friendly Congressional treatment since Acheson did not want to disturb 
Congress with the issue until after it reconvened in January 1952.   
 
 
                                                            
18
 FRUS 1950 Vol. 5, pp. 1306-1309, “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Secretary of Defense (Johnson),” signed “A.C. Davis” and dated 9 September 1950;  p. 1315, 
“Editorial Note.” 
19
 These memoranda are located in the Truman Library’s Acheson Papers, Box 58:  
“Secretary of State File, 1945-1972; General Correspondence File, 1945-1953,” in a folder 
titled “Correspondence Regarding Speaking Engagements: 1951-1952.” 
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3.4.  The U.S. Political Left and Turkey 
 
Finally, these observations suggest an answer for a question that has long perplexed this 
scholar.  Throughout the Cold War, and not simply a cumulative effect of the Cyprus 
intervention, the release of Midnight Express, and the 1980 Turkish military coup, U.S. 
liberals and progressives maintained an overall negative opinion of Turkey, of the Turkish 
state, and of U.S. aid for that state.  Part of that distaste must be found in the Cold War’s 
partisan politics:  the U.S. government was opposed to the USSR, and U.S. progressives and 
leftists, across an entire spectrum of differences in beliefs, argued that a different approach, 
more conciliatory than containment or rollback, needed to be followed in dealing with the 
world’s other Great Power.  Because the Turkish Republic was allied with the U.S. 
government in resisting the USSR, some U.S. leftists harbored a dislike for Turkey as a state 
and as a country beginning in 1947 at the latest. 
Naturally, there were other issues that U.S. progressives and liberals could refer to in support 
of their attitude.  Turkish conflict with the Greeks, the 1915 deportations and massacres of 
Ottoman Armenians, the Turkish stance towards Cyprus and the 1974 Turkish invasion of 
that island, and the Turkish state’s reputation for human rights violations all contributed to 
this phenomenon at one time or another.  Before the 1945-1953 period, the Armenian and 
Greek issues were known or understood by only a minute fragment of the U.S. population, 
and were more salient in the 1920s and 1930s, so those issues cannot have accounted for the 
much wider anti-Turkish feeling that developed amongst the U.S. left during the Cold War.  
Thus, the Cyprus and human rights issues were simply phenomena that reinforced a 
previously formulated impression.  This is why the 1945-1953 period is key:  a much wider 
segment of the U.S. left was introduced to Turkey, with the negative interpretation supplied 
by Henry Wallace (and others around him), in a highly charged ideological atmosphere, and 
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with results that left many embittered and disillusioned but unwilling to renounce 
interpretations they had absorbed from the Wallace crusade or other contemporary 
progressive or leftist sources.  That is, the essence of the issue was idealism and politics, and 
the Turkish state appeared to support a project that left-wing U.S. liberals, progressives, and 
militants disagreed with.   
This author’s theory is that this negative perception of Turkey, constructed in the agitated 
ideological environment of the late 1940s and early 1950s, was perpetuated as the actors in 
those years’ public policy battles exited politics and entered academia or the media.  As they 
expressed their political interpretation in the following years and decades, they also reiterated 
and reinforced the negative understanding of Turkey’s role in the Cold War.  Another way to 
express this, in contemporary argot, would be that the anti-Turkish meme in U.S. society was 
formulated in the post-WWII political atmosphere and continued its low-level existence at 
least through the end of the Cold War.20  Data to lend empirical support to this hypothesis 
may be obtained through evaluation of the material concerning Turkey published in 
periodicals such as the Nation, the New Republic, the Progressive, the Daily Worker (and its 
descendents), and others.  For academia, the data would be more difficult to obtain since 
Turkey is a topic about which very few U.S. academicians have written.  As noted above in 
Chapter One, most of those in U.S. academia who wrote about Turkey in the past 65 years 
did so in order to promote that country against a perceived adverse conception.  This 
dissertation provides an explanation for why that anti-Turkey sentiment existed.   
                                                            
20
 This is not to suggest that nothing happened during the Cold War to reinforce the negative 
impression of Turkey.  Just the opposite, after the highly positive developments in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the Turkish state and military did much to cripple their image 
internationally during the Cold War:  three coups, the 6-7 September pogroms in 1955, the 
forced emigration of most of the remaining Greek population in the early 1960s, and the 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974 all left lasting black marks on international evaluation of the 
Turkish state and of Turkish society.  However, those events by themselves do not provide a 
persuasive explanation for an overall attitude held amongst people with a certain political 
leaning, especially when one notes the long time span that those events occurred within. 
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However, because a negative perception of Turkey was a political attitude rather than a 
widespread subject of academic discussion and writing, the amount of proof that exists, or 
might be obtained, for the hypothesis is doubtful, although a recent study on U.S. policy 
towards the Eastern Mediterranean touches on similar issues.  Matthew Jacobs explains that 
there were two ahistorical assumptions that dominated U.S. thinking about the Eastern 
Mediterranean in the 19th and early 20th Centuries.  The first tendency was to project ideal 
religious, political, and social visions, whether from the past or of the future, onto the Eastern 
Mediterranean; those visions were fundamentally American in content.  The second was to 
understand those envisioned Eastern Mediterranean societies as unchanging, rendering the 
local societies incapable of transformation, and requiring American intervention to effect 
change.  To this researcher, Dean Acheson’s pragmatism and realism appears as a step 
towards overcoming the assumptions described by Jacobs.  The late 1940s U.S. left, 
following Wallace’s interpretation, used the already present negative conception of Turkey as 
backwards and despotic, the first tendency described by Jacobs, in order to argue against 
helping Turkey, while academic and political writers of the same era turned to the second 
tendency Jacobs mentions in order to superficially promote cooperation with Turkey.  The 
process of overcoming these assumptions continues today.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
21
 Jacobs pp. 20-21.  See also:  Jacobs, Matthew F.  “The Perils and Promise of Islam: The 
United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War.”  Diplomatic History.  Sep. 
2006, Vol. 30 Issue 4.  pp. 705-739. 
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3.5.  Conclusion 
 
  The only state strong enough to furnish the leadership in this effort was the 
 United States.  Both its government and its people responded vigorously to the press 
 of necessity. The steps which were taken are well known and need not be recalled 
 here. The important thing is that they were successful in bringing about a common 
 sense of purpose, certainly in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and to a 
 large extent were effective in giving opportunity to those nations in Asia and Africa 
 which were just coming to the point where they were free to pursue their national 
 destinies undirected from the outside. 
  Since the war, therefore, the foreign policy of the United States has become, 
 by necessity a positive and activist one. It has been one of attempting to draw 
 together, through various groupings, that Western area which must be the center of a 
 free and open world system, and of taking the leading part in providing it with 
 military security, and with a developing economy in which trade could grow and 
 industrial productivity could be developed, both in areas which were already 
 industrially advanced and those which were at the threshold. At the same time it was 
 an essential part of this policy to produce the maximum degree of cohesion 
 throughout the whole  non-Communist area, through political policies which would 
 make for integration and strength rather than for exploitation.  
  Various aspects of this effort—the military, the economic, the political—I 
 have attempted to describe in some detail elsewhere. I have there pointed out the 
 interdependence of the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe; how the power 
 factors involved make it essential that this part of the world shall stand firmly 
 united; how, without the American connection, it is impossible to maintain 
 independent national life in Western Europe; and how, without Western Europe, the 
 power factors would turn disastrously against the United States. 
  Broadly speaking, these conceptions have for the past decade or more had 
 wide acceptance both in this country and throughout the Western world. They have 
 been successful beyond the dream of those who first advocated them. They are 
 beginning to bear the most valuable fruit.22 
 
Dean Acheson’s words provide a germane preface to this dissertation’s final section.  
Acheson is this study’s main focus, but the vision expressed by Acheson’s words, which 
implicitly included Turkey since, in 1945, Turkey was clearly a country which had only 
recently won the right to be “free to pursue [its] national destin[y] undirected from the 
outside,” is striking.  Acheson understood the value that Turkish people, as well as many 
others, saw in the right to national determination.   
                                                            
22
 Acheson, Dean.  “The Illusion of Disengagement.”  Foreign Affairs.  Vol. 36, No. 3.  April 
1958.  pp. 372-373. 
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Most importantly, however, is what Acheson suggests in the quote’s last sentence, that the 
postwar efforts to create a better, more peaceful, and more prosperous world system had 
begun “to bear fruit” in Western Europe.  Acheson refers specifically to Western Europe in 
that paragraph, but his description in the previous paragraphs had also mentioned societies 
outside of Western Europe that benefitted from America’s efforts.  When Acheson wrote that 
article, Turkey may not have seemed the best example to offer in support of his assertion.  
Important changes were occurring in Turkish society nonetheless, and support from the 
United States, even though not the sole factor in those changes, was a fundamental 
facilitating factor. 
What should be noted is that the importance of Turkey as a situation of strength has not 
waned since the conclusion of the Cold War.  Turkey’s military importance to NATO and its 
situation in the nexus of Southeast Europe, Southwest Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
Northeast Africa is overt and needs no elaboration.  As countries in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe have, since the Cold War’s conclusion, been broken off one-by-one from the Russian 
orbit, as Arab states and the Horn of Africa have been wracked by internal political disorder, 
as Iraq and Afghanistan have been subjected to U.S. or NATO occupation, Turkey’s steadfast 
NATO member status has provided a regional island of stability.           
Turkey’s function as a situation of strength extends beyond the political and military 
dimensions.  Turkey is also a strengthening democracy that is in the last stages of 
industrialization and state formation.  Turkey’s increasing life standards, growing economy, 
cultural influence, developing tolerance for internal ethnic, religious, and social minorities, 
and expanding infrastructural and technical capacity in a variety of sectors (business, energy, 
government, manufacturing, transportation) all project an example to other regional and 
developing societies that has part of its roots in the alliance formed with the U.S. after WWII.  
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In this way, Turkey can be defined as not only a military or political situation of strength, but 
also as a cultural, economic, industrial, social, and technological situation of strength.  As 
such, Turkey’s strategic importance to the U.S., to Europe, and to NATO will not decrease in 
the foreseeable future.     
In short, Dean Acheson’s efforts in the years after WWII to convince U.S. officials, 
politicians, and society that Turkey was a country worthy of U.S. economic, military, and 
technical aid are, as he suggested so long ago, coming to fruition.  Naturally, the U.S. 
deserves only part of the accolades for the development.  Turkish people and politicians are 
the ones who have grasped that opportunity to make positive, progressive steps towards a 
more democratic and more prosperous future. 
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